

J. STALIN  
WORKS

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WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

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OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY  
OF THE SOVIET UNION  
(BOLSHEVIKS)

*Пролетарии всех стран, соединяйтесь!*

**ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСА—ЭНГЕЛЬСА—ЛЕНИНА при ЦК ВКП(б)**

**И.В. СТАЛИН**

**СОЧИНЕНИЯ**



**О Г И З**

**ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЛИТЕРАТУРЫ**

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# J. V. STALIN

WORKS

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## PREFACE

The Eleventh Volume of the *Works* of J. V. Stalin contains writings and speeches of the period January 1928 to March 1929.

In this period, on the basis of the successes achieved in the socialist industrialisation of the country, the Bolshevik Party worked intensively to prepare the way for the transition of the labouring masses of the peasantry from individual economy to collective-farm socialist economy. Consistently steering a course towards the collectivisation of agriculture, as decided at the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), the Party worked to create all the necessary conditions for a mass influx of the peasants into the collective farms.

When the Party passed over to the offensive against the kulaks, the hostile Bukharin-Rykov group of Right capitulators threw off the mask and came out openly against the Party's policy.

In the letter "To the Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee," in the speeches on "The Right Danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.)," *Industrialisation of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)* and "Bukharin's Group and the Right Deviation

in Our Party," in the article "They Have Sunk to the Depths" and in other works, J. V. Stalin reveals the counter-revolutionary kulak nature of the Right deviation, exposes the subversive activities of the Right capitalists and of the Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet organisation, and points to the necessity of waging a relentless fight on two fronts, while concentrating fire on the Right deviation.

In the reports on *The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and Results of the July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)*, in the talk "On the Grain Front," the speeches on "Industrialisation and the Grain Problem" and "On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms," the speech at the Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League and the speech on "Grain Procurements and the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture," in the article "Lenin and the Question of the Alliance with the Middle Peasant" and in other works, J. V. Stalin defines the principal ways and means of solving the grain problem, building collective farms and state farms and strengthening the bond between town and country. In these works he demonstrates the necessity for a rapid rate of development of industry, as the basis for socialism and the defence of the country and sets the task of training new cadres from the ranks of the working class capable of mastering science and technology. J. V. Stalin stresses the vital necessity for the utmost development of criticism and self-criticism as the Bolshevik method of educating cadres, as the motive force of the development of Soviet society.

J. V. Stalin's work *The National Question and Leninism* published here for the first time, is devoted to further development of Marxist-Leninist theory and substantiation of the Bolshevik Party's policy on the national question. In this work J. V. Stalin advances the thesis of new, socialist nations, which have been formed first of all in the Soviet Union, brings out the fundamental difference between bourgeois nations and socialist nations, and stresses the solidarity and viability of the socialist nations.

This volume contains J. V. Stalin's well-known speech on *Three Distinctive Features of the Red Army*, which reveals the sources of the Red Army's strength and might and outlines the ways and means of further strengthening it.

Questions of the international revolutionary movement and the tasks of the fraternal Communist Parties are dealt with in the report on *Results of the July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)* and in the speeches on "The Programme of the Comintern" and *The Right Danger in the German Communist Party*. J. V. Stalin stresses the international significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution and of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. He explains that the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the Soviet state is an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution in all countries.

In this volume the following fourteen works of J. V. Stalin are published for the first time: "Grain Procurements and the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture"; "First Results of the Procurement Campaign and the Further Tasks of the Party"; "To the

Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee"; "The Programme of the Comintern"; "Industrialisation and the Grain Problem"; "On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms"; "Letter to Comrade Kuibyshev"; "Reply to Comrade Sh."; "Reply to Kushtysev"; "They Have Sunk to the Depths"; "Bukharin's Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party"; "Reply to Bill-Belotserkovsky"; "Telegram to . . . Proskurov"; The National Question and Leninism.

*Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute  
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)*

***1928-MARCH 1929***







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## GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE

*From Statements Made in Various Parts  
of Siberia in January 1928<sup>1</sup>  
(Brief Record)*

I have been sent to you here in Siberia for a short visit. I have been instructed to help you to fulfil the plan for grain procurements. I have also been instructed to discuss with you the prospects for the development of agriculture, the plan for developing the formation of collective farms and state farms in your territory.

You are no doubt aware that this year our country's grain accounts show a shortage, a deficit, of more than 100,000,000 poods. Because of this the Government and the Central Committee have had to tighten up grain procurements in all regions and territories so as to cover this deficit in our grain accounts. The deficit will have to be met primarily by the regions and territories with good harvests, which will have not only to fulfil, but to overfulfil the plan for grain procurements.

You know, of course, what the effect of the deficit may be if it is not made good. The effect will be that our towns and industrial centres, as well as our Red Army, will be in grave difficulties; they will be poorly supplied and will be threatened with hunger. Obviously, we cannot allow that.

What do you think about it? What measures are you thinking of taking in order to perform your duty

to the country? I have made a tour of the districts of your territory and have had the opportunity to see for myself that your people are not seriously concerned to help our country to emerge from the grain crisis. You have had a bumper harvest, one might say a record one. Your grain surpluses this year are bigger than ever before. Yet the plan for grain procurements is not being fulfilled. Why? What is the reason?

You say that the plan for grain procurements is a heavy one, and that it cannot be fulfilled. Why cannot it be fulfilled? Where did you get that idea from? Is it not a fact that your harvest this year really is a record one? Is it not a fact that Siberia's grain procurement plan this year is almost the same as it was last year? Why, then, do you consider that the plan cannot be fulfilled? Look at the kulak farms: their barns and sheds are crammed with grain; grain is lying in the open under pent roofs for lack of storage space; the kulaks have 50,000-60,000 poods of surplus grain per farm, not counting seed, food and fodder stocks. Yet you say that the grain procurement plan cannot be fulfilled. Why are you so pessimistic?

You say that the kulaks are unwilling to deliver grain, that they are waiting for prices to rise, and prefer to engage in unbridled speculation. That is true. But the kulaks are not simply waiting for prices to rise; they are demanding an increase in prices to three times those fixed by the government. Do you think it permissible to satisfy the kulaks? The poor peasants and a considerable section of the middle peasants have already delivered their grain to the state at government prices. Is it permissible for the government to pay the kulaks

three times as much for grain as it pays the poor and middle peasants? One has only to ask this question to realise how impermissible it would be to satisfy the kulaks' demands.

If the kulaks are engaging in unbridled speculation on grain prices, why do you not prosecute them for speculation? Don't you know that there is a law against speculation—Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., under which persons guilty of speculation are liable to prosecution, and their goods to confiscation in favour of the state? Why don't you enforce this law against the grain speculators? Can it be that you are afraid to disturb the tranquillity of the kulak gentry?!

You say that enforcement of Article 107 against the kulaks would be an emergency measure, that it would not be productive of good results, that it would worsen the situation in the countryside. Comrade Zagumenny is especially insistent about this. Supposing it would be an emergency measure—what of it? Why is it that in other territories and regions enforcement of Article 107 has yielded splendid results, has rallied the labouring peasantry around the Soviet Government and improved the situation in the countryside, while among you, in Siberia, it is held that it is bound to produce bad results and worsen the situation? Why, on what grounds?

You say that your prosecuting and judicial authorities are not prepared for such a step. But why is it that in other territories and regions the prosecuting and judicial authorities were prepared for it and are acting quite effectively, yet here they are not prepared to enforce Article 107 against speculators? Who is to blame

for that? Obviously, it is your Party organisations that are to blame; they are evidently working badly and are not seeing to it that the laws of our country are conscientiously observed. I have seen several dozen of your prosecuting and judicial officials. Nearly all of them live in the homes of kulaks, board and lodge with them, and, of course, they are anxious to live in peace with the kulaks. In reply to my question, they said that the kulaks' homes are cleaner, and the food there is better. Clearly, nothing effective or useful for the Soviet state is to be expected from such prosecuting and judicial officials. The only thing that is not clear is why these gentry have not yet been cleared out and replaced by other, honest officials.

I propose:

a) that the kulaks be ordered to deliver all their grain surpluses immediately at government prices;

b) that if the kulaks refuse to obey the law they should be prosecuted under Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., and their grain surpluses confiscated in favour of the state, 25 per cent of the confiscated grain to be distributed among the poor peasants and economically weaker middle peasants at low government prices or in the form of long-term loans.

As for your prosecuting and judicial officials, all who are unfit for their posts should be dismissed and replaced by honest, conscientious Soviet-minded people.

You will soon see that these measures yield splendid results, and you will be able not only to fulfil, but even overfulfil the plan for grain procurements.

But this does not exhaust the problem. These measures will be sufficient to correct the situation this year.

But there is no guarantee that the kulaks will not again sabotage the grain procurements next year. More, it may be said with certainty that so long as there are kulaks, so long will there be sabotage of the grain procurements. In order to put the grain procurements on a more or less satisfactory basis, other measures are required. What measures exactly? I have in mind developing the formation of collective farms and state farms.

Collective and state farms are, as you know, large-scale farms capable of employing tractors and machines. They produce larger marketable surpluses than the landlord or kulak farms. It should be borne in mind that our towns and our industry are growing and will continue to grow from year to year. That is necessary for the industrialisation of the country. Consequently, the demand for grain will increase from year to year, and this means that the grain procurement plans will also increase. We cannot allow our industry to be dependent on the caprice of the kulaks. We must therefore see to it that in the course of the next three or four years the collective farms and state farms, as deliverers of grain, are in a position to supply the state with at least one-third of the grain required. This would relegate the kulaks to the background and lay the foundation for the more or less proper supply of grain to the workers and the Red Army. But in order to achieve this, we must develop the formation of collective and state farms to the utmost, sparing neither energy nor resources. It can be done, and we must do it.

But even that is not all. Our country cannot live with an eye only to today's needs. We must also give thought to the morrow, to the prospects for the develop-

ment of our agriculture and, lastly, to the fate of socialism in our country. The grain problem is part of the agricultural problem, and the agricultural problem is an integral part of the problem of building socialism in our country. The partial collectivisation of agriculture of which I have just spoken will be sufficient to keep the working class and the Red Army more or less tolerably supplied with grain, but it will be altogether insufficient for:

a) providing a firm basis for a fully adequate supply of food to the whole country while ensuring the necessary food reserves in the hands of the state, and

b) securing the victory of socialist construction in the countryside, in agriculture.

Today the Soviet system rests upon two heterogeneous foundations: upon united *socialised* industry and upon *individual* small-peasant economy based on *private* ownership of the means of production. Can the Soviet system persist for long on these heterogeneous foundations? No, it cannot.

Lenin says that so long as individual peasant economy, which engenders capitalists and capitalism, predominates in the country, the danger of a restoration of capitalism will exist. Clearly, so long as this danger exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist construction in our country.

Hence, for the consolidation of the Soviet system and for the victory of socialist construction in our country, the socialisation of industry alone is quite insufficient. What is required for that is to pass from the socialisation of industry to the socialisation of the whole of agriculture.

And what does that imply?

It implies, firstly, that we must gradually, but unswervingly, unite the individual peasant farms, which produce the smallest marketable surpluses, into collective farms, kolkhozes, which produce the largest marketable surpluses.

It implies, secondly, that all areas of our country, without exception, must be covered with collective farms (and state farms) capable of replacing not only the kulaks, but the individual peasants as well, as suppliers of grain to the state.

It implies, thirdly, doing away with all sources that engender capitalists and capitalism, and putting an end to the possibility of the restoration of capitalism.

It implies, fourthly, creating a firm basis for the systematic and abundant supply of the whole country not only with grain, but also with other foodstuffs, while ensuring the necessary reserves for the state.

It implies, fifthly, creating a single and firm socialist basis for the Soviet system, for Soviet power.

It implies, lastly, ensuring the victory of socialist construction in our country.

Such are the prospects for the development of our agriculture.

Such is the task of victoriously building socialism in our country.

It is a complex and difficult task, but one that is quite possible to fulfil; for difficulties exist in order to be surmounted and vanquished.

We must realise that we can no longer make progress on the basis of small individual peasant economy, that what we need in agriculture is large farms capable of



employing machines and producing the maximum marketable surpluses. There are two ways of creating large farms in agriculture: the *capitalist* way—through the wholesale ruin of the peasants and the organisation of big capitalist estates exploiting labour; and the *socialist* way—through the union of the small peasant farms into large collective farms, without ruining the peasants and without exploitation of labour. Our Party has chosen the socialist way of creating large farms in agriculture.

Even before the victory of the October Revolution, and then, immediately after that victory, Lenin set the Party the task of uniting the small peasant farms into large collective farms as the prospect for the development of our agriculture, and as the decisive means of securing the victory of socialism in the countryside, in agriculture.

Lenin pointed out that:

a) “The small-farming system under commodity production cannot save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the masses” (Vol. XX, p. 122<sup>2</sup>);

b) “If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin” (Vol. XX, p. 417<sup>3</sup>);

c) “Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has landed us” (Vol. XXIV, p. 537).

Lenin further points out:

“Only if we succeed in practice in *showing* the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant

the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry. Hence the importance of every kind of measure to promote co-operative, artel agriculture can hardly be overestimated. We have millions of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed in the depths of the countryside. . . . Only when it is *proved in practice, by experience* easily understood by the peasants, that the transition to the co-operative, artel form of agriculture is essential and possible, only then shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture has been taken”\* (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80).

Such are Lenin’s directives.

In pursuance of these directives, the Fifteenth Congress of our Party<sup>4</sup> stated in its resolution on “Work in the Countryside”:

“In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be made the Party’s *principal task* in the countryside.”<sup>5</sup>

That, comrades, is how matters stand in regard to the socialisation of agriculture in our country.

Our duty is to carry out these directives.

Published for the first time

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

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## **FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN AND THE FURTHER TASKS OF THE PARTY**

*To All Organisations of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*

About a month and a half ago, in January 1928, we experienced a very grave crisis in regard to grain procurements. Whereas by January 1927 we had managed to procure 428,000,000 poods of cereals, by January 1928 procurements of cereals scarcely totalled 300,000,000 poods. Hence, by January 1928, as compared with January 1927, we had a deficit, a shortage, of 128,000,000 poods. That shortage is an approximate statistical expression of the grain procurement crisis.

What does the grain procurement crisis imply? What is its significance? What are its probable consequences?

It implies, above all, a crisis in the supply of the working class areas, high bread prices in these areas, and a fall in the real wages of the workers.

It implies, secondly, a crisis in the supply of the Red Army, and dissatisfaction among the Red Army men.

It implies, thirdly, a crisis in the supply of the flax-growing and cotton-growing areas, profiteering prices for grain in these areas, abandonment of the growing of flax and cotton for the growing of grain—and hence curtailment of cotton and flax output, leading to curtailed output of the corresponding branches of the textile industry.

It implies, fourthly, the absence of grain reserves in the hands of the state, both for needs at home (in the event of crop failure) and for the needs of export, which is necessary for the import of equipment and agricultural machines.

It implies, lastly, a break-down of our entire price policy, a break-down of the policy of stabilising prices of grain products, a break-down of the policy of systematically lowering prices of manufactured goods.

In order to cope with these difficulties, it was necessary to make up for lost time and to cover the procurement deficit of 128,000,000 poods. And in order to cover this deficit, it was necessary to bring into action all the levers of the Party and government, to shake our organisations out of their lethargy, to throw the best forces of the Party, from top to bottom, on to the procurement front and increase the procurements at all costs, taking the utmost advantage of the short period still remaining before the spring thaws rendered the roads impassable.

It was with these objects in view that the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) issued its first two grain procurement directives (the first of December 14, 1927, and the second of December 24, 1927). Since these directives, however, did not have the desired effect, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) found it necessary to issue on January 6, 1928, a third directive, one quite exceptional both as to its tone and as to its demands. This directive concluded with a threat to leaders of Party organisations in the event of their failing to secure a decisive improvement in grain procurements within a very short time. Naturally, such a threat can be resorted to only in exceptional cases, the

more so as secretaries of Party organisations work not for the sake of their jobs, but for the sake of the revolution. Nevertheless, the C.C. thought it proper to resort to such a step because of the above-mentioned exceptional circumstances.

Of the various causes that determined the grain procurement crisis, the following should be noted.

Firstly. The countryside is growing stronger and richer. Above all, it is the kulak that has grown stronger and richer. Three years of good harvest have not been without their effect. Grain surpluses this year are not less than last year, just as this year there are not fewer, but more manufactured goods in the country than last year. But the well-to-do sections of the rural population were able this year to get a living from industrial crops, meat products, etc., and held back their grain products in order to force up prices of them. True, the kulak cannot be considered the principal holder of grain products, but he enjoys prestige in economic matters in the countryside, he works hand in glove with the urban speculator, who pays him more for his grain, and he is able to get the middle peasant to follow him in raising grain prices, in sabotaging the Soviet price policy, because he meets with no resistance from our procurement organisations.

Secondly. Our procurement organisations proved unequal to their task. Abusing the system of bonuses and all the various "lawful" additions to prices, our procurement organisations, instead of curbing speculation, frantically competed with one another, undermined the united front of the procurement officials, inflated grain prices and involuntarily helped the specula-

tors and kulaks to sabotage the Soviet price policy, spoil the market, and reduce the volume of procurements. True, if the Party had interfered, it could have put a stop to these shortcomings. But, intoxicated by last year's procurement successes and absorbed by the discussion,<sup>6</sup> it disregarded the shortcomings in the belief that everything would come right of its own accord. More, a number of Party organisations adopted a perfunctory attitude towards the procurements, as of no concern of theirs, forgetting that it is primarily the Party that is answerable to the working class for shortcomings in procurement, just as it is for shortcomings in the work of all economic and co-operative organisations.

Thirdly. The line of our work in the countryside was distorted in a whole number of areas. The Party's basic slogan "rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks" was often applied incorrectly. While our Party organisations have learned to build an alliance with the middle peasant—which is a tremendous achievement for the Party—not everywhere by far are they yet working properly with the poor peasants. As to the fight against the kulaks and the kulak danger, here our Party organisations are still far from having done all they should have done. This, incidently, explains why elements alien to the Party have of late developed both in our Party and in our other organisations, elements who fail to see that there are classes in the countryside, do not understand the principles of our class policy, and try to work in such a way as not to offend anybody in the countryside, to

live in peace with the kulak, and generally to preserve their popularity among "all strata" of the rural population. Naturally, the presence of such "Communists" in the countryside could not serve to improve our work there, to restrict the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks, and to rally the poor peasants around the Party.

Further. Up to January, owing to the peasants' greater returns from non-cereal crops, animal husbandry and seasonal occupations, their effective demand was much greater than last year. Moreover, despite the greater volume of manufactured goods sent to the rural areas, in terms of value there was a certain falling off in the supply of goods, that is to say, the supply lagged behind the growth of effective demand.

All this, coupled with such blunders in our work as belated delivery of manufactured goods to the countryside, an inadequate agricultural tax, inability to extract cash surpluses from the countryside, etc., brought about the conditions which led to the grain procurement crisis.

It goes without saying that the responsibility for these blunders rests primarily on the Central Committee, and not only on the local Party organisations.

In order to put an end to the crisis, it was necessary, first of all, to rouse the Party organisations and make them understand that grain procurement was a matter for the whole Party.

It was necessary, secondly, to curb speculation and rehabilitate the market by striking at the speculators and the kulaks who engaged in speculation, by setting in motion the Soviet laws against speculation in articles of mass consumption.

It was necessary, thirdly, to extract the cash surpluses from the countryside by setting in motion the laws on self-taxation, on the peasant loan, and on illicit distilling.

It was necessary, fourthly, to put our procurement organisations under the control of the Party organisations, compelling them to cease competing among themselves and to observe the Soviet price policy.

It was necessary, lastly, to put an end to distortions of the Party line in the practical work in the countryside, by laying stress on the necessity of combating the kulak danger, and by making it obligatory for our Party organisations "to develop further the offensive against the kulaks" (see the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on "Work in the Countryside").<sup>7</sup>

We know from the Central Committee's directives that the Party resorted precisely to these measures in its fight for increased procurements, and launched a campaign along these lines throughout the country.

Under different conditions and in other circumstances, the Party might have put into operation other forms of struggle as well, such as, for example, throwing tens of millions of poods of grain on to the market and thus wearing down the well-to-do sections of the rural population who were withholding their grain from the market. But for that the state needed to have either sufficient grain reserves, or substantial foreign currency reserves for importing tens of millions of poods of grain from abroad. But, as we know, the state did not possess such reserves. And just because such reserves were not available, the Party had to resort to those emergency measures which are reflected in the Central Committee's



directives, which have found expression in the procurement campaign that has developed, and the majority of which can remain in force only in the current procurement year.

The talk to the effect that we are abolishing NEP, that we are introducing the surplus-appropriation system, dekulakisation, etc., is counter-revolutionary chatter that must be most vigorously combated. NEP is the basis of our economic policy, and will remain so for a long historical period. NEP means trade and tolerating capitalism, on condition that the state retains the right and the possibility of regulating trade in the interest of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without this, the New Economic Policy would simply mean the restoration of capitalism, which is what the counter-revolutionary chatterers who are talking about the abolition of NEP refuse to understand.

Now we have every ground for affirming that the measures adopted and the grain procurement campaign that has developed have already been crowned with the first decisive victory for the Party. The rate of procurement has substantially increased everywhere. Twice as much was procured in January as in December. In February the rate of procurement has shown a further increase. The procurement campaign has been a test for all our organisations, Party as well as Soviet and co-operative; it has helped them to rid themselves of degenerate elements and has brought to the fore new, revolutionary personnel. Shortcomings in the work of the procurement organisations are being brought to light, and ways of correcting them are being outlined in the course of the procurement campaign. Party work in the coun-

tryside is improving and acquiring a fresh spirit, and distortions of the Party line are being eliminated. The influence of the kulak in the countryside is becoming weaker, work among the poor peasants is being livened up, Soviet public life in the countryside is being put on a firmer footing, and the prestige of the Soviet Government among the main mass of the peasantry, including the middle peasants, is rising.

We are obviously emerging from the grain procurement crisis.

However, side by side with these achievements in the practical implementation of the Party's directives, there are a number of distortions and excesses which, if not eliminated, may create new difficulties. Instances of such distortions and excesses are the attempts in certain individual districts to pass to methods of direct barter, compulsory subscription to the agricultural loan, organisation of substitutes for the old interception squads, and, lastly, abuse of powers of arrest, unlawful confiscation of grain surpluses, etc.

A definite stop must be put to all such practices.

The Central Committee instructs all local Party and Soviet organisations, besides intensifying the efforts of all bodies to secure the complete fulfilment of the grain procurement plan, to proceed at once to prepare for the spring sowing campaign in such a way as to ensure an enlargement of the spring crop area.

The agitation carried on by individual kulak-speculator elements for a decrease of the sown area must be countered by a solid, concerted and organised campaign for an extension of the sown area by the poorer sections of the rural population and the middle peasants,

particular support being rendered to the collective farms.

In view of the above, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) recommends that:

1. The campaign for increasing the grain procurements should be continued unflaggingly, and the fulfilment of the year's grain procurement plan should be secured at all costs.

2. The fight against all direct and indirect raising of the contractual prices should be intensified.

3. Competition among state and co-operative procurement agencies should be completely eliminated, ensuring a real united front of them against the private traders and kulaks who are speculating on a rise in prices.

4. Pressure on the kulaks—the real holders of big marketable grain surpluses—should be continued, this pressure to be exerted exclusively on the basis of Soviet law (in particular, by enforcing Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. and the corresponding article of the Ukrainian Code against particularly malicious elements who hold surpluses of two thousand poods of marketable grain and over); but in no circumstances must these or similar measures be applied to the middle peasantry.

5. Twenty-five per cent of the grain surpluses confiscated by law from speculators and kulak speculating elements should be turned over to the poor peasants in the form of long-term loans to satisfy their need of grain for seed and, if necessary, for food.

6. Excesses and distortions in carrying out the campaign for increasing grain procurements, which

in some cases have assumed the form of applying the methods of the surplus-appropriation system, such as allocation of grain delivery quotas to the separate farms, the posting of interception squads on district boundaries, etc., should be resolutely eliminated.

7. When exacting from peasants repayment of debts to the state (arrears in agricultural tax, insurance, loans, etc.), while pressure should continue to be exerted on the wealthier, especially the kulak, sections of the rural population, rebates and preferential treatment should be accorded to the poor peasants and, where necessary, to the economically weaker middle peasants.

8. In cases of self-taxation, higher progressive rates than those of the agricultural tax should be applied to the kulaks and the well-to-do sections of the rural population. Exemption from self-taxation should be ensured for the poorer sections, and reduced rates for the economically weaker middle peasants and families of Red Army men. In developing the self-taxation campaign everywhere, public initiative should be stimulated and the co-operation of the poor peasants, Young Communist League, women delegates and rural intellectuals extensively enlisted. The proceeds from self-taxation should be used strictly for the purposes laid down and not allowed to be spent on maintaining the apparatus, the specific objects of investments, estimates of expenditure, etc., being discussed and endorsed by the peasant assemblies, and the use of the sums made subject to wide public control.

9. Administrative methods of placing the peasant loan (payment in loan certificates for grain delivered by peasants, compulsory allocation of loan

subscription quotas to the farms, etc.) should be categorically prohibited; attention should be focused on explaining to the peasants all the benefits the peasant loan offers them, and the influence and forces of the rural public organisations should be used to place the loan also among the wealthy sections of the rural population.

10. There should be no relaxation of attention to satisfying the demand for manufactured goods in the grain procurement areas. While putting a stop to all direct and indirect forms of bartering grain for manufactured goods, with regard to goods in very short supply the privileges enjoyed by members of co-operatives may in exceptional cases be extended to peasant sellers of grain who are not members of co-operatives.

11. While continuing verification and determined purging of Party, Soviet and co-operative organisations in the course of the procurement campaign, all alien and adventitious elements should be expelled from these organisations and replaced by staunch Party people or tested non-Party people.

On the instructions of the C.C., C.P.B.U.(B.)

*J. Stalin*

February 13, 1928

Published for the first time

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## GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY

Greetings to the Red Army, which upheld the achievements of the October Revolution in great battles!

Glory to the soldiers who fell in the proletarian cause!

Glory to the soldiers who stand guard over the great cause of socialist construction!

***J. Stalin***

*Krasnaya Zvezda*, No. 46,  
February 23, 1928

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## THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE RED ARMY

*Speech Delivered at a Plenum of the Moscow Soviet  
Held in Honour of the Tenth Anniversary  
of the Red Army  
February 25, 1928*

Comrades, permit me to convey the greetings of the Central Committee of our Party to the men of our Red Army, the men of our Red Navy, the men of our Red Air Force, and, lastly, to our potential servicemen, the armed workers of the U.S.S.R.

The Party is proud that, with the assistance of the workers and peasants, it has succeeded in creating the first Red Army in the world, which in great battles fought for and upheld the liberty of the workers and peasants.

The Party is proud that the Red Army has acquitted itself with honour in travelling the hard route of fierce battles against internal and external enemies of the working class and peasantry of our country, that it has succeeded in taking shape as a mighty militant revolutionary force, to the terror of the enemies of the working class and the joy of all the oppressed and enslaved.

The Party is proud that the Red Army, having travelled the long route of the liberation of the workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, has at last won the right to celebrate its jubilee, marking the completion of the tenth year since its birth.

Comrades, wherein lies the strength, what is the source of the strength of our Red Army?

What are the features which radically distinguish our Red Army from all armies that have ever existed in the world?

What are the distinctive features which constitute the source of the strength and might of our Red Army?

The first fundamental distinctive feature of our Red Army is that it is the army of the liberated workers and peasants, it is the army of the October Revolution, the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

All armies that have ever existed under capitalism, no matter what their composition, have been armies for the furtherance of the power of capital. They were, and are, armies of capitalist rule. The bourgeois of all countries lie when they say that the army is politically neutral. That is not true. In bourgeois countries, the army is deprived of political rights, it is not allowed into the political arena. That is true. But that by no means implies that it is politically neutral. On the contrary, always and everywhere, in all capitalist countries, the army was, and is, drawn into the political struggle as an instrument for the suppression of the working people. Is it not true that the army in those countries suppresses the workers and serves as a buttress of the masters?

In contrast to such armies, our Red Army is distinguished by the fact that it is an instrument for the furtherance of the power of the workers and peasants, an instrument for the furtherance of the dictatorship of the proletariat, an instrument for the liberation of the workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists.



Our army is an army of liberation of the working people.

Have you considered the fact, comrades, that in the old days the people feared the army, as indeed they fear it now in the capitalist countries; that between the people and the army is a barrier separating the one from the other? And how is it with us? With us, on the contrary, people and army constitute a single whole, a single family. Nowhere in the world is there such an attitude of love and solicitude on the part of the people for the army as in our country. In our country the army is loved and respected, it is the object of general solicitude. Why? Because for the first time in the history of the world the workers and peasants have created their own army, which serves not the masters, but the former slaves, the now emancipated workers and peasants.

There you have a source of the strength of our Red Army.

And what does the people's love for their army mean? It means that such an army will have the firmest of rears, that such an army is invincible.

What is an army without a firm rear? Nothing at all. The biggest armies, the best-equipped armies collapsed and fell to pieces when they did not have a firm rear, when they did not have the support and sympathy of the rear, of the labouring population. Ours is the only army in the world that has the sympathy and support of the workers and peasants. Therein lies its strength, therein lies its might.

That, above all, is what distinguishes our Red Army from all other armies that ever existed or exist today.

The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to it that this distinctive feature of the Red Army, its closeness to and fraternal connection with the workers and peasants, is preserved and made permanent.

A second distinctive feature of our Red Army is that it is an army of brotherhood among the nations of our country, an army of liberation of the oppressed nations of our country, an army of defence of the liberty and independence of the nations of our country.

In the old days, armies were usually trained in the spirit of dominant-nation chauvinism, in the spirit of conquest, in the belief of the need to subjugate weaker nations. That, indeed, explains why armies of the old type, capitalist armies, were at the same time armies of national, colonial oppression. Therein lay one of the fundamental weaknesses of the old armies. Our army radically differs from the armies of colonial oppression. Its whole nature, its whole structure, is based on strengthening the ties of friendship among the nations of our country, on the idea of liberating the oppressed peoples, on the idea of defending the liberty and independence of the socialist republics that go to make up the Soviet Union.

That is a second and fundamental source of the strength and might of our Red Army. Therein lies the pledge that at a critical moment our army will have the fullest support of the vast masses of all the nations and nationalities inhabiting our boundless land.

The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to it that this distinctive feature of our Red Army is likewise preserved and made permanent.

And, lastly, a third distinctive feature of the Red Army. It is that the spirit of internationalism is trained and fostered in our army, that the spirit of internationalism imbues our Red Army through and through.

In the capitalist countries, armies are usually trained to hate the peoples of other countries, to hate other states, to hate the workers and peasants of other countries. Why is this done? In order to turn the army into an obedient herd in the event of armed clashes between states, between powers, between countries. That is a source of weakness of all capitalist armies.

Our army is built on entirely different principles. The strength of our Red Army lies in the fact that from the day of its birth it has been trained in a spirit of internationalism, that it has been trained to respect the peoples of other countries, to love and respect the workers of all countries, to preserve and promote peace among countries. And precisely because our army is trained in the spirit of internationalism, trained to understand that the interests of the workers of all countries are one, precisely for this reason our army is an army of the workers of all countries.

And that this is a source of our army's strength and might, the bourgeois of all countries will learn if they should venture to attack our country, for they will then see that our Red Army, trained as it is in the spirit of internationalism, has countless friends and allies in all parts of the world, from Shanghai to New York and from London to Calcutta.

That, comrades, is a third and fundamental distinctive feature which imbues the spirit of our army and constitutes a source of its strength and might.

The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to it that this distinctive feature of our army is likewise preserved and made permanent.

It is to these three distinctive features that our army owes its strength and might.

This, too, explains the fact that our army knows where it is heading for, because it consists not of tin soldiers, but of enlightened people who understand where to head for and what to fight for.

But an army that knows what it is fighting for is invincible, comrades.

That is why our Red Army has every ground for being the best army in the world.

Long live our Red Army!

Long live its soldiers!

Long live its leaders!

Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat which created the Red Army, gave it victory and crowned it with glory! (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

*Pravda*, No. 50,  
February 28, 1928

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## THE WORK OF THE APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION

*Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active  
of the Moscow Organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.)  
April 13, 1928\**

Comrades, the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.<sup>8</sup> that has just concluded has one feature which distinguishes it from the series of plenary meetings held in the past two years. This feature is that it was a plenum of a purely business-like character, a plenum where there were no inner-Party conflicts, a plenum where there were no inner-Party dissensions.

Its agenda consisted of the most burning questions of the day: the grain procurements, the Shakhty affair,<sup>9</sup> and, lastly, the plan of work of the Political Bureau and plenum of the Central Committee. These, as you see, are quite serious questions. Nevertheless, the debates at the plenum were of a purely business-like character, and the resolutions were adopted unanimously.

The reason is that there was no opposition at the plenum. The reason is that the questions were approached in a strictly business-like manner, without factional attacks, without factional demagoguery. The reason is that only after the Fifteenth Congress, only after the liquidation of the opposition, did it become possible

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\* Several paragraphs of this report which at the time were not published in the press are here restored.—*Ed.*

for the Party to tackle practical problems seriously and thoroughly.

That is the good aspect and, if you like, the inestimable advantage of that phase of development which we have entered since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, since the liquidation of the opposition.

## I

### SELF-CRITICISM

A characteristic feature of the work of this plenum, of its debates and its resolutions, is that from beginning to end, its key-note was the sternest self-criticism. More, there was not a single question, not a single speech, at the plenum which was not accompanied by criticism of shortcomings in our work, by self-criticism of our organisations. Criticism of our shortcomings, honest and Bolshevik self-criticism of Party, Soviet and economic organisations—that was the general tone of the plenum.

I know that there are people in the ranks of the Party who have no fondness for criticism in general, and for self-criticism in particular. Those people, whom I might call “skin-deep” Communists (*laughter*), every now and then grumble and shrug their shoulders at self-criticism, as much as to say: Again this accursed self-criticism, again this raking out of our shortcomings—can’t we be allowed to live in peace? Obviously, those “skin-deep” Communists are complete strangers to the spirit of our Party, to the spirit of Bolshevism. Well, in view of the existence of such sentiments among those people who greet self-criticism with anything but enthusiasm, it is permissible to ask: Do we need

self-criticism; where does it derive from, and what is its value?

I think, comrades, that self-criticism is as necessary to us as air or water. I think that without it, without self-criticism, our Party could not make any headway, could not disclose our ulcers, could not eliminate our shortcomings. And shortcomings we have in plenty. That must be admitted frankly and honestly.

The slogan of self-criticism cannot be regarded as a new one. It lies at the very foundation of the Bolshevik Party. It lies at the foundation of the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since our country is a country with a dictatorship of the proletariat, and since the dictatorship is directed by one party, the Communist Party, which does not, and cannot, share power with other parties, is it not clear that, if we want to make headway, we ourselves must disclose and correct our errors—is it not clear that there is no one else to disclose and correct them for us? Is it not clear, comrades, that self-criticism must be one of the most important motive forces of our development?

The slogan of self-criticism has developed especially powerfully since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. Why? Because after the Fifteenth Congress, which put an end to the opposition, a new situation arose in the Party, one that we have to reckon with.

In what does the novelty of this situation consist? In the fact that now we have no opposition, or next to none; in the fact that, because of the easy victory over the opposition—a victory which in itself is a most important gain for the Party—there may be a danger of the Party resting on its laurels, beginning to take things

easy and closing its eyes to the shortcomings in our work.

The easy victory over the opposition is a most important gain for our Party. But concealed within it is a certain drawback, which is that the Party may be a prey to self-satisfaction, to self-admiration, and begin to rest on its laurels. And what does resting on our laurels mean? It means putting an end to our forward movement. And in order that this may not occur, we need self-criticism—not that malevolent and actually counter-revolutionary criticism which the opposition indulged in—but honest, frank, Bolshevik self-criticism.

The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was alive to this, and it issued the slogan of self-criticism. Since then the tide of self-criticism has been mounting, and it laid its imprint also on the work of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.

It would be strange to fear that our enemies, our internal and external enemies, might exploit the criticism of our shortcomings and raise the shout: Oho! All is not well with those Bolsheviks! It would be strange if we Bolsheviks were to fear that. The strength of Bolshevism lies precisely in the fact that it is not afraid to admit its mistakes. Let the Party, let the Bolsheviks, let all the upright workers and labouring elements in our country bring to light the shortcomings in our work, the shortcomings in our constructive effort, and let them indicate ways of eliminating our shortcomings, so that there may be no stagnation, vegetation, decay in our work and our construction, so that all our work and all our constructive measures may improve from day to day and go from success to success. That is



the chief thing just now. As for our enemies, let them rant about our shortcomings—such trifles cannot and should not disconcert Bolsheviks.

Lastly, there is-yet another circumstance that impels us to self-criticism. I am referring to the question of the masses and the leaders. A peculiar sort of relation has lately begun to arise between the leaders and the masses. On the one hand there was formed, there came into being historically, a group of leaders among us whose prestige is rising and rising, and who are becoming almost unapproachable for the masses. On the other hand the working-class masses in the first place, and the mass of the working people in general are rising extremely slowly, are beginning to look up at the leaders from below with blinking eyes, and not infrequently are afraid to criticise them.

Of course, the fact that we have a group of leaders who have risen excessively high and enjoy great prestige is in itself a great achievement for our Party. Obviously, the direction of a big country would be unthinkable without such an authoritative group of leaders. But the fact that as these leaders rise they get further away from the masses, and the masses begin to look up at them from below and do not venture to criticise them, cannot but give rise to a certain danger of the leaders losing contact with the masses and the masses getting out of touch with the leaders.

This danger may result in the leaders becoming conceited and regarding themselves as infallible. And what good can be expected when the top leaders become self-conceited and begin to look down on the masses? Clearly, nothing can come of this but the ruin of the Party.

But what we want is not to ruin the Party, but to move forward and improve our work. And precisely in order that we may move forward and improve the relations between the masses and the leaders, we must keep the valve of self-criticism open all the time, we must make it possible for Soviet people to "go for" their leaders, to criticise their mistakes, so that the leaders may not grow conceited, and the masses may not get out of touch with the leaders.

The question of the masses and the leaders is sometimes identified with the question of promotion. That is wrong, comrades. It is not a question of bringing new leaders to the fore, although this deserves the Party's most serious attention. It is a question of preserving the leaders who have already come to the fore and possess the greatest prestige by organising permanent and indissoluble contact between them and the masses. It is a question of organising, along the lines of self-criticism and criticism of our shortcomings, the broad public opinion of the Party, the broad public opinion of the working class, as an instrument of keen and vigilant moral control, to which the most authoritative leaders must lend an attentive ear if they want to retain the confidence of the Party and the confidence of the working class.

From this standpoint, the value of the press, of our Party and Soviet press, is truly inestimable. From this standpoint, we cannot but welcome the initiative shown by Pravda in publishing the *Bulletin of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*,<sup>10</sup> which conducts systematic criticism of shortcomings in our work. Only we must see to it that the criticism is serious and penetrating,

and does not just skate on the surface. From this standpoint, too, we have to welcome the initiative shown by *Komsomolskaya Pravda*<sup>11</sup> in vigorously and spiritedly attacking shortcomings in our work.

Critics are sometimes abused because of imperfections in their criticism, because their criticism is not always 100 per cent correct. The demand is often made that criticism should be correct on all accounts, and if it is not correct on every point, they begin to decry and disparage it.

That is wrong, comrades. It is a dangerous misconception. Only try to put forward such a demand, and you will gag hundreds and thousands of workers, worker correspondents and village correspondents who desire to correct our shortcomings but who sometimes are unable to formulate their ideas correctly. We would get not self-criticism, but the silence of the tomb.

You must know that workers are sometimes afraid to tell the truth about shortcomings in our work. They are afraid not only because they might get into "hot water" for it, but also because they might be made into a "laughing-stock" on account of their imperfect criticism. How can you expect an ordinary worker or an ordinary peasant, with his own painful experience of shortcomings in our work and in our planning, to frame his criticism according to all the rules of the art? If you demand that their criticism should be 100 per cent correct, you will be killing all possibility of criticism from below, all possibility of self-criticism. That is why I think that if criticism is even only 5 or 10 per cent true, such criticism should be welcomed, should be listened to attentively, and the sound core in it taken into ac-

count. Otherwise, I repeat, you would be gagging all those hundreds and thousands of people who are devoted to the cause of the Soviets, who are not yet skilled enough in the art of criticism, but through whose lips speaks truth itself.

Precisely in order to develop self-criticism and not extinguish it, we must listen attentively to all criticism coming from Soviet people, even if sometimes it may not be correct to the full and in all details. Only then can the masses have the assurance that they will not get into "hot water" if their criticism is not perfect, that they will not be made a "laughing-stock" if there should be errors in their criticism. Only then can self-criticism acquire a truly mass character and meet with a truly mass response.

It goes without saying that what we have in mind is not just "any sort" of criticism. Criticism by a counter-revolutionary is also criticism. But its object is to discredit the Soviet regime, to undermine our industry, to disrupt our Party work. Obviously, it is not such criticism we have in mind. It is not of such criticism I am speaking, but of criticism that comes from Soviet people, and which has the aim of improving the organs of Soviet rule, of improving our industry, of improving our Party and trade-union work. We need criticism in order to strengthen the Soviet regime, not to weaken it. And it is precisely with a view to strengthening and improving our work that the Party proclaims the slogan of criticism and self-criticism.

What do we expect primarily from the slogan of self-criticism, what results can it yield if it is carried out properly and honestly? It should yield at least two

results. It should, in the first place, sharpen the vigilance of the working class, make it pay more attention to our shortcomings, facilitate their correction, and render impossible any kind of “surprises” in our constructive work. It should, in the second place, improve the political culture of the working class, develop in it the feeling that it is the master of the country, and facilitate the training of the working class in the work of administering the country.

Have you considered the fact that not only the Shakhty affair, but also the procurement crisis of January 1928 came as a “surprise” to many of us? The Shakhty affair was particularly noteworthy in this respect. This counter-revolutionary group of bourgeois experts carried on their work for five years, receiving instructions from the anti-Soviet organisations of international capital. For five years our organisations were writing and circulating all sorts of resolutions and decisions. Our coal industry, of course, was making headway all the same, because our Soviet economic system is so virile and powerful that it got the upper hand in spite of our blockheadedness and our blunders, and in spite of the subversive activities of the experts. For five years this counter-revolutionary group of experts was engaged in sabotaging our industry, causing boiler explosions, wrecking turbines, and so on. And all this time we were oblivious to everything. Then “suddenly,” like a bolt from the blue, came the Shakhty affair.

Is this normal, comrades? I think it is very far from normal. To stand at the helm and peer ahead, yet see nothing until circumstances bring us face to face with some calamity—that is not leadership. That is not

the way Bolshevism understands leadership. In order to lead, one must foresee. And foreseeing is not always easy, comrades.

It is one thing when a dozen or so leading comrades are on the watch for and detect shortcomings in our work, while the working masses are unwilling or unable either to watch for or to detect shortcomings. Here all the chances are that you will be sure to overlook something, will not detect everything. It is another thing when, together with the dozen or so leading comrades, hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are on the watch to detect shortcomings in our work, disclosing our errors, throwing themselves into the general work of construction and indicating ways of improving it. Here there is a greater guarantee that there will be no surprises, that objectionable features will be noted promptly and prompt measures taken to eliminate them.

We must see to it that the vigilance of the working class is not damped down, but stimulated, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are drawn into the general work of socialist construction, that hundreds of thousands and millions of workers and peasants, and not merely a dozen leaders, keep vigilant watch over the progress of our construction work, notice our errors and bring them into the light of day. Only then shall we have no "surprises." But to bring this about, we must develop criticism of our shortcomings from below, we must make criticism the affair of the masses, we must assimilate and carry out the slogan of self-criticism.

Lastly, as regards promoting the cultural powers of the working class, developing in it the faculty of

administering the country in connection with the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism. Lenin said:

"The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer. . . . Economically and politically, *N E P* fully ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is 'only' a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard."<sup>12</sup>

What does this mean? It means that one of the main tasks of our constructive work is to develop in the working class the faculty and ability to administer the country, to administer economy, to administer industry.

Can we develop this faculty and ability in the working class without giving full play to the powers and capacities of the workers, the powers and capacities of the finest elements of the working class, for criticising our errors, for detecting our shortcomings and for advancing our work? Obviously, we cannot.

And what is required in order to give full play to the powers and capacities of the working class and the working people generally, and to enable them to acquire the faculty of administering the country? It requires, above all, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of self-criticism, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan of criticism from below of shortcomings and errors in our work. If the workers take advantage of the opportunity to criticise shortcomings in our work frankly and bluntly, to improve and advance our work, what does that mean? It means that the workers are becoming active participants in the work of directing the country, economy, industry. And this cannot but enhance in the workers the feeling that they are the mas-

ters of the country, cannot but enhance their activity, their vigilance, their culture.

This question of the cultural powers of the working class is a decisive one. Why? Because, of all the ruling classes that have hitherto existed, the working class, as a ruling class, occupies a somewhat special and not altogether favourable position in history. All ruling classes until now—the slave-owners, the landlords, the capitalists—were also wealthy classes. They were in a position to train in their sons the knowledge and faculties needed for government. The working class differs from them, among other things, in that it is not a wealthy class, that it was not able formerly to train in its sons the knowledge and faculty of government, and has become able to do so only now, after coming to power.

That, incidently, is the reason why the question of a cultural revolution is so acute with us. True, in the ten years of its rule the working class of the U.S.S.R. has accomplished far more in this respect than the landlords and capitalists did in hundreds of years. But the international and internal situation is such that the results achieved are far from sufficient. Therefore, every means capable of promoting the development of the cultural powers of the working class, every means capable of facilitating the development in the working class of the faculty and ability to administer the country and industry—every such means must be utilised by us to the full.

But it follows from what has been said that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the most important means of developing the cultural powers of the proletariat, of developing the faculty of government in the working



class. From this follows yet another reason why the carrying out of the slogan of self-criticism is a vital task for us.

Such, in general, are the reasons which make the slogan of self-criticism imperative for us as a slogan of the day.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the key-note of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was self-criticism.

Let us pass now to the question of grain procurements.

## II

### THE QUESTION OF GRAIN PROCUREMENTS

First of all, a few words about the nature of the grain procurement crisis that developed here in January of this year. The essence of the matter is that in October of last year our procurements began to decline, reached a very low point in December, and by January of this year we had a deficit of 130,000,000 poods of grain. This year's harvest was, perhaps, no worse than last year's; it may have been a little less. The carry-over from previous harvests was bigger than it was last year, and it was generally considered that the marketable surplus of grain in our country this year was not smaller, but larger than in the previous year.

It was with this consideration in mind that the procurement plan for the year was fixed at slightly above last year's plan. But in spite of this, the procurements declined, and by January 1928 we had a deficit of 130,000,000 poods. It was an "odd" situation: there was plenty of grain in the country, yet the procurements

were falling and creating the threat of hunger in the towns and in the Red Army.

How is this "oddity" to be explained? Was it not due to some chance factor? The explanation many are inclined to give is that we had been caught napping, had been too busy with the opposition and had let our attention slip. That we really had been caught napping is, of course, true. But to put it all down to an oversight would be the grossest error. Still less can the procurement crisis be attributed to some chance factor. Such things do not happen by chance. That would be too cheap an explanation.

What, then, were the factors that led up to the procurement crisis?

I think there were at least three such factors.

*Firstly.* The difficulties of our socialist construction in the conditions of our international and internal situation. I am referring primarily to the difficulties of developing urban industry. It is necessary to pour goods of every kind into the countryside in order to be able to draw out of it the maximum quantity of agricultural produce. This requires a faster rate of development of our industry than is the case now. But in order to develop industry more swiftly, we need a faster rate of socialist accumulation. And to attain such a rate of accumulation is not so easy, comrades. The result is a shortage of goods in the countryside.

I am referring, further, to the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Agriculture is developing slowly, comrades. It should be developing with gigantic strides, grain should become cheaper and harvests bigger, fertilisers should be applied to

the utmost and mechanised production of grain should be developed at high speed. But that is not the case, comrades, and will not come about quickly.

Why?

Because our agriculture is a small-peasant economy, which does not readily lend itself to substantial improvement. Statistics tell us that before the war there were about 16,000,000 individual peasant farms in our country. Now we have about 25,000,000 individual peasant farms. This means that ours is essentially a land of small-peasant economy. And what is small-peasant economy? It is the most insecure, the most primitive, the most underdeveloped form of economy, producing the smallest marketable surpluses. That is the whole crux of the matter, comrades. Fertilisers, machines, scientific agriculture and other improvements—these are things which can be effectively applied on large farms, but which are inapplicable or practically inapplicable in small-peasant economy. That is the weakness of small-scale economy, and that is why it cannot compete with the large kulak farms.

Have we any large farms at all in the countryside, employing machines, fertilisers, scientific agriculture and so on? Yes, we have. Firstly, there are the collective farms and state farms. But we have few of them, comrades. Secondly, there are the large kulak (capitalist) farms. Such farms are by no means few in our country, and they are still a big factor in agriculture.

Can we adopt the course of encouraging privately owned, large capitalist farms in the countryside? Obviously, we cannot. It follows then that we must do our ut-

most to develop in the countryside large farms of the type of the collective farms and state farms and try to convert them into grain factories for the country organised on a modern scientific basis. That, in fact, explains why the Fifteenth Congress of our Party issued the slogan of the maximum development in forming collective and state farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the collective farms must only be formed from the poorer strata of the peasantry. That would be wrong, comrades. Our collective farms must comprise both poor and middle peasants, and embrace not only individual groups or clusters, but entire villages. The middle peasant must be given a prospect, he must be shown that he can develop his husbandry best and most rapidly through the collective farm. Since the middle peasant cannot rise into the kulak group, and it would be unwise for him to sink, he must be given the prospect of being able to improve his husbandry through the formation of collective farms.

But our collective farms and state farms are still all too few, scandalously few. Hence the difficulties of our constructive work in the countryside. Hence our inadequate grain output.

*Secondly.* It follows from this that the difficulties of our constructive work in town and country are a basis on which a procurement crisis can develop. But this does not mean that a procurement crisis was bound to develop precisely this year. We know that these difficulties existed not only this year, but also last year. Why, then, did a procurement crisis develop precisely this year? What is the secret?

The secret is that this year the kulak was able to take advantage of these difficulties to force up grain prices, launch an attack on the Soviet price policy and thus slow up our procurement operations. And he was able to take advantage of these difficulties for at least two reasons:

firstly, because three years of good harvests had not been without their effect. The kulak grew strong in that period, grain stocks in the countryside in general, and among the kulaks in particular, accumulated during that time, and it became possible for the kulak to attempt to dictate prices;

secondly, because the kulak had support from the urban speculators, who speculate on a rise of grain prices and thus force up prices.

This does not mean, of course, that the kulak is the principal holder of grain. By and large, it is the middle peasant who holds most of the grain. But the kulak has a certain economic prestige in the countryside, and in the matter of prices he is sometimes able to get the middle peasant to follow his lead. The kulak elements in the countryside are thus in a position to take advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work for forcing up grain prices for purposes of speculation.

But what is the consequence of forcing up grain prices by, say, 40-50 per cent, as the kulak speculating elements did? The first consequence is to undermine the real wages of the workers. Let us suppose that we had raised workers' wages at the time. But in that case we should have had to raise prices of manufactured goods, and that would have hit at the living standards

both of the working class and of the poor and middle peasants. And what would have been the effect of this? The effect would undoubtedly have been directly to undermine our whole economic policy.

But that is not all. Let us suppose that we had raised grain prices 40-50 per cent in January or in the spring of this year, just before the preparations for the sowing. What would have been the result? We should have disorganised the raw materials base of our industry. The cotton-growers would have abandoned the growing of cotton and started growing grain, as a more profitable business. The flax-growers would have abandoned flax and also started growing grain. The beet-growers would have done the same. And so on and so forth. In short, we should have undermined the raw materials base of our industry because of the profiteering appetites of the capitalist elements in the countryside.

But that is not all either. If we had forced up grain prices this spring, say, we should certainly have brought misery on the poor peasant, who in the spring buys grain for food as well as for sowing his fields. The poor peasants and the lower-middle peasants would have had every right to say to us: "You have deceived us, because last autumn we sold grain to you at low prices, and now you are compelling us to buy grain at high prices. Whom are you protecting, gentlemen of the Soviets, the poor peasants or the kulaks?"

That is why the Party had to retaliate to the blow of the kulak speculators, aimed at forcing up grain prices, with a counter-blow that would knock out of the kulaks and speculators all inclination to menace the working class and our Red Army with hunger.

*Thirdly.* It is unquestionable that the capitalist elements in the countryside could not have taken advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work to the degree they actually did, and the procurement crisis would not have assumed such a menacing character, if they had not been assisted in this matter by one other circumstance. What is that circumstance?

It is the slackness of our procurement bodies, the absence of a united front between them, their competition with one another, and their reluctance to wage a determined struggle against speculating on higher grain prices.

It is, lastly, the inertia of our Party organisations in the grain procurement areas, their reluctance to intervene as they should have done in the grain procurement campaign, their reluctance to intervene and put an end to the general slackness on the procurement front.

Intoxicated by the successes of last year's procurement campaign, and believing that this year the procurements would come in automatically, our procurement and Party organisations left it all to the "will of God," and left a clear field to the kulak speculating elements. And that was just what the kulaks were waiting for. It is scarcely to be doubted that, had it not been for this circumstance, the procurement crisis could not have assumed such a menacing character.

It should not be forgotten that we, that is to say our organisations, both procurement and other, control nearly 80 per cent of the supply of manufactured goods to the countryside, and nearly 90 per cent of all the procurements there. It need scarcely be said that this cir-

cumstance makes it possible for us to dictate to the kulak in the countryside, provided that our organisations know how to utilise this favourable position. But we, instead of utilising this favourable position, allowed everything to go on automatically and thereby facilitated—against our own will, of course—the fight of the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government.

Such, comrades, were the conditions which determined the procurement crisis at the end of last year.

You see, therefore, that the procurement crisis cannot be considered a matter of chance.

You see that the procurement crisis is the expression of the first serious action, under the conditions of NEP, undertaken by the capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet Government in connection with one of the most important questions of our constructive work, that of grain procurements.

That, comrades, is the class background of the grain procurement crisis.

You know that, in order to end the procurement crisis and curb the kulaks' appetite for speculation, the Party and the Soviet Government were obliged to adopt a number of practical measures. Quite a lot has been said about these measures in our press. They have been dealt with in fairly great detail in the resolution of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. Hence I think that there is no need to repeat that here.

I only want to say something about certain emergency measures which were taken because of the emergency circumstances, and which, of course, will lapse when these emergency circumstances cease to exist.



I am referring to the enforcement of Article 107 of the law against speculation. This article was adopted by the Central Executive Committee in 1926. It was not applied last year. Why? Because the grain procurements proceeded, as it is said, normally, and there were no grounds for applying this article. It was called to mind only this year, at the beginning of 1928. And it was recalled because we had a number of emergency circumstances which resulted from the speculating machinations of the kulaks and which held out the threat of hunger. It is clear that if there are no emergency circumstances in the next procurement year and the procurements proceed normally, Article 107 will not be applied. And, on the contrary, if emergency circumstances arise and the capitalist elements start their "tricks" again, Article 107 will again appear on the scene.

It would be stupid on these grounds to say that NEP is being "abolished," that there is a "reversion" to the surplus-appropriation system, and so on. Only enemies of the Soviet regime can now think of abolishing NEP. Nobody benefits more from the New Economic Policy now than the Soviet Government. But there are people who think that NEP means not intensifying the struggle against capitalist elements, including the kulaks, with a view to overcoming them, but ceasing the struggle against the kulaks and other capitalist elements. It need scarcely be said that such people have nothing in common with Leninism, for there is not, and cannot be, any place for them in our Party.

The results of the measures taken by the Party and the Soviet Government to put an end to the food crisis are also known to you. Briefly, they are as follows.

Firstly, we made up for lost time and procured grain at a tempo which equalled, and in places surpassed, that of last year. You know that in the three months January-March we succeeded in procuring more than 270,000,000 poods of grain. That, of course, is not all we need. We shall still have to procure upwards of 100,000,000 poods. Nevertheless, it constituted that necessary achievement which enabled us to *put an end* to the procurement crisis. We are now fully justified in saying that the Party and the Soviet Government have scored a signal victory on this front.

Secondly, we have put our procurement and Party organisations in the localities on a sound, or more or less sound, footing, having tested their combat readiness in practice and purged them of blatantly corrupt elements who refuse to recognise the existence of classes in the countryside and are reluctant to “quarrel” with the kulaks.

Thirdly, we have improved our work in the countryside, we have brought the poor peasants closer to us and won the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of the middle peasants, we have isolated the kulaks and have somewhat offended the well-to-do top stratum of the middle peasants. In doing so, we have put into effect our old Bolshevik slogan, proclaimed by Lenin as far back as the Eighth Congress of our Party<sup>13</sup>: Rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks.

I know that some comrades do not accept this slogan very willingly. It would be strange to think that now, when the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly

established, the alliance of the workers and the peasants means an alliance of the workers with the entire peasantry, including the kulaks. No, comrades, such an alliance we do not advocate, and cannot advocate. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the power of the working class is firmly established, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry means reliance on the poor peasants, alliance with the middle peasants, and a fight against the kulaks. Whoever thinks that under our conditions alliance with the peasantry means alliance with the kulaks has nothing in common with Leninism. Whoever thinks of conducting a policy in the countryside that will please everyone, rich and poor alike, is not a Marxist, but a fool, because such a policy does not exist in nature, comrades. (*Laughter and applause.*) Our policy is a class policy.

Such, in the main, are the results of the measures we took to increase the grain procurements.

Undoubtedly, in the practical work of carrying out these measures there were a number of excesses and distortions of the Party line. A number of cases of distortion of our policy which, because of our blockheadedness, hit primarily at the poor and middle peasant—cases of incorrect application of Article 107, etc.—are familiar to all. We punish, and shall punish, people guilty of such distortions with the utmost severity. But it would be strange, because of these distortions, not to see the beneficial and truly valuable results of the Party's measures, without which we could not have emerged from the procurement crisis. To do so would be closing one's eyes to the chief thing and giving prominence to that which is minor and incidental. It would be overlooking

the very substantial achievements of the procurement campaign because of a handful of individual instances of distortion of our line, distortions which have absolutely no warrant in the measures adopted by the Party.

Were there any circumstances which facilitated our procurement achievements and our fight against the attack of the capitalist elements in the countryside?

Yes, there were. One might mention at least two such circumstances.

Firstly, there is the fact that we secured the intervention of the Party in the procurement campaign and the blow at the kulak speculating elements after the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, after the liquidation of the opposition, after the Party had attained the maximum unity by routing its Party enemies. The fight against the kulaks must not be regarded as a trifling matter. In order to defeat the machinations of the kulak speculators without causing any complications in the country, we need an absolutely united party, an absolutely firm rear and an absolutely firm government. It can scarcely be doubted that the existence of these factors was in a large degree instrumental in forcing the kulaks to beat an instantaneous retreat.

Secondly, there is the fact that we succeeded in linking our practical measures for curbing the kulak speculating elements with the vital interests of the working class, the Red Army and the majority of the poorer sections of the rural population. The fact that the kulak speculating elements were menacing the labouring masses of town and country with the spectre of famine, and in addition were violating the laws of the Soviet

Government (Article 107), could not but result in the majority of the rural population siding with us in our fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The kulak was scandalously speculating in grain, thereby creating the gravest difficulties both in town and country; in addition he was violating Soviet laws, that is, the will of the Central Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies—is it not obvious that this circumstance was bound to facilitate the work of isolating the kulaks?

The pattern was in a way similar (with the appropriate reservations, of course) to the one we had in 1921, when, because of the famine in the country, the Party, headed by Lenin, raised the question of confiscating valuables from the churches with a view to acquiring food for the famine-stricken regions, and made this the basis of an extensive anti-religious campaign, and when the priests, by clinging to their valuables, were in fact opposing the starving masses and thereby evoked the resentment of the masses against the Church in general and against religious prejudices in particular, and especially against the priests and their leaders. There were some queer people at that time in our Party who thought that Lenin had come to realise the necessity of combating the Church only in 1921 (*laughter*)—that he had not realised it until then. That, of course, was silly, comrades. Lenin, of course, realised the necessity of combating the Church before 1921 too. But that was not the point. The point was to link a broad mass anti-religious campaign with the struggle for the vital interests of the masses, and to conduct it in such a way that it was understood by the masses and supported by them.

The same must be said of the Party's manoeuvre at the beginning of this year in connection with the grain procurement campaign. There are people who think that the Party has only now come to realise the necessity of a struggle against the kulak danger. That, of course, is silly, comrades. The Party has always realised the necessity for such a struggle and has waged it not in words, but in deeds. The specific feature of the manoeuvre undertaken by the Party at the beginning of this year is that this year the Party had the opportunity to link a determined struggle against the kulak speculating elements in the countryside with the struggle for the vital interests of the broad masses of the working people, and by means of this link it succeeded in winning the following of the majority of the labouring masses in the countryside and isolating the kulaks.

The art of Bolshevik policy by no means consists in firing indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of whether the masses are ready to support this or that step of the leadership. The art of Bolshevik policy consists in being able to choose the time and place and to take all the circumstances into account in order to concentrate fire on the front where the maximum results are to be attained most quickly.

What results, indeed, should we now be having if we had undertaken a powerful blow at the kulaks three years ago, when we did not yet have the firm backing of the middle peasant, when the middle peasant was infuriated and was violently attacking the chairmen of our volost executive committees, when the poor peasants were dismayed at the consequences of NEP, when

we had only 75 per cent of the pre-war crop area, when we were confronted with the basic problem of expanding the production of food and raw materials in the countryside, and when we did not yet have a substantial food and raw materials base for industry?

I have no doubt that we would have lost the battle, that we would not have succeeded in enlarging the crop area to the extent that we have succeeded in doing now, that we would have undermined the possibility of creating a food and raw materials base for industry, that we would have facilitated the strengthening of the kulaks, and that we would have repelled the middle peasants, and that, possibly, we would now be having most serious political complications in the country.

What was the position in the countryside at the beginning of this year? Crop areas enlarged to pre-war dimensions, a securer raw materials and food base for industry, the majority of the middle peasants firmly backing the Soviet Government, a more or less organised poor peasantry, improved and stronger Party and Soviet organisations in the countryside. Is it not obvious that only because of these conditions were we able to count on serious success in organising a blow at the kulak speculating elements? Is it not clear that only imbeciles could fail to understand the vast difference between these two situations in the matter of organising a broad struggle of the masses against the capitalist elements in the countryside?

There you have an example of how unwise it is to fire indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of the relation between the contending forces.

That, comrades, is how matters stand with regard to the grain procurements.

Let us pass now to the Shakhty affair.

### III

#### THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR

What was the class background of the Shakhty affair? Where do the roots of the Shakhty affair lie hidden, and from what class basis could this economic counter-revolution have sprung?

There are comrades who think that the Shakhty affair was something accidental. They usually say: We were properly caught napping, we allowed our attention to slip; but if we had not been caught napping, there would have been no Shakhty affair. That there was an oversight here, and a pretty serious one, is beyond all doubt. But to put it all down to an oversight means to understand nothing of the essence of the matter.

What do the facts, the documents in the Shakhty case, show?

The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic counter-revolution, plotted by a section of the bourgeois experts, former coal-owners.

The facts show, further, that these experts were banded together in a secret group and were receiving money for sabotage purposes from former owners now living abroad and from counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist organisations in the West.

The facts show, lastly, that this group of bourgeois experts operated and wrought destruction to our industry on orders from capitalist organisations in the West.



And what does all this indicate?

It indicates that it is a matter here of economic intervention in our industrial affairs by West-European anti-Soviet capitalist organisations. At one time there was military and political intervention, which we succeeded in liquidating by means of a victorious civil war. Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, for the liquidation of which we do not need a civil war, but which we must liquidate all the same, and shall liquidate with all the means at our disposal.

It would be foolish to believe that international capital will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it cannot look on calmly at the development of the country that is building socialism. Formerly, international capital thought it could overthrow the Soviet regime by means of outright armed intervention. The attempt failed. Now it is trying, and will go on trying, to undermine our economic strength by means of inconspicuous, not always noticeable but quite considerable, economic intervention, organising sabotage, engineering all sorts of "crises" in this or that branch of industry, and thereby facilitating the possibility of armed intervention in the future. All this is woven into the web of the class struggle of international capital against the Soviet regime, and there can be no question of anything accidental here.

One thing or the other:

*either* we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy, rallying the proletarians and the oppressed of all countries around the working class of the U.S.S.R.—in which case international capital will do everything it can to hinder our advance;

or we renounce our revolutionary policy and agree to make a number of fundamental concessions to international capital—in which case international capital, no doubt, will not be averse to “assisting” us in converting our socialist country into a “good” bourgeois republic.

There are people who think that we can conduct an emancipatory foreign policy and at the same time have the European and American capitalists praising us for doing so. I shall not stop to show that such naive people do not and cannot have anything in common with our Party.

Britain, for instance, demands that we join her in establishing predatory spheres of influence somewhere or other, in Persia, Afghanistan or Turkey, say, and assures us that if we made this concession, she would be prepared to establish “friendship” with us. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* America demands that we renounce in principle the policy of supporting the emancipation movement of the working class in other countries, and says that if we made this concession everything would go smoothly. Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* We could establish “friendly” relations with Japan if we agreed to join her in dividing up Manchuria. Can we make this concession?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* Or, for instance, the demand is made that we “loosen” our foreign trade monopoly and

agree to repay all the war and pre-war debts. Perhaps we should agree to this, comrades?

*Chorus of shouts.* No!

*Stalin.* But precisely because we cannot agree to these or similar concessions without being false to ourselves—precisely because of this we must take it for granted that international capital will go on playing us every sort of scurvy trick, whether it be a Shakhty affair or something else of a similar nature.

There you have the class roots of the Shakhty affair.

Why was armed intervention by international capital possible in our country? Because there were in our country whole groups of military experts, generals and officers, scions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, who were always ready to undermine the foundations of the Soviet regime. Could these officers and generals have organised a serious war against the Soviet regime if they had not received financial, military and every other kind of assistance from international capital? Of course not. Could international capital have organised serious intervention without the assistance of this group of whiteguard officers and generals? I do not think so.

There were comrades among us at that time who thought that the armed intervention was something accidental, that if we had not released Krasnov, Mamontov and the rest from prison, there would have been no intervention. That, of course, is untrue. That the release of Mamontov, Krasnov and the other whiteguard generals did play a part in the development of civil war is beyond doubt. But that the roots of the armed intervention lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between the Soviet regime on the one hand, and interna-

tional capital and its lackey generals in Russia on the other, is also beyond doubt.

Could certain bourgeois experts, former mine owners, have organised the Shakhty affair here without the financial and moral support of international capital, without the prospect of international capital helping them to overthrow the Soviet regime? Of course not. Could international capital have organised in our country economic intervention, such as the Shakhty affair, if there had not been in our country a bourgeoisie, including a certain group of bourgeois experts who were ready to go to all lengths to destroy the Soviet regime? Obviously not. Do there exist at all such groups of bourgeois experts in our country as are ready to go to the length of economic intervention, of undermining the Soviet regime? I think there do. I do not think that there can be many of them. But that there do exist in our country certain insignificant groups of counter-revolutionary bourgeois experts—far fewer than at the time of the armed intervention—is beyond doubt.

It is the combination of these two forces that creates the soil for economic intervention in the U.S.S.R.

And it is precisely this that constitutes the class background of the Shakhty affair.

Now about the practical conclusions to be drawn from the Shakhty affair.

I should like to dwell upon four practical conclusions indicated by the Shakhty affair.

Lenin used to say that selection of personnel is one of the cardinal problems in the building of socialism. The Shakhty affair shows that we selected our economic cadres badly, and not only selected them badly, but

placed them in conditions which hampered their development. Reference is made to Order 33, and especially to the "Model Regulations" accompanying the order.<sup>14</sup> It is a characteristic feature of these model regulations that they confer practically all the rights on the technical director, leaving to the general director the right to settle conflicts, to "represent," in short, to twiddle his thumbs. It is obvious that under such circumstances our economic cadres could not develop as they should.

There was a time when this order was absolutely necessary, because when it was issued we had no economic cadres of our own, we did not know how to manage industry, and had willy-nilly to assign the major rights to the technical director. But now this order has become a fetter. Now we have our own economic cadres with experience and capable of developing into real leaders of our industry. And for this very reason the time has come to abolish the obsolete model regulations and to replace them by new ones.

It is said that it is impossible for Communists, and especially communist business executives who come from the working class, to master chemical formulas or technical knowledge in general. That is not true, comrades. There are no fortresses that the working people, the Bolsheviks, cannot capture. (*Applause.*) We captured tougher fortresses than these in the course of our struggle against the bourgeoisie. Everything depends on the desire to master technical knowledge and on arming ourselves with persistence and Bolshevik patience. But in order to alter the conditions of work of our economic cadres and to help them to become real and full-fledged masters of their job, we must abolish the old model regula-

tions and replace them by new ones. Otherwise, we run the risk of maiming our personnel.

Were some of our business executives who have now deteriorated worse than any of us? Why is it that they, and other comrades like them, began to deteriorate and degenerate and come to identify themselves in their way of living with the bourgeois experts? It is due to our wrong way of doing things in the business field; it is due to our business executives being selected and having to work in conditions which hinder their development, which convert them into appendages of the bourgeois experts. This way of doing things must be discarded, comrades.

The second conclusion indicated to us by the Shakhty affair is that our cadres are being taught badly in our technical colleges, that our Red experts are not being trained properly. That is a conclusion from which there is no escaping. Why is it, for example, that many of our young experts do not get down to the job, and have turned out to be unsuitable for work in industry? Because they learned from books, they are book-taught experts, they have no practical experience, are divorced from production, and, naturally, prove a failure. But is it really such experts we need? No, it is not such experts we need, be they young experts three times over. We need experts—whether Communists or non-Communists makes no difference—who are strong not only in theory but also in practical experience, in their connection with production.

A young expert who has never seen a mine and does not want to go down a mine, a young expert who has never seen a factory and does not want to soil his hands in

a factory, will never get the upper hand over the old experts, who have been steeled by practical experience but are hostile to our cause. It is easy to understand, therefore, why such young experts are given an unfriendly reception not only by the old experts, and not only by our business executives, but often even by the workers. But if we are not to have such surprises with our young experts, the method of training them must be changed, and changed in such a way that already in their first years of training in the technical colleges they have continuous contact with production, with factory, mine and so forth.

The third conclusion concerns the question of enlisting the broad mass of the workers in the management of industry. What is the position in this respect, as revealed by the Shakhty evidence? Very bad. Shockingly bad, comrades. It has been revealed that the labour laws are violated, that the six-hour working day in underground work is not always observed, that safety regulations are ignored. Yet the workers tolerate it. And the trade unions say nothing. And the Party organisations take no steps to put a stop to this scandal.

A comrade who recently visited the Donbas went down the pits and questioned the miners about their conditions of work. It is a remarkable thing that not one of the miners thought it necessary to complain of the conditions. "How is life with you, comrades?" this comrade asked them. "All right, comrade, we are living not so badly," the miners replied. "I am going to Moscow, what should I tell the centre?" he asked. "Say that we are living not so badly," was their answer. "Listen, comrades, I am not a foreigner, I am a Russian, and I have

come here to learn the truth from you," the comrade said. "That's all one to us, comrade, we tell nothing but the truth whether to foreigners or to our own people," the miners replied.

That's the stuff our miners are made of. They are not just workers, they are heroes. There you have that wealth of moral capital we have succeeded in amassing in the hearts of the workers. And only to think that we are squandering this invaluable moral capital so iniquitously and criminally, like profligate and dissolute heirs to the magnificent legacy of the October Revolution! But, comrades, we cannot carry on for long on the old moral capital if we squander it so recklessly. It is time to stop doing that. High time!

Finally, the fourth conclusion concerns checking fulfilment. The Shakhty affair has shown that as far as checking fulfilment is concerned, things could not be worse than they are in all spheres of administration—in the Party, in industry, in the trade unions. Resolutions are written, directives are sent out, but nobody wants to take the trouble to ask how matters stand with the carrying out of those resolutions and directives, whether they are really being carried out or are simply pigeon-holed.

Ilyich used to say that one of the most serious questions in administering the country is the checking of fulfilment. Yet precisely here things could not possibly be worse. Leadership does not just mean writing resolutions and sending out directives. Leadership means checking fulfilment of directives, and not only their fulfilment, but the directives themselves—whether they are right or wrong from the point of view of the actual



practical work. It would be absurd to think that all our directives are 100 per cent correct. That is never so, and cannot be so, comrades. Checking fulfilment consists precisely in our leading personnel testing in the crucible of practical experience not only the way our directives are being fulfilled, but the correctness of the directives themselves. Consequently, faults in this field signify that there are faults in all our work of leadership.

Take, for example, the checking of fulfilment in the purely Party sphere. It is our custom to invite secretaries of okrug and gubernia committees to make reports to the Central Committee, in order to check how the C.C.'s directives are being carried out. The secretaries report, they confess to shortcomings in their work. The C.C. takes them to task and passes stereotyped resolutions instructing them to give greater depth and breadth to their work, to lay stress on this or that, to pay serious attention to this or that, etc. The secretaries go back with those resolutions. Then we invite them again, and the same thing is repeated about giving greater depth and breadth to the work and so on and so forth. I do not say that all this work is entirely without value. No, comrades, it has its good sides in educating and bracing up our organisations. But it must be admitted that this method of checking fulfilment is no longer sufficient. It must be admitted that this method has to be supplemented by another, namely, the method of assigning members of our top Party and Soviet leadership to work in the localities. (*A voice*: "A good idea!") What I have in mind is the sending of leading comrades to the localities for temporary work, not as commanders, but as ordinary functionaries placed at the disposal of the

local organisations. I think that this idea has a big future and may improve the work of checking fulfilment, if it is carried out honestly and conscientiously.

If members of the Central Committee, members of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, People's Commissars and their deputies, members of the Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U., and members of presidiums of trade-union central committees were to go regularly to the localities and work there, in order to get an idea of how things are being done, to study all the difficulties, all the good sides and bad sides, then I can assure you that this would be the most valuable and effective way of checking fulfilment. It would be the best way of enriching the experience of our highly respected leaders. And if this were to become a regular practice—and it certainly must become a regular practice—I can assure you that the laws which we write here and the directives which we elaborate would be far more effective and to the point than is the case now.

So much, comrades, for the Shakhty affair.

#### IV

### GENERAL CONCLUSION

We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment.

We had a procurement crisis, which has already been liquidated. The procurement crisis marked the first serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by the capitalist elements of the countryside under NEP conditions.

We have the Shakhty affair, which is already being liquidated and undoubtedly will be liquidated. The Shakhty affair marks another serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by international capital and its agents in our country. It is economic intervention in our internal affairs.

It need scarcely be said that these and similar attacks, both internal and external, may be repeated and in all likelihood will be repeated. Our task is to exercise the maximum vigilance and to be on the alert. And, comrades, if we are vigilant, we shall most certainly defeat our enemies in the future, just as we are defeating them now and have defeated them in the past. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

*Pravda*, No. 90,  
April 18, 1929

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## GREETINGS TO THE WORKERS OF KOSTROMA

Fraternal greetings to the workers of Kostroma on this First of May, the occasion of the unveiling in Kostroma of a monument to Lenin, the founder of our Party!

Long live the workers of Kostroma!

Long live May Day!

May the memory of Lenin live eternally in the hearts of the working class!

***J. Stalin***

April 30, 1928

The newspaper *Severnaya Pravda* (Kostroma)  
No. 102, May 4, 1928

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**SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH  
CONGRESS OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST  
YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE<sup>15</sup>**

*May 16, 1928*

Comrades, it is the accepted thing at congresses to speak of achievements. That we have achievements is beyond question. They, these achievements, are, of course, not inconsiderable, and there is no reason to hide them. But, comrades, it has become a practice with us lately to talk so much of achievements, and sometimes so affectedly, that one loses all desire to speak of them once again. Allow me, therefore, to depart from the general practice and to say a few words not about our achievements, but about our weaknesses and our tasks in connection with these weaknesses.

I am referring, comrades, to the tasks involved by the questions of our internal work of construction.

These tasks relate to three questions: that of the line of our political work, that of stimulating the activity of the broad mass of the people in general and of the working class in particular, and of stimulating the struggle against bureaucracy, and, lastly, that of training new personnel for our work of economic construction.

## I

**STRENGTHEN THE READINESS FOR ACTION  
OF THE WORKING CLASS**

Let us begin with the first question. The characteristic feature of the period we are now passing through is that for five years already we have been building in conditions of peaceful development. When I say peaceful development, I am referring not only to the absence of war with external enemies, but also to the absence of the elements of civil war at home. That is what we mean by conditions of the peaceful development of our work of construction.

You know that in order to win these conditions of peaceful development, we had to fight the capitalists of the whole world for three years. You know that we did win those conditions, and we consider that one of our greatest achievements. But, comrades, every gain, and this gain is no exception, has its obverse side. The conditions of peaceful development have not been without their effect on us. They have laid their imprint on our work, on our executive personnel, on their mentality. During these five years we have been advancing smoothly, as though on rails. And the effect of this has been to induce the belief in some of our executives that everything is going swimmingly, that we are as good as travelling on an express train, and that we are being carried on the rails non-stop straight to socialism.

From this has sprung the theory of things going "of their own accord," the theory of "muddling through," the theory that "everything will come out right,"

that there are no classes in our country, that our enemies have calmed down, and that everything will go according to the book. Hence a certain tendency to inertia, to somnolence. Well, it is this mentality of somnolence, this mentality of relying on the work going right "of its own accord" that constitutes the obverse side of the period of peaceful development.

Why are such states of mind so dangerous? Because they throw dust into the eyes of the working class, prevent it from seeing its enemies, lull it with boastful talk about the weakness of our enemies, undermine its readiness for action.

We must not allow ourselves to be reassured by the fact that we have a million members in our Party, two million in the Young Communist League and ten million in the trade unions, and believe that this is all that is required for complete victory over our enemies. That is not true, comrades. History tells us that some of the biggest armies perished because they grew conceited, had too much faith in their own strength, paid too little heed to the strength of their enemies, gave themselves over to somnolence, lost their readiness for action, and at a critical moment were caught unawares.

The biggest party may be caught unawares, the biggest party may perish, if it does not learn the lessons of history and does not work day in and day out to forge the readiness for action of its class. To be caught unaware is a most dangerous thing, comrades. To be caught unawares is to fall prey to "surprises," to panic in face of the enemy. And panic leads to break-down, to defeat, to destruction.

I could give you many examples from the history of our armies during the civil war, examples of small detachments routing big military formations when the latter were lacking in readiness for action. I could tell you how in 1920 three cavalry divisions, with a total of not less than 5,000 cavalymen, were routed and put to disorderly flight by a single infantry battalion just because they, the cavalry divisions, were caught unawares and succumbed to panic in face of an enemy about whom they knew nothing, and who was extremely weak numerically and could have been shattered at one blow if these divisions had not been in a state of somnolence, and then of panic and confusion.

The same must be said of our Party, our Young Communist League, our trade unions, our forces in general. It is not true that we no longer have class enemies, that they have been smashed and eliminated. No, comrades, our class enemies still exist. They not only exist, they are growing and trying to take action against the Soviet Government.

That was shown by our procurement difficulties last winter, when the capitalist elements in the countryside tried to sabotage the policy of the Soviet Government.

It was shown by the Shakhty affair, which was the expression of a joint attack on the Soviet regime launched by international capital and the bourgeoisie in our country.

It is shown by numerous facts in the sphere of home and foreign policy, facts which are known to you and which there is no need to dwell on here.

To keep silent about these enemies of the working class would be wrong. To underrate the strength of the



class enemies of the working class would be criminal. To keep silent about all this would be particularly wrong now, in the period of our peaceful development, when there is a certain favourable soil for the theory of somnolence and of things going "of their own accord," which undermines the readiness for action of the working class.

The procurement crisis and the Shakhty affair were of tremendous educational value, because they shook up all our organisations, discredited the theory of things going "of their own accord," and once more stressed the existence of class enemies, showing that they are alive, are not dozing, and that in order to combat them we must enhance the strength of the working class, its vigilance, its revolutionary spirit, its readiness for action.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party, the political line of its day-to-day work: *to enhance the readiness of the working class for action against its class enemies.*

It must be said that this Y.C.L. congress, and especially *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, have now come closer than ever before to this task. You know that the importance of this task is being stressed by speakers here and by articles in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. That is very good, comrades. It is necessary only that this task should not be regarded as a temporary and transient one, for the task of enhancing the readiness of the proletariat for action is one that must imbue all our work so long as there are classes in our country and so long as capitalist encirclement exists.

## II

### ORGANISE MASS CRITICISM FROM BELOW

The second question concerns the task of combating bureaucracy, of organising mass criticism of our shortcomings, of organising mass control from below.

Bureaucracy is one of the worst enemies of our progress. It exists in all our organisations—Party, Y.C.L., trade-union and economic. When people talk of bureaucrats, they usually point to the old non-Party officials, who as a rule are depicted in our cartoons as men wearing spectacles. (*Laughter.*) That is not quite true, comrades. If it were only a question of the old bureaucrats, the fight against bureaucracy would be very easy. The trouble is that it is not a matter of the old bureaucrats. It is a matter of the new bureaucrats, bureaucrats who sympathise with the Soviet Government, and finally, communist bureaucrats. The communist bureaucrat is the most dangerous type of bureaucrat. Why? Because he masks his bureaucracy with the title of Party member. And, unfortunately, we have quite a number of such communist bureaucrats.

Take our Party organisations. You have no doubt read about the Smolensk affair, the Artyomovsk affair and so on. What do you think, were they matters of chance? What is the explanation of these shameful instances of corruption and moral deterioration in certain of our Party organisations? The fact that Party monopoly was carried to absurd lengths, that the voice of the rank and file was stifled, that inner-Party democracy was abolished and bureaucracy became rife. How is

this evil to be combated? I think that there is not and cannot be any other way of combating this evil than by organising control from below by the Party masses, by implanting inner-Party democracy. What objection can there be to rousing the fury of the mass of the Party membership against these corrupt elements and giving it the opportunity to send such elements packing? There can hardly be any objection to that.

Or take the Young Communist League, for instance. You will not deny, of course, that here and there in the Young Communist League there are utterly corrupt elements against whom it is absolutely essential to wage a ruthless struggle. But let us leave aside the corrupt elements. Let us take the latest fact of an unprincipled struggle waged by groups within the Young Communist League around personalities, a struggle which is poisoning the atmosphere in the Young Communist League. Why is it that you can find as many "Kosarevites" and "Sobolevites" as you like in the Young Communist League, while Marxists have to be looked for with a candle? (*Applause.*) What does this indicate, if not that a process of bureaucratic petrification is taking place in certain sections of the Y.C.L. top leadership?

And the trade unions? Who will deny that in the trade unions there is bureaucracy in plenty? We have production conferences in the factories. We have temporary control commissions in the trade unions. It is the task of these organisations to rouse the masses, to bring our shortcomings to light and to indicate ways and means of improving our constructive work. Why are these organisations not developing? Why are they not seething with activity? Is it not obvious that it is bureaucracy in

the trade unions, coupled with bureaucracy in the Party organisations, that is preventing these highly important organisations of the working class from developing?

Lastly, our economic organisations. Who will deny that our economic bodies suffer from bureaucracy? Take the Shakhty affair as an illustration. Does not the Shakhty affair indicate that our economic bodies are not speeding ahead, but crawling, dragging their feet?

How are we to put an end to bureaucracy in all these organisations?

There is only one sole way of doing this, and that is to organise control from below, to organise criticism of the bureaucracy in our institutions, of their shortcomings and their mistakes, by the vast masses of the working class.

I know that by rousing the fury of the masses of the working people against the bureaucratic distortions in our organisations, we sometimes have to tread on the toes of some of our comrades who have past services to their credit, but who are now suffering from the disease of bureaucracy. But ought this to stop our work of organising control from below? I think that it ought not and must not. For their past services we should take off our hats to them, but for their present blunders and bureaucracy it would be quite in order to give them a good drubbing. (*Laughter and applause.*) How else? Why not do this if the interests of the work demand it?

There is talk of criticism from above, criticism by the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, by the Central Committee of our Party and so on. That, of course, is all very good. But it is still far from enough. More, it is by no means the chief thing now. The chief thing

now is to start a broad tide of criticism from below against bureaucracy in general, against shortcomings in our work in particular. Only by organising twofold pressure—from above and from below—and only by shifting the principal stress to criticism from below, can we count on waging a successful struggle against bureaucracy and on rooting it out.

It would be a mistake to think that only the leaders possess experience in constructive work. That is not true, comrades. The vast masses of the workers who are engaged in building our industry are day by day accumulating vast experience in construction, experience which is not a whit less valuable to us than the experience of the leaders. Mass criticism from below, control from below, is needed by us in order that, among other things, this experience of the vast masses should not be wasted, but be reckoned with and translated into practice.

From this follows the immediate task of the Party: *to wage a ruthless struggle against bureaucracy, to organise mass criticism from below, and to take this criticism into account when adopting practical decisions for eliminating our shortcomings.*

It cannot be said that the Young Communist League, and especially *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, have not appreciated the importance of this task. The shortcoming here is that often the fulfilment of this task is not carried out completely. And in order to carry it out completely, it is necessary to give heed not only to criticism, but also to the results of criticism, to the improvements that are introduced as a result of criticism.

### III

## THE YOUTH MUST MASTER SCIENCE

The third task concerns the question of organising new cadres for socialist construction.

Before us, comrades, lies the gigantic task of reconstructing our entire national economy. In the sphere of agriculture, we must lay the foundation of large-scale, united, socially-conducted farming. You no doubt know from Comrade Molotov's manifesto<sup>16</sup> published today that the Soviet Government is tackling the very formidable task of uniting the small, scattered peasant farms into collective farms and creating new large state farms for grain production. Unless these tasks are accomplished, substantial and rapid progress will be impossible.

Whereas in industry the Soviet regime rests upon the largest-scale and most highly concentrated form of production, in agriculture it rests upon the most scattered and small-scale peasant economy, which is of a semi-commodity character and yields a far smaller surplus of marketable grain than the pre-war economy, despite the fact that the crop areas have reached pre-war levels. That is the basis for all sorts of difficulties that may arise in the sphere of grain procurements in future. In order to extricate ourselves from this situation, we must seriously set about organising large-scale socially-conducted production in agriculture. But in order to organise large-scale farming, we must have a knowledge of agricultural science. And knowledge entails study. Yet we have scandalously few people with a knowledge of agricultural science. Hence the task of training new,

young cadres of builders of a new, socially-conducted agriculture.

In the sphere of industry the situation is much better. But, here, too, lack of new cadres of builders is retarding our progress. It suffices to recall the Shakhty affair to realise how acute the problem is of training new cadres of builders of socialist industry. Of course, we have old experts in the building of industry. But, firstly, there are very few of them, secondly, not all of them want to build a new industry, thirdly, many of them do not understand the new construction tasks, and, fourthly, a large proportion of them are already old and are going out of commission. In order to advance matters, we must train at a high speed new cadres of experts, drawn from the working class, the Communists and members of the Young Communist League.

We have plenty of people who are willing to build and to direct the work of construction both in agriculture and in industry. But we have scandalously few people who know how to build and direct. On the contrary, our ignorance in this sphere is abysmal. More, there are people among us who are prepared to extol our lack of knowledge. If you are illiterate or cannot write grammatically and are proud of your backwardness—you are a worker “at the bench,” you deserve honour and respect. But if you have climbed out of your ignorance, have learned to read and write and have mastered science—you are an alien element who has “broken away” from the masses, you have ceased to be a worker.

I consider that we shall not advance a single step until we root out this barbarism and boorishness, this barbaric attitude towards science and men of cul-

ture. The working class cannot become the real master of the country if it does not succeed in overcoming its lack of culture, if it does not succeed in creating its own intelligentsia, if it does not master science and learn to administer economy on scientific lines.

It must be realised, comrades, that the conditions of the struggle today are not what they were at the time of the civil war. At the time of the civil war it was possible to capture enemy positions by dash, courage, daring, by cavalry assaults. Today, in the conditions of peaceful economic construction, cavalry assaults can only do harm. Courage and daring are needed now as much as before. But courage and daring alone will not carry us very far. In order to beat the enemy now, we must know how to build industry, agriculture, transport, trade; we must abandon the haughty and supercilious attitude towards trade.

In order to build, we must have knowledge, mastery of science. And knowledge entails study. We must study perseveringly and patiently. We must learn from everyone, both from our enemies and from our friends, especially from our enemies. We must clench our teeth and study, not fearing that our enemies may laugh at us, at our ignorance, at our backwardness.

Before us stands a fortress. That fortress is called science, with its numerous branches of knowledge. We must capture that fortress at all costs. It is our youth who must capture that fortress, if they want to be builders of the new life, if they want to be real successors of the old guard.

We cannot now confine ourselves to training communist cadres *in general*, Bolshevik cadres *in general*,



people who are able to prattle a little about everything. Dilettantism and the know-all attitude are now shackles on our feet. We now need Bolshevik *experts* in metallurgy, textiles, fuel, chemistry, agriculture, transport, trade, accountancy, and so on and so forth. We now need whole groups, hundreds and thousands of new Bolshevik cadres capable of becoming masters of their subject in the most diverse branches of knowledge. Failing this, it is useless to think of any swift rate of socialist construction in our country. Failing this, it is useless to think that we can overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries.

*We must master science, we must train new cadres of Bolshevik experts in all branches of knowledge, we must study, study and study most perseveringly.* That is the task now.

*A mass campaign of the revolutionary youth for science—that is what we need now, comrades. (Stormy applause. Cries of “Hurrah!” and “Bravo!” All rise.)*

*Pravda*, No. 113,  
May 17, 1928

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## TO *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*

*On Its Tenth Anniversary*

Friendly greetings to *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the militant organ of our worker and peasant youth!

I wish it success on the difficult front of training the youth for an implacable struggle against the enemies of the working class, for the struggle for the complete victory of communism all over the world!

Let *Komsomolskaya Pravda* be a signal bell that arouses the slumbering, heartens the weary, urges on the stragglers, scourges bureaucracy in our institutions, reveals shortcomings in our work, gives prominence to our achievements in construction, and thus facilitates the training of new people, of new builders of socialism, a new generation of young men and women capable of succeeding the old guard of Bolsheviks!

The strength of our revolution lies in the fact that there is no division between our old and new generations of revolutionaries. We owe our victories to the fact that the old guard and the young guard march shoulder to shoulder, in a united front, in a single column, against our enemies, internal as well as external.

The task is to preserve and fortify this unity.

Let *Komsomolskaya Pravda* be an untiring advocate of the unity of the old and the young guard of Bolsheviks!

***J. Stalin***

May 26, 1928

*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 122,  
May 27, 1928

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## TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY

### *On Its Tenth Anniversary*

The ten years' existence of the Sverdlov University<sup>17</sup> is a signal achievement of the Party on the front of the struggle for training new Leninist cadres.

In these ten years the Sverdlov University has given the Party hundreds and thousands of young forces who are devoted to the cause of communism and have become successors to the old guard of Bolsheviks.

In these ten years the university has fully justified its existence and shown that it is not for nothing that it bears the name of its founder, that foremost champion of communism, Y. M. Sverdlov.

The task of the Sverdlov University is to train working-class members of the Party to master the scientific method of Marx and Lenin and to apply it properly in the work of building socialism, and this task it has performed, is performing, and will continue to perform with honour.

Congratulations to past and present Sverdlovians on the tenth anniversary of the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University!

Congratulations to the Sverdlovians of the anniversary graduation, the new detachment of builders of socialism!

***J. Stalin***

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## ON THE GRAIN FRONT

*From a Talk to Students  
of the Institute of Red Professors,  
the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov University  
May 28, 1928*

*Question:* What should be considered as the basic cause of our difficulties in the matter of the grain supply? What is the way out of these difficulties? What, in connection with these difficulties, are the conclusions that must be drawn as regards the rate of development of our industry, particularly from the point of view of the relation between the light and heavy industries?

*Answer:* At first sight it may appear that our grain difficulties are an accident, the result merely of faulty planning, the result merely of a number of mistakes committed in the sphere of economic co-ordination.

But it may appear so only at first sight. Actually the causes of the difficulties lie much deeper. That faulty planning and mistakes in economic co-ordination have played a considerable part—of that there cannot be any doubt. But to attribute everything to faulty planning and chance mistakes would be a gross error. It would be an error to belittle the role and importance of planning. But it would be a still greater error to exaggerate the part played by the planning principle, in the belief that we have already reached a stage of development when it is possible to plan and regulate everything.

It must not be forgotten that in addition to elements which lend themselves to our planning activities there

are also other elements in our national economy which do not as yet lend themselves to planning; and that, lastly, there are classes hostile to us which cannot be overcome simply by the planning of the State Planning Commission.

That is why I think that we must not reduce everything to a mere accident, to mistakes in planning, etc.

And so, what is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front?

The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the fact that the increase in the production of marketable grain is not keeping pace with the increase in the demand for grain.

Industry is growing. The number of workers is growing. Towns are growing. And, lastly, the areas producing industrial crops (cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc.) are growing, creating a demand for grain. All this leads to a rapid increase in the demand for grain—grain available for the market. But the production of marketable grain is increasing at a disastrously slow rate.

It cannot be said that the grain stocks at the disposal of the state have been smaller this year than last, or the year before. On the contrary, we have had far more grain in the hands of the state this year than in previous years. Nevertheless, we are faced with difficulties as regards the grain supply.

Here are a few figures. In 1925-26 we managed to procure 434,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 123,000,000 poods were exported. Thus, there remained in the country 311,000,000 poods of the grain procured. In 1926-27 we had procured 596,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 153,000,000 poods were exported. There remained in the country

443,000,000 poods. In 1927-28 we had procured 576,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 27,000,000 poods were exported. There remained in the country 549,000,000 poods.

In other words, this year, by April 1, the grain supplies available to meet the requirements of the country amounted to 100,000,000 poods more than last year, and 230,000,000 poods more than the year before last. Nevertheless, we are experiencing difficulties on the grain front this year.

I have already said in one of my reports that the capitalist elements in the countryside, and primarily the kulaks, took advantage of these difficulties in order to disrupt Soviet economic policy. You know that the Soviet government adopted a number of measures aimed at putting a stop to the anti-Soviet action of the kulaks. I shall not therefore dwell on this matter here. In the present case it is another question that interests me. I have in mind the reasons for the slow increase in the production of marketable grain, the question why the increase in the production of marketable grain in our country is slower than the increase in the demand for grain, in spite of the fact that our crop area and the gross production of grain have already reached the pre-war level.

Indeed, is it not a fact that our grain crop area has already reached the pre-war mark? Yes, it is a fact. Is it not a fact that already last year the gross production of grain was equal to the pre-war output, i.e., 5,000 million poods? Yes, it is a fact. How, then, is it to be explained that, in spite of these circumstances, the amount of marketable grain we are producing is

only one half, and the amount we are exporting is only about one-twentieth, of the pre-war figure?

The reason is primarily and chiefly the change in the structure of our agriculture brought about by the October Revolution, the passing from large-scale landlord and large-scale kulak farming, which provided the largest amount of marketable grain, to small- and middle-peasant farming, which provides the smallest amount of marketable grain. The mere fact that before the war there were 15,000,000 to 16,000,000 individual peasant farms, whereas at present there are 24,000,000 to 25,000,000 peasant farms, shows that now the basis of our agriculture is essentially small-peasant farming, which provides the least amount of marketable grain.

The strength of large-scale farming, irrespective of whether it is landlord, kulak or collective farming, lies in the fact that large farms are able to employ machines, scientific methods, fertilizers, to increase the productivity of labour, and thus to produce the maximum quantity of marketable grain. On the other hand, the weakness of small-peasant farming lies in the fact that it lacks, or almost lacks, these opportunities, and as a result it is semi-consuming farming, yielding little marketable grain.

Take, for instance, the collective farms and the state farms. They market 47.2 per cent of their gross output of grain. In other words, they yield relatively more marketable grain than did landlord farming in pre-war days. But what about the small- and middle-peasant farms? They market only 11.2 per cent of their total output of grain. The difference, as you see, is quite striking.

Here are a few figures illustrating the structure of grain production in the past, in the pre-war period, and at present, in the post-October period. These figures were supplied by Comrade Nemchinov, a member of the Collegium of the Central Statistical Board. It is not claimed that these figures are exact, as Comrade Nemchinov explains in his memorandum; they permit of only approximate calculations. But they are quite adequate to enable us to understand the difference between the pre-war period and the post-October period as regards the structure of grain production in general, and the production of marketable grain in particular.

	<i>Gross Grain Production</i>		<i>Marketable Grain (i. e., not con- sumed in the countryside)</i>		Percentage of market- able grain
	Millions of poods	Per cent	Millions of poods	Per cent	
<i>Pre-war</i>					
1. Landlords . . . .	600	12.0	281.6	21.6	47.0
2. Kulaks . . . . .	1,900	38.0	650.0	50.0	34.0
3. Middle and poor peasants . . . . .	2,500	50.0	369.0	28.4	14.7
<i>Total . . .</i>	5,000	100.0	1,300.6	100.0	26.0
<i>Post-war (1926-27)</i>					
1. State farms and collective farms .	80.0	1.7	37.8	6.0	47.2
2. Kulaks . . . . .	617.0	13.0	126.0	20.0	20.0
3. Middle and poor peasants . . . . .	4,052.0	85.3	466.2	74.0	11.2
<i>Total . . .</i>	4,749.0	100.0	630.0	100.0	13.3



What does this table show?

It shows, firstly, that the production of the overwhelming proportion of grain products has passed from the landlords and kulaks to the small and middle peasants. This means that the small and middle peasants, having completely emancipated themselves from the yoke of the landlords, and having, in the main, broken the strength of the kulaks, have thereby been enabled considerably to improve their material conditions. That is the result of the October Revolution. Here we see the effect, primarily, of the decisive gain which accrued to the main mass of the peasantry as a result of the October Revolution.

It shows, secondly, that in our country the principal holders of marketable grain are the small and, primarily, the middle peasants. This means that not only as regards gross production of grain, but also as regards the production of marketable grain, the U.S.S.R. has become, as a result of the October Revolution, a land of small-peasant farming, and the middle peasant has become the "central figure" in agriculture.

It shows, thirdly, that the abolition of landlord (large-scale) farming, the reduction of kulak (large-scale) farming to less than one-third, and the passing to small-peasant farming with only 11 per cent of its output marketed, in the absence, in the sphere of grain production, of any more or less developed large-scale socially-conducted farming (collective farms and state farms), were bound to lead, and in fact have led, to a sharp reduction in the production of marketable grain as compared with pre-war times. It is a fact that the amount of marketable grain in our country is now half what

it was before the war, although the gross output of grain has reached the pre-war level.

That is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

That is why our difficulties in the sphere of grain procurements must not be regarded as a mere accident.

No doubt the situation has been aggravated to some extent by the fact that our trading organisations took upon themselves the unnecessary task of supplying grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns, and this was bound to reduce to a certain extent the state's grain reserves. But there are no grounds whatever for doubting that the basis of our difficulties on the grain front lies not in this particular circumstance, but in the slow development of the output of our agriculture for the market, accompanied by a rapid increase in the demand for marketable grain.

What is the way out of this situation?

Some people see the way out of this situation in a return to kulak farming, in the development and extension of kulak farming. These people dare not speak of a return to landlord farming, for they realise, evidently, that such talk is dangerous in our times. All the more eagerly, however, do they speak of the necessity of the utmost development of kulak farming in the interests of—the Soviet regime. These people think that the Soviet regime can rely simultaneously on two opposite classes—the class of the kulaks, whose economic principle is the exploitation of the working class, and the class of the workers, whose economic principle is the abolition of all exploitation. A trick worthy of reactionaries.

There is no need to prove that these reactionary “plans” have nothing in common with the interests of the working class, with the principles of Marxism, with the tasks of Leninism. Talk about the kulak being “no worse” than the urban capitalist, about the kulak being no more dangerous than the urban Nepman, and therefore, about there being no reason to “fear” the kulaks now—such talk is sheer liberal chatter which lulls the vigilance of the working class and of the main mass of the peasantry. It must not be forgotten that in industry we can oppose to the small urban capitalist our large-scale socialist industry, which produces nine-tenths of the total output of manufactured goods, whereas in the countryside we can oppose to large-scale kulak farming only the still weak collective farms and state farms, which produce but one-eighth of the amount of grain produced by the kulak farms. To fail to understand the significance of large-scale kulak farming in the countryside, to fail to understand that the relative importance of the kulaks in the countryside is a hundred times greater than that of the small capitalists in urban industry, is to lose one’s senses, to break with Leninism, to desert to the side of the enemies of the working class.

What, then, is the way out of the situation?

1) The way out lies, above all, in passing from small, backward and scattered peasant farms to united, large socially-conducted farms, equipped with machinery, armed with scientific knowledge and capable of producing the maximum amount of marketable grain. The way out lies in the transition from individual peasant farming to collective, socially-conducted economy in agriculture.

Lenin called on the Party to organise collective farms from the very first days of the October Revolution. From that time onwards the propaganda of the idea of collective farming has not ceased in our Party. However, it is only recently that the call for the formation of collective farms has met with a mass response. This is to be explained primarily by the fact that the widespread development of a co-operative communal life in the countryside paved the way for a radical change in the attitude of the peasants in favour of collective farms, while the existence of a number of collective farms already harvesting from 150 to 200 poods per dessiatin, of which from 30 to 40 per cent represents a marketable surplus, is strongly attracting the poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants towards the collective farms.

Of no little importance in this connection is also the fact that only recently has it become possible for the state to lend substantial financial assistance to the collective-farm movement. We know that this year the state has granted twice the amount of money it did last year in aid of the collective farms (more than 60,000,000 rubles). The Fifteenth Party Congress was absolutely right in stating that the conditions have already ripened for a mass collective-farm movement and that the stimulation of the collective-farm movement is one of the most important means of increasing the proportion of marketable grain in the country's grain production.

According to the data of the Central Statistical Board, the gross production of grain by the collective farms in 1927 amounted to no less than 55,000,000 poods,

with an average marketable surplus of 30 per cent. The widespread movement at the beginning of this year for the formation of new collective farms and for the expansion of the old ones should considerably increase the grain output of the collective farms by the end of the year. The task is to maintain the present rate of development of the collective-farm movement, to enlarge the collective farms, to get rid of sham collective farms, replacing them by genuine ones, and to establish a system whereby the collective farms will deliver to the state and co-operative organisations the whole of their marketable grain under penalty of being deprived of state subsidies and credits. I think that, if these conditions are adhered to, within three or four years we shall be able to obtain from the collective farms as much as 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

The collective-farm movement is sometimes contrasted with the co-operative movement, apparently on the assumption that collective farms are one thing, and co-operatives another. That, of course, is wrong. Some even go so far as to contrast collective farms with Lenin's co-operative plan. Needless to say, such contrasting has nothing in common with the truth. In actual fact, the collective farms are a form of co-operatives, the most striking form of producers' co-operatives. There are marketing co-operatives, there are supply co-operatives, and there are also producers' co-operatives. The collective farms are an inseparable and integral part of the co-operative movement in general, and of Lenin's co-operative plan in particular. To carry out Lenin's co-operative plan means to raise the peasantry from the level of marketing and supply co-operatives to the level

of producers' co-operatives, of collective-farm co-operatives, so to speak. This, by the way, explains why our collective farms began to arise and develop only as a result of the development and consolidation of the marketing and supply co-operatives.

2) The way out lies, secondly, in expanding and strengthening the old state farms, and in organising and developing new, large ones. According to the data of the Central Statistical Board, the gross production of grain in the existing state farms amounted in 1927 to no less than 45,000,000 poods with a marketable surplus of 65 per cent. There is no doubt that, given a certain amount of state support, the state farms could considerably increase the production of grain.

But the task does not end there. There is a decision of the Soviet government on the strength of which new large state farms (from 10,000 to 30,000 dessiatins each) are being organised in districts where there are no peasant holdings; and in five or six years these state farms should yield about 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain. The organisation of these state farms has already begun. The task is to put this decision of the Soviet government into effect at all costs. I think that, provided these tasks are fulfilled, within three or four years we shall be able to obtain from the old and new state farms about 80,000,000-100,000,000 poods of grain for the market.

3) Finally, the way out lies in systematically increasing the yield of the individual small- and middle-peasant farms. We cannot and should not lend any support to the individual large kulak farms. But we can and should assist the individual small- and middle-peas-

ant farms, helping them to increase their crop yields and drawing them into the channel of co-operative organisation. This is an old task; it was proclaimed with particular emphasis as early as 1921 when the tax in kind was substituted for the surplus-appropriation system. This task was reaffirmed by our Party at its Fourteenth<sup>18</sup> and Fifteenth Congresses. The importance of this task is now emphasised by the difficulties on the grain front. That is why this task must be fulfilled with the same persistence as the first two tasks will be, those concerning the collective farms and the state farms.

All the data show that the yield of peasant farms can be increased by some 15 to 20 per cent in the course of a few years. At present no less than 5,000,000 wooden ploughs are in use in our country. Their replacement by modern ploughs alone would result in a very considerable increase in grain production in the country. This is apart from supplying the peasant farms with a certain minimum of fertilisers, selected seed, small machines, etc. The contract system, the system of signing contracts with whole villages for supplying them with seed, etc., on condition that in return they unfailingly deliver a certain quantity of grain products—this system is the best method of raising the yield of peasant farms and of drawing the peasants into the co-operatives. I think that if we work persistently in this direction we can, within three or four years, obtain additionally from the small and middle individual peasant farms not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

Thus, if all these tasks are fulfilled, the state can in three or four years' time have at its disposal 250,000,000 to 300,000,000 additional poods of marketable grain—

a supply more or less sufficient to enable us to manoeuvre properly within the country as well as abroad.

Such, in the main, are the measures which must be taken in order to solve the difficulties on the grain front.

Our task at present is to combine these basic measures with current measures to improve planning in the sphere of supplying the countryside with goods, relieving our trading organisations of the duty of supplying grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns.

Should not, in addition to these measures, a number of other measures be adopted—measures, say, to reduce the rate of development of our industry, the growth of which is causing a considerable increase in the demand for grain, which at present is outstripping the increase in the production of marketable grain? No, not under any circumstances! To reduce the rate of development of industry would mean to weaken the working class; for every step forward in the development of industry, every new factory, every new works, is, as Lenin expressed it, “a new stronghold” of the working class, one which strengthens the latter’s position in the fight against the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, in the fight against the capitalist elements in our economy. On the contrary, we must maintain the present rate of development of industry: we must at the first opportunity speed it up in order to pour goods into the rural areas and obtain more grain from them, in order to supply agriculture, and primarily the collective farms and state farms, with machines, in order to industrialise agriculture and to increase the proportion of its output for the market.



Should we, perhaps, for the sake of greater “caution,” retard the development of heavy industry so as to make light industry, which produces chiefly for the peasant market, the basis of our industry? Not under any circumstances! That would be suicidal; it would undermine our whole industry, including light industry. It would mean abandoning the slogan of industrialising our country, it would mean transforming our country into an appendage of the world capitalist system of economy.

In this respect we proceed from the well-known guiding principles which Lenin set forth at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern<sup>19</sup> and which are absolutely binding for the whole of our Party. Here is what Lenin said on this subject at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern:

“The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms—that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods—that, too, is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry.”

Or again:

“We are exercising economy in all things, even in schools. This must be so, because we know that unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without that we shall be doomed as an independent country” (Vol. XXVII, p. 349).

These directives given by Lenin must never be forgotten.

How will the measures proposed affect the alliance between the workers and the peasants? I think that these

measures can only help to strengthen the alliance between the workers and the peasants.

Indeed, if the collective farms and the state farms develop at increased speed; if, as a result of direct assistance given to the small and middle peasants, the yield of their farms increases and the co-operatives embrace wider and wider masses of the peasantry; if the state obtains the hundreds of millions of poods of additional marketable grain required for manoeuvring; if, as a result of these and similar measures, the kulaks are curbed and gradually overcome—is it not clear that the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry within the alliance of the workers and peasants will thereby be smoothed out more and more; that the need for emergency measures in the procurement of grain will disappear; that wide masses of the peasantry will turn more and more to collective forms of farming, and that the fight to overcome the capitalist elements in the countryside will assume an increasingly mass and organised character?

Is it not clear that the cause of the alliance between the workers and the peasants can only benefit by such measures?

It must only be borne in mind that the alliance of the workers and peasants under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be viewed as an ordinary alliance. It is a special form of class alliance between the working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry, which sets itself the object: a) of strengthening the position of the working class; b) of ensuring the leading role of the working class within this alliance; c) of abolishing classes and class society. Any other

conception of the alliance of the workers and peasants is opportunism, Menshevism, S.-R.-ism—anything you like, but not Marxism, not Leninism.

How can the idea of the alliance of the workers and peasants be reconciled with Lenin's well-known thesis that the peasantry is "the last capitalist class"? Is there not a contradiction here? The contradiction is only an apparent, a seeming one. Actually there is no contradiction here at all. In that same speech at the Third Congress of the Comintern<sup>20</sup> in which Lenin characterised the peasantry as "the last capitalist class," he again and again substantiates the need for an alliance between the workers and the peasants, declaring that "the supreme principle of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power." It is clear that Lenin, at any rate, saw no contradiction in this.

How are we to understand Lenin's thesis that the peasantry is "the last capitalist class"? Does it mean that the peasantry consists of capitalists? No, it does not.

It means, firstly, that the individual peasantry is a special class, which bases its economy on the private ownership of the instruments and means of production and which, for that reason, differs from the class of proletarians, who base their economy on collective ownership of the instruments and means of production.

It means, secondly, that the individual peasantry is a class which produces from its midst, engenders and nourishes, capitalists, kulaks and all kinds of exploiters in general.

Is not this circumstance an insuperable obstacle to the organisation of an alliance of the workers and peasants? No, it is not. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be regarded as an alliance with the whole of the peasantry. The alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry is an alliance of the working class with the labouring masses of the peasantry. Such an alliance cannot be effected without a struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry, against the kulaks. Such an alliance cannot be a stable one unless the poor peasants are organised as the bulwark of the working class in the countryside. That is why the alliance between the workers and the peasants under the present conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be effected only in accordance with Lenin's well-known slogan: Rely on the poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks. For only by applying this slogan can the main mass of the peasantry be drawn into the channel of socialist construction.

You see, therefore, that the contradiction between Lenin's two formulas is only an imaginary, a seeming contradiction. Actually, there is no contradiction between them at all.

*Pravda*, No. 127,  
June 2, 1928

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## LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AFFAIRS STUDY CIRCLE AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY

Today I received Slepkov's theses on self-criticism. It appears that they were discussed in your circle. I have been told by members of the circle that these theses were circulated as a document that is intended not to criticise the line of the Central Committee, but to substantiate it.

It would be wrong to deny that Party members have the right to criticise the line of the Central Committee. More, I am ready to grant that members of your study circle even have the right to put forward among themselves their own separate theses opposing the C.C.'s position. Slepkov's theses, however, evidently do not aim at criticising the C.C.'s line, or putting forward anything new in opposition to it, but at explaining and substantiating the position of the C.C. It is this, presumably, that explains why Slepkov's theses received certain currency in Moscow Party circles.

Nevertheless, or, rather, for that very reason, I consider it my duty to declare that Slepkov's theses

a) do not coincide with the C.C.'s position on the slogan of self-criticism, and that

b) they "correct," "supplement" and, naturally, worsen it, to the advantage of the bureaucratic elements in our institutions and organisations.

1) Incorrect, in the first place, is the line of Slepkov's theses. Slepkov's theses only superficially resem-

ble theses on the slogan of self-criticism. Actually, they are theses on the *dangers* of the slogan of self-criticism. There is no denying that every revolutionary slogan harbours certain possibilities of being distorted in practical use. Such possibilities also apply, of course, to the slogan of self-criticism. But to make these possibilities the central issue, the basis of theses on self-criticism, is to turn things upside down, to undermine the revolutionary significance of self-criticism, to assist the bureaucrats who are trying to evade self-criticism owing to the “dangers” connected with it. I have no doubt that it will not be without a feeling of satisfaction that the bureaucratic elements in our Party and Soviet organisations will read Slepko’s theses.

Has such a line anything in common with the C.C.’s line on self-criticism, with the resolution of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. on the Shakhty affair, or with the C.C.’s June appeal on the subject of self-criticism?<sup>21</sup>

I think not.

2) Incorrect, too, is the inner substance of Slepko’s theses. One of the most serious factors making self-criticism unavoidable, and at the same time one of the most important objects of self-criticism, is the bureaucracy of our organisations.

Can we make any progress if we do not combat the bureaucracy of our Party and Soviet apparatus?

No, we cannot!

Can we organise control by the masses, stimulate the initiative and independent activity of the masses, draw the vast masses into the work of socialist construction, if we do not wage a determined struggle against bureaucracy in our organisations?

No, we cannot!

Can we sap, weaken, discredit bureaucracy without giving effect to the slogan of self-criticism?

No, we cannot!

Is it possible, in theses dealing with the slogan of self-criticism, to evade discussing bureaucracy as a factor detrimental to our socialist construction and as one of the most important objects of self-criticism?

Obviously, we cannot.

How, then, is it to be explained that Slepkov contrived in his theses to say nothing about this burning question? How is it possible, in theses on self-criticism that are intended to substantiate the position of the C.C., to forget the most important task of self-criticism—that of combating bureaucracy? Yet it is a fact that in Slepkov's theses there is not a single word (literally not a single word!) about the bureaucracy of our organisations, about the bureaucratic elements in these organisations, about the bureaucratic perversions in the work of our Party and Soviet apparatus.

Can this more than frivolous attitude towards the highly important question of combating bureaucracy be reconciled with the C.C.'s position on the question of self-criticism, with such Party documents as the resolution of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. on the Shakhty affair or the C.C.'s June appeal on self-criticism?

I think not.

With communist greetings,

***J. Stalin***

June 8, 1928

*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 90,  
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## LENIN AND THE QUESTION OF THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT\*

*Reply to Comrade S.*

Comrade S.,

*It is not true* that Lenin's slogan: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on the poor peasant," which he advanced in his well-known article on Pitirim Sorokin,<sup>22</sup> is, as is alleged, a slogan of the "period of the Poor Peasants' Committees," a slogan of "the end of the period of the so-called neutralisation of the middle peasantry." *That is absolutely untrue.*

The Poor Peasants' Committees were formed in June 1918. By the end of October 1918, our forces in the countryside had already gained the upper hand over the kulaks, and the middle peasants had *turned* to the side of the Soviet power. It was on the basis of this turn that the decision of the Central Committee was taken to abolish the dual power of the Soviets and the Poor Peasants' Committees, to hold new elections to the volost and village Soviets, to merge the Poor Peasants' Committees with the newly-elected Soviets and, consequently, to dissolve the Poor Peasants' Committees. This decision was formally approved, as is well known, on November 9,

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\* Slightly abridged.—*J. St.*



1918, by the Sixth Congress of Soviets. I have in mind the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets of November 9, 1918, on the village and volost Soviet elections and the merging of the Poor Peasants' Committees with the Soviets.

But when did Lenin's article, "The Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin," appear, the article in which he proclaimed the slogan of agreement with the middle peasant in the place of the slogan of neutralising the middle peasant? It appeared on November 21, 1918, i.e., nearly two weeks *after* the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets. In this article Lenin plainly says that the policy of agreement with the middle peasant is dictated by the *turn* to our side made by the middle peasant.

Here is what Lenin says:

"Our task in the countryside is to destroy the landlord and smash the resistance of the exploiter and the kulak speculator. For this purpose we can rely firmly *only* on the semi-proletarians, the 'poor peasants.' But the middle peasant is not our enemy. He vacillated, is vacillating and will continue to vacillate. The task of influencing the vacillators *is not identical* with the task of overthrowing the exploiter and defeating the active enemy. The task at the present moment is to come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on the poor peasant, for it is precisely now that *a turn in our direction on the part of the middle peasantry is inevitable*,\* owing to the causes above enumerated" (Vol. XXIII, p. 294).

What follows from this?

It follows from this that Lenin's slogan refers, not to the *old* period, not to the period of the Poor Peasants' Committees and the neutralisation of the middle peasant,

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

but to the *new* period, the period of agreement with the middle peasant. Thus, it reflects, not the *end* of the old period, but the *beginning* of a new period.

But your assertion about Lenin's slogan is not only wrong from the formal point of view, not merely, so to speak, chronologically; it is wrong in substance.

We know that Lenin's slogan regarding agreement with the middle peasant was proclaimed as a new slogan by the whole Party at the Eighth Party Congress (March 1919). We know that the Eighth Party Congress was the congress which laid the foundation of our policy of a stable alliance with the middle peasant. It is known that our programme, the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was adopted also at the Eighth Congress of the Party. We know that that programme contains special points dealing with the Party's attitude towards the various groups in the countryside: the poor peasants, the middle peasants, and the kulaks. What do these points in the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) say regarding the social groups in the countryside and regarding our Party's attitude towards them? Listen:

"In all its work in the countryside the R.C.P., as hitherto, *relies on the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata of the rural population*; first and foremost it organises these strata into an independent force by establishing Party units in the villages, forming organisations of poor peasants, a special type of trade unions of proletarians and semi-proletarians in the country side, and so forth, bringing them closer in every way to the urban proletariat and wresting them from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and the small proprietor interests.

"With respect to the kulaks, to the rural bourgeoisie, the policy of the R.C.P. is *resolutely to combat their exploiting proclivities, to suppress their resistance to the Soviet policy.*

“With respect to the middle peasants, the policy of the R.C.P. is gradually and systematically to draw them into the work of socialist construction. The Party sets itself the task of separating them from the kulaks, of winning them to the side of the working class by carefully attending to their needs, of combating their backwardness by measures of ideological influence and not at all by measures of repression, and of striving in all cases where their vital interests are concerned to come *to practical agreements with them*, making concessions to them in determining the methods of carrying out socialist changes”\* (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, p. 351<sup>23</sup>).

Try to find the slightest difference even in words between these points of the programme and Lenin’s slogan! You will not find any difference, for there is none. More than that. There cannot be any doubt that Lenin’s slogan not only does not contradict the decisions of the Eighth Congress on the middle peasant, but, on the contrary, is a most apt and exact formulation of these decisions. And it is a fact that the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was adopted in March 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the Party, which specially discussed the question of the middle peasant, while Lenin’s article against Pitirim Sorokin, which proclaimed the slogan of agreement with the middle peasant, appeared in the press in November 1918, four months before the Eighth Congress of the Party.

Is it not clear that the Eighth Congress of the Party *fully and entirely confirmed* Lenin’s slogan, proclaimed by him in his article against Pitirim Sorokin, as a slogan by which the Party must be *guided* in its work in the countryside *during the whole of the present period of socialist construction*?

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\* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

What is the essential point of Lenin's slogan?

The essential point of Lenin's slogan is that it embraces with remarkable precision the *triune* task of Party work in the countryside, expressed in a single condensed formula: a) *rely* on the poor peasant, b) establish *agreement* with the middle peasant, and c) never for a moment cease *fighting* against the kulaks. Try to take from this formula any one of its parts as a basis for work in the countryside at the present time and forget about the other parts, and you will inevitably find yourself in a blind alley.

Is it possible in the present phase of socialist construction to reach a real and stable agreement with the middle peasant without relying on the poor peasant and without waging a fight against the kulak?

It is not possible.

Is it possible, under the present conditions of development, to wage a successful fight against the kulak without relying on the poor peasant and without reaching agreement with the middle peasant?

It is not possible.

How can this triune task of Party work in the countryside be most aptly expressed in one all-embracing slogan? I think that Lenin's slogan is the most apt expression of this task. It must be admitted that you cannot express it more aptly than Lenin. . . .

Why is it necessary to emphasise the expediency of Lenin's slogan *just now*, precisely *under the present conditions* of work in the countryside?

Because just now we see a tendency among certain comrades to break up this *triune* task of Party work in the countryside into parts and to sever these parts

from one another. This is fully borne out by the experience of our grain-procurement campaign in January and February of this year.

Every Bolshevik knows that agreement must be reached with the middle peasant. But not everybody understands how this agreement is to be reached. Some think that agreement with the middle peasant can be brought about by abandoning the fight against the kulak, or by slackening this fight; because, they say, the fight against the kulak may frighten away a section of the middle peasantry, its well-to-do section.

Others think that agreement with the middle peasant can be brought about by abandoning the work of organising the poor peasants, or by slackening this work; because, they say, the organisation of the poor peasants means singling out the poor peasants, and this may frighten the middle peasants away from us.

The result of these deviations from the correct line is that such people forget the Marxist thesis that the middle peasantry is a vacillating class, that agreement with the middle peasants can be rendered stable only if a determined fight is carried on against the kulaks and if the work among the poor peasants is intensified; that unless these conditions are adhered to, the middle peasantry may swing to the side of the kulaks, as to a force.

Remember what Lenin said at the Eighth Party Congress:

“We have to determine our attitude to a class which *has no definite and stable position*.\* The proletariat in its mass is in favour of socialism, the bourgeoisie in its mass is opposed to socialism;

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

to determine the relation between these two classes is easy. But when we pass to a stratum like the middle peasantry we find that *it is a class that vacillates*. The middle peasant is partly a property owner, partly a toiler. He does not exploit other representatives of the toilers. For decades he had to defend his position under the greatest difficulties; he suffered the exploitation of the landlords and the capitalists; he bore everything and yet at the same time he is a property owner. Our attitude to this vacillating class therefore presents enormous difficulties" (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, p. 300<sup>24</sup>).

But there are other deviations from the correct line, no less dangerous than those already mentioned. In some cases the fight against the kulak is indeed carried on, but it is carried on in such a clumsy and senseless manner that the blows fall on the middle and poor peasants. As a result, the kulak escapes unscathed, a rift is made in the alliance with the middle peasant, and a section of the poor peasants temporarily falls into the clutches of the kulak, who is fighting to undermine Soviet policy.

In other cases attempts are made to transform the fight against the kulaks into dekulakisation, and the work of grain procurement into appropriation of surpluses, forgetting that under present conditions dekulakisation is folly and the surplus-appropriation system means not an alliance with, but a fight against, the middle peasant.

What is the source of these deviations from the Party line?

The source lies in failure to understand that the triple task of Party work in the countryside is a *single* and *indivisible* task; in failure to understand that the task of fighting the kulak *cannot be separated* from the

task of reaching agreement with the middle peasant, and that these two tasks cannot be separated from the task of converting the poor peasant into a bulwark of the Party in the countryside.\*

What must be done to ensure that these tasks are not separated from one another in the course of our current work in the countryside?

We must, at least, issue a guiding slogan that will combine all these tasks in one general formula and, consequently, prevent these tasks from being separated from one another.

Is there such a formula, such a slogan in our Party arsenal?

Yes, there is. That formula is Lenin's slogan: "To come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while

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\* From this it follows that deviations from the correct line create a twofold danger to the alliance of the workers and peasants: a danger from the side of those who want, for instance, to transform the temporary emergency measures for grain procurement into a permanent or long-term policy of the Party; and a danger from the side of those who want to take advantage of the discontinuance of emergency measures in order to give the kulak a free hand, to proclaim complete freedom of trade, without any regulation of trade by state bodies. Hence, in order to ensure that the correct line is pursued the fight must be waged on two fronts.

I take this opportunity to observe that our press does not always follow this rule and sometimes displays a certain one-sidedness. In some cases, for instance, the press exposes those who want to transform the emergency measures for grain procurement which are of a temporary character, into a permanent line of our policy and who thus endanger the bond with the peasants. That is very good. But it is bad and wrong if at the same time our press fails to pay sufficient attention to and properly

never for a moment renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on the poor peasant."

That is why I think that this slogan is the most expedient and all-embracing slogan, that it must be brought to the forefront *just now, precisely under the present conditions* of our work in the countryside.

You regard Lenin's slogan as an "oppositionist" slogan and in your letter you ask: "*How is it that . . . this oppositionist slogan was printed in Pravda for May 1, 1928 . . . how can the fact be explained that this slogan appeared on the pages of Pravda, the organ of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.—is this merely a technical oversight, or is it a compromise with the opposition on the question of the middle peasant?*"

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expose those who endanger the bond from the other side, who succumb to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, demand a slackening of the fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside and the establishment of complete freedom of trade, trade not regulated by the state, and thus undermine the bond with the peasants from the other end. That is bad. That is one-sidedness.

It also happens that the press exposes those who, for instance, deny the possibility and expediency of improving the individual small- and middle-peasant farms, which at the present stage are the basis of agriculture. That is very good. But it is bad and wrong if at the same time the press does not expose those who belittle the importance of the collective farms and the state farms and who fail to see that the task of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farms must be supplemented in practice by the task of expanding the construction of collective and state farms. That is one-sidedness.

In order to ensure that the correct line is pursued, the fight must be waged *on two fronts*, and all one-sidedness must be rejected.



That is very strongly put—there's no denying! But “watch your step,” Comrade S.; otherwise you may, in your zeal, arrive at the conclusion that we must *prohibit* the printing of our programme, which fully confirms Lenin's slogan (this is a fact!), and which in the main was drawn up by Lenin (who was certainly not an oppositionist!), and which was adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party (also not oppositionist!). Have more respect for the well-known points in our programme on the social groups in the countryside! Have more respect for the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress on the middle peasantry! . . .

As for your phrase “a compromise with the opposition on the question of the middle peasant,” I do not think it is worth refuting it; no doubt you wrote it in the heat of the moment.

You seem to be disturbed by the fact that both Lenin's slogan and the Programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party speak of *agreement* with the middle peasant, whereas in his speech in opening the Eighth Congress Lenin spoke of *a stable alliance* with the middle peasant. Evidently, you think there is something in the nature of a contradiction in this. Perhaps you are even inclined to believe that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasant is something in the nature of a departure from the policy of *alliance* with the middle peasant. That is wrong, Comrade S. That is a serious misconception. Only those who are able to read the letter of a slogan, but are unable to grasp its meaning, can think like that. Only those who are ignorant of the history of the slogan of alliance,

of agreement with the middle peasant, can think like that. Only those can think like that who are capable of believing that Lenin, who in his opening speech at the Eighth Congress spoke about the policy of a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant, *departed* from his own position by saying in another speech *at the same* congress, and in the Party programme adopted by the Eighth Congress, that we now need a policy of "agreement" with the middle peasant.

What is the point then? The point is that both Lenin and the Party, in the shape of the Eighth Congress, make *no distinction whatever* between the concept "agreement" and the concept "alliance." The point is that everywhere, in all his speeches at the Eighth Congress, Lenin places *a sign of equality* between the concept "alliance" and the concept "agreement." The same must be said about the resolution of the Eighth Congress, "The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry," in which *a sign of equality* is placed between the concept "agreement" and the concept "alliance." And since Lenin and the Party regard the policy of agreement with the middle peasant not as a casual and transient one, but as a *long-term* policy, they had, and have, every reason to call the policy of agreement with the middle peasant a policy of stable alliance with him and, conversely, to call the policy of stable alliance with the middle peasant a policy of agreement with him. One has only to read the verbatim report of the Eighth Congress of the Party and the resolution of that congress on the middle peasant to be convinced of this.

Here is an excerpt from Lenin's speech at the Eighth Congress:

“Owing to the inexperience of Soviet officials and to the difficulties of the problem, the blows which were intended for the kulaks very frequently fell on the middle peasantry. Here we have sinned exceedingly. The experience we have gained in this respect will enable us to do everything to avoid this in the future. That is the task now facing us, not theoretically, but practically. You know very well that this task is a difficult one. We have no material advantages to offer the middle peasant; and he is a materialist, a practical man who demands definite, material advantages, which we are not now in a position to offer and which the country will have to do without, perhaps, for several months yet of severe struggle—a struggle which now promises to end in complete victory. But there is a great deal we can do in our administrative work: we can improve our administrative apparatus and correct a host of abuses. The line of our Party, which has not done enough towards arriving at *a bloc, an alliance, an agreement*\* with the middle peasantry, can and must be straightened out and corrected” (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, p. 20<sup>25</sup>).

As you see, Lenin makes no distinction between “agreement” and “alliance.”

And here are excerpts from the resolution of the Eighth Congress, “The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry”:

“To confuse the middle peasants with the kulaks, to extend to them, to any degree, the measures that are directed against the kulaks, means most grossly to violate, not only all Soviet decrees and all Soviet policy, but also all the fundamental principles of communism, which point to *agreement* between the proletariat and the middle peasantry during the period of the resolute struggle of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie as one of the conditions for the painless transition to the abolition of all forms of exploitation.

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

"The middle peasantry, which possesses comparatively strong economic roots owing to the backwardness of agricultural technique, compared with industrial technique, even in the advanced capitalist countries, let alone Russia, will continue to exist for a fairly long time after the beginning of the proletarian revolution. That is why the tactics of Soviet officials in the countryside, as well as of active Party workers, must be based on the assumption of a *long period of collaboration* with the middle peasantry. . . .

" . . . An absolutely correct policy pursued by the Soviet government in the countryside thus ensures *alliance and agreement* between the victorious proletariat and the middle peasantry. . . .

" . . . The policy of the workers' and peasants' government and of the Communist Party must continue to be conducted in this *spirit of agreement* between the proletariat, together with the poor peasantry, and the middle peasantry"\* (*Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)*, verbatim report, pp. 370-72<sup>26</sup>).

As you see, the resolution also makes no distinction between "agreement" and "alliance."

It will not be superfluous to observe that there is not a single word in this resolution of the Eighth Congress about a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant. Does that mean, however, that the resolution thereby *departs* from the policy of a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant? No, it does not. It only means that the resolution places a sign of equality between the concept "agreement," "collaboration," and the concept "stable alliance." For it is clear: there cannot be an "alliance" with the middle peasant without an "agreement" with him, and the alliance with the middle peasant cannot be "stable" unless there is "a long period" of agreement and collaboration with him.

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\* All italics mine.—*J. St.*

Such are the facts.

Either one or the other: *either* Lenin and the Eighth Congress of the Party *departed* from Lenin's statement about a "stable alliance" with the middle peasant, *or* this frivolous assumption must be abandoned and it must be admitted that Lenin and the Eighth Congress of the Party made *no* distinction *whatever* between the concept "agreement" and the concept "stable alliance."

Thus, one who refuses to be a victim of idle pedantry, one who desires to grasp the true meaning of Lenin's slogan, which speaks of relying on the poor peasantry, of agreement with the middle peasantry and of fighting the kulaks, cannot fail to understand that the policy of *agreement* with the middle peasant is a policy of *stable alliance* with him.

Your mistake is that you have failed to understand the fraudulent trick of the opposition and have fallen a prey to their provocation; you walked into the trap the enemy set for you. The oppositionist swindlers noisily assure us that they are in favour of Lenin's slogan of agreement with the middle peasant, but at the same time they drop the provocatory hint that "agreement" with the middle peasant is one thing and a "stable alliance" with him is something different. In this way they want to kill two birds with one stone: firstly, to conceal their real attitude to the middle peasantry, which is not one of agreement with the middle peasant, but of "*dissension* with the middle peasant" (see the well-known speech of the oppositionist Smirnov, which I quoted at the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference<sup>27</sup>); and, secondly, to catch the simpletons among the Bol-

sheviks with the *alleged* difference between “agreement” and “alliance,” and muddle them up completely, by driving them away from Lenin.

And how do certain of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the oppositionist tricksters, instead of convicting them of deceiving the Party about their true position, they swallow the bait, walk into the trap, and allow themselves to be driven away from Lenin. The opposition is making a lot of noise about Lenin’s slogan; the oppositionists are posing as adherents of Lenin’s slogan; therefore, I must dissociate myself from this slogan, otherwise I may be confused with the opposition, otherwise I may be accused of “compromising with the opposition”—such is the logic of these comrades!

And this is not the only instance of the fraudulent tricks played by the opposition. Take, for instance, the slogan of self-criticism. Bolsheviks cannot but know that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the foundations of our Party activities: it is a means of strengthening the proletarian dictatorship, the soul of the Bolshevik method of training cadres. The opposition makes a lot of noise, asserting that it, the opposition, invented the slogan of self-criticism, that the Party stole this slogan from it, and thereby capitulated to the opposition. By acting in this way the opposition is trying to gain at least two ends:

firstly, to deceive the working class and to conceal from it the fact that an abyss divides the opposition’s “self-criticism,” the purpose of which is to *destroy* the Party spirit, from Bolshevik self-criticism, the purpose of which is to *strengthen* the Party spirit;

secondly, to catch certain simpletons and to induce them to dissociate themselves from the Party slogan of self-criticism.

And how do some of our comrades react to this? Instead of tearing the mask from the oppositionist tricksters and upholding the slogan of Bolshevik self-criticism, they walk into the trap, dissociate themselves from the slogan of self-criticism, dance to the tune of the opposition and . . . capitulate to it, in the mistaken belief that they are dissociating themselves from the opposition.

A host of such instances could be quoted,

But in our work we cannot dance to anybody's tune. Still less can we be guided in our work by what the oppositionists say about us. We must pursue our own path, brushing, aside both the fraudulent tricks of the opposition and the errors of certain of our Bolsheviks who fall victims to the provocation of the oppositionists. Remember the words quoted by Marx: "Follow your own course, and let people talk!"<sup>28</sup>

Written: June 12, 1928

Published in *Pravda*, No. 152,  
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Signed: *J. Stalin*

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## TO THE MEMBERS' OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

### REPLY TO FRUMKIN

*(With Reference to Frumkin's Letter of June 15, 1928)*

Frumkin's letter of June 15, 1928, deserves attentive consideration.

Let us examine it point by point.

1. Incorrect, in the first place, is Frumkin's appraisal of the international position of the U.S.S.R. It is the generally accepted opinion in the Party that the reason for the growth of the contradictions between the U.S.S.R. and its capitalist encirclement, the reason for the offensive of the capitalist states against the U.S.S.R., is the growth of the socialist elements in the U.S.S.R., the growth of the U.S.S.R.'s influence on the working class in all countries and, hence, the danger which the developing U.S.S.R. represents for capitalism. That is precisely the way the Fifteenth Congress of our Party understood it, in saying in its resolution on the report of the Central Committee: "The contradictions between the countries of the bourgeois encirclement and the U.S.S.R., whose victorious development is undermining the foundations of world capitalism, have grown more acute. The chief factors contributing to this increasing acuteness are the *growth* of the socialist elements in the U.S.S.R., *the collapse of the hopes of the bourgeoisie that the proletarian dictatorship would*



*degenerate*, coupled with the *increasing* international and revolutionary influence of the U.S.S.R.”\*<sup>29</sup>

We know that the Party elaborated this standpoint not casually and incidentally, but in the course of a desperate struggle against the opposition, who openly asserted that the reason for the offensive of imperialism against the U.S.S.R. was the *weakening* of the U.S.S.R. owing to its being in process of *degeneration*.

Frumkin, however, fundamentally disagrees with the standpoint of the Party. He asserts that, on the contrary, “the basic and decisive factor determining the offensive of the capitalist world against the U.S.S.R. is that we are *growing weaker*, politically and economically.”

What can there be in common between these two opposite estimates, one of which emanates from Frumkin and the other from the Fifteenth Congress of our Party?

2. Even more incorrect is Frumkin’s estimate of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. Reading Frumkin’s letter, one might think that the Soviet regime is on its last legs, that the country is on the verge of the abyss and that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. is a matter of only a few months, if not of a few days. The only thing he omitted to say is that we have “sung our swan song.”

We are accustomed to hearing the wailing of intellectuals about the “doom” of the U.S.S.R. coming from the lips of the oppositionists. But is it seemly for Frumkin to follow the example of the opposition?

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

It would be incorrect, of course, to underestimate the importance of our difficulties. But it would be even more incorrect to overestimate their importance, to lose our balance and succumb to panic. Undoubtedly, the kulak is furious with the Soviet Government: it would be strange to expect him to be friendly towards it. Undoubtedly, the kulak has an influence on a certain section of the poor and middle peasants. But to conclude from this that the sentiment of the majority of the poor and middle peasants is *against* the Soviet Government, that "this sentiment is already beginning to spread to the *working-class centres*," is to lose one's head and succumb to panic. It is with truth that the proverb says: "Fear has big eyes."

One can imagine in what a state Frumkin would be if we had today not our present, but more serious difficulties—a war, say, when vacillations of every kind would have a wide "field of action."

3. Frumkin is absolutely wrong when he states that "the deterioration in our economic position has *grown sharper* owing to the new political line in relation to the countryside after the Fifteenth Congress." This evidently refers to the measures taken by the Party at the beginning of this year to improve grain procurements. Frumkin regards these measures as *harmful*, as having caused a "deterioration" in our position.

It follows that the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was *wrong* when it established that

a) "the grain procurement difficulties were connected with the *difficulties arising from the swift rate of industrialisation* of the country dictated to the proletarian state by the entire international and internal situation, and

with the errors committed in the planned direction of the economy," that

b) "the *aggravation* of the disproportion in market relations (between rural effective demand on the one hand, and the supply of manufactured goods on the other) is due to the *increased incomes* of the rural population, and especially of its *well-to-do and kulak* sections" (and not to the Party's measures—*J. St.*), and that

c) "the difficulties were *aggravated and complicated* by the endeavour of the *kulak* section of the rural population and the *speculators* to take advantage of them in order to force up grain prices and to disrupt the Soviet price policy"\* (and not by the Party's measures—*J. St.*).

It follows that the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was *wrong* when it declared in its resolution on grain procurements that "the above-mentioned *measures of the Party*, which were in part of an *emergency* character, *ensured very great successes* in increasing grain procurements."\*<sup>30</sup>

It follows, then, that Frumkin is *right*, and the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. is *wrong*!

Who, after all, is right—Frumkin or the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.?

Let us turn to the facts.

What was the position at the beginning of January of this year? We had a deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain as compared with last year.

How were the procurements being carried out at that time? By letting them proceed of their own accord, without any emergency measures being taken by the

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

Party, without any active interference by the Party in the procurements.

What resulted from letting things go of their own accord and not exerting any pressure? A deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain.

What would the results be now if the Party had followed Frumkin's advice and had not interfered, if the deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain had not been made good *before* the spring, *before the spring sowing*? Our workers would now be going hungry, there would be hunger in the industrial centres, a break-down of our constructive work, hunger in the Red Army.

Could the Party refrain from interfering and not go to the length of applying emergency measures? Obviously, it could not have acted otherwise than it did.

What follows from this? It follows that our entire national economy would now be in a most dangerous crisis if we had not interfered in the matter of grain procurements *in good time*.

There can be only one conclusion, and that is that Frumkin is *absolutely wrong* in coming out *against* the decisions of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. and in demanding their *revision*.

4. Frumkin is absolutely wrong when he says: "We must *return* to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Congresses." We have no need to return to the Fifteenth Congress, for the Party stands fully and entirely by the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress. But Frumkin demands a return to the Fourteenth Congress. What does that mean? Does it not mean *obliterating* the whole path we have travelled and going *backward* instead of forward?

The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution on "Work in the Countryside" that, in the interest of socialist development in the countryside, we must wage a "*more resolute offensive against the kulak.*"<sup>31</sup> The Fourteenth Party Congress did not say this, and could not have said it in the conditions of that time. What, in that case, can Frumkin's demand for a "return to the Fourteenth Congress" mean? It can mean only one thing, namely, renunciation of the policy of a "more resolute offensive against the kulak."

It follows that Frumkin's demand that we return to the Fourteenth Congress would lead to *renunciation* of the decisions of the Fifteenth Party Congress.

The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution on "Work in the Countryside" that "in the present period, the task of uniting and transforming the small individual peasant farms into large collective farms must be made the Party's *principal task* in the countryside."<sup>32</sup> The Fourteenth Party Congress did not say this, and could not have said it in the conditions of that time. It could be said only by the time of the Fifteenth Congress, when, parallel with the old and unquestionably obligatory task of developing individual small- and middle-peasant farming, we were faced with the new *practical* task of developing *collective farms*, as farms producing large marketable surpluses.

What, in that case, can be meant by Frumkin's demand for a "return to the Fourteenth Congress"? It can mean only one thing: renunciation of the new *practical* task of developing collective farms. This, indeed, explains the fact that for the *practical* task of developing collective farms, Frumkin substitutes the

*artful* task of rendering "maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives."

It follows, therefore, that Frumkin's demand for a return to the Fourteenth Congress would lead to *renunciation* of the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress.

The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution on "Directives for Drafting a Five-Year Plan for the National Economy" that "it is necessary at the present time to give greater support to all viable forms of *producers'* co-operatives (communes, collective farms, artels, producers' co-operatives, co-operative factories, etc.), as well as to *state farms, which must be raised to a higher level.*"\*<sup>33</sup> The Fourteenth Party Congress did not say this, and could not have said it in the conditions of that time. It could be said only by the time of the Fifteenth Congress, when, parallel with the tasks of developing individual small- and middle-peasant farming on the one hand, and of developing collective farms on the other, we were faced with another new *practical* task, the task of developing *state farms*, as units producing the largest marketable surpluses.

What, in that case, can be meant by Frumkin's demand for a "return to the Fourteenth Congress"? It can mean only one thing: renunciation of the policy of "raising the state farms to a higher level." This, indeed, explains why for the *positive* task of developing state farms, as laid down by the Fifteenth Congress, Frumkin substitutes a *negative* task, namely, that "state farms should not be expanded by shock or super-shock tactics," although Frumkin cannot help knowing that

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

here the Party is not setting itself, and cannot set itself, any "super-shock" tasks, because we are only just *beginning* seriously to *approach* the question of organising new state farms.

Again it follows that Frumkin's demand for a return to the Fourteenth Congress leads to *renunciation* of the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress.

In view of all this, what value can be attached to Frumkin's assertion that the C.C. has "departed" from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress? Would it not be truer to say that Frumkin's whole letter is a badly camouflaged attempt to *nullify* the Fifteenth Congress decisions on a number of highly important questions?

Is it not this that explains Frumkin's assertion that the resolution of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. on grain procurements is "*half-hearted and ambiguous*"? Would it not be truer to say that the resolution of the plenum is correct, and that it is Frumkin himself who is beginning to see things "ambiguously" because of a certain "half-heartedness" in his position?

Frumkin's basic mistake is that he sees only *one* task, that of stimulating individual peasant farming, believing that our attitude towards agriculture is in the main *restricted* to this.

His mistake is that he does not understand the new thing that the Party gave us at its Fifteenth Congress; he does not understand that we cannot now *restrict* ourselves to the one task of stimulating individual peasant farming, that this task must be *supplemented* by two new *practical* tasks: that of developing state farms and that of developing collective farms.

Frumkin does not understand that if the first task is not combined with the two others, we shall not be able to make good either in the matter of supplying the state with marketable grain, or in the matter of organizing the entire national economy on socialist lines.

Does this mean that we are already laying the principal stress on the state farms and collective farms? No, it does not. At the present stage, the principal stress must still be laid on raising the level of individual small- and middle-peasant farming. But it does mean that this task alone *is no longer enough*. It means that the time has come when this task must be *practically supplemented* by two new tasks—the development of collective farms and the development of state farms.

5. Absolutely incorrect is Frumkin's remark that "the outlawing of the kulak has led to lawless actions against the entire peasantry."

In the first place, it is not true that the kulak has been "outlawed."

In the second place, if there is any meaning at all in Frumkin's words, it can only be that he is demanding that the Party should restore "rights of citizenship" to the kulak, should restore political rights to the kulak (the right, say, to take part in elections to the Soviets, etc.).

Does Frumkin think that the Party and the Soviet Government would gain by abolishing the restrictions on the kulaks? How can Frumkin's "state of mind" be reconciled with the Fifteenth Congress decision to wage a "more resolute offensive against the kulak"?

Does Frumkin think that weakening the fight against the kulak will strengthen our alliance with the



middle peasant? Does it not occur to Frumkin that restoration of rights to the kulak would only facilitate the latter's efforts to sever the middle peasant from us?

In view of all this, what value can be attached to Frumkin's talk about alliance with the middle peasant?

Of course, it would be wrong to deny the infringement of laws by some of our officials in the countryside. It would be still more wrong to deny that, because of the clumsy way some of our officials are waging the fight against the kulak, blows intended for the kulak sometimes fall on the heads of the middle peasants, and even of the poor peasants. Unquestionably, a most resolute struggle is necessary against such distortions of the Party line. But how can it be concluded from this that the fight against the kulak must be relaxed, that restriction of the kulak's political rights must be renounced, and so on?

6. Frumkin is right when he says that you cannot fight the kulaks by means of dekulakisation, as certain of our local officials are doing. But he is mistaken if he thinks that he has said anything new by this. To blame Comrade Molotov or Comrade Kubyak for these distortions, as Frumkin does, and to assert that the Party is not combating such distortions, is to commit the gravest injustice and to be guilty of unpardonable bad temper.

7. Frumkin is right when he says that we must open peasant markets, the grain market. But he is mistaken if he thinks that he has said anything new by this. In the first place, the Party never was in favour of closing the peasant markets. In the second place, Frumkin cannot help knowing that, since closing of peasant markets did take

place in certain districts, the centre promptly ordered the local organisations to reopen them immediately and to put a stop to such distortions. We know that this decision of the centre was circulated to the localities already towards the end of May (May 26), that is, two weeks before the appearance of Frumkin's letter. Frumkin could not help knowing this. Was it then worth while "knocking at an open door"?

8. Frumkin is right when he says that grain prices must be raised and that the fight against illicit distilling must be intensified. But, again, it would be strange to think that Frumkin has made some new discovery. The fight against illicit distilling has been going on since January of this year. It must and will be intensified, although Frumkin cannot but know that it will cause discontent in the countryside. As to raising grain prices, Frumkin cannot but know that a decision to raise grain prices at the beginning of the next procurement year was taken by the Political Bureau in February of this year, that is, four months before the appearance of Frumkin's letter. Once again: was it worth while "knocking at an open door" with regard to raising prices?

9. At first glance it might appear that Frumkin's letter was composed with a view to defending the alliance with the middle peasant. But that is only an appearance. Actually, Frumkin's letter is a plea on behalf of *making things easier* for the kulak, a plea on behalf of *abolishing the restrictions* on the kulak. No one who desires to strengthen the alliance with the middle peasant can demand that the struggle against the kulak should be relaxed.

To ensure a stable alliance with the middle peasant is a most important task of our Party. But such an alliance can be ensured only if a resolute fight is waged against the kulak, only if the poor peasant is made the bulwark of the proletariat in the countryside, and, finally, only if we are ready and able to come to a lasting agreement with the middle peasant, one capable of reinforcing the alliance with him and strengthening the position of the proletariat in the struggle for socialist construction.

Our policy in this field must aim not at a relaxation of the struggle against the capitalist elements in the countryside, but at “*agreement* between the proletariat and the middle peasantry,” at “*a long period of collaboration* with the middle peasantry,” at “*alliance and agreement* between the victorious proletariat and the middle peasantry” (see the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress on “The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry”).<sup>34</sup>

***J. Stalin***

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## AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM

The slogan of self-criticism must not be regarded as something temporary and transient. Self-criticism is a specific method, a Bolshevik method, of training the forces of the Party and of the working class generally in the spirit of revolutionary development. Marx himself spoke of self-criticism as a method of strengthening the proletarian revolution.<sup>35</sup> As to self-criticism in our Party, its beginnings date back to the first appearance of Bolshevism in our country, to its very inception as a specific revolutionary trend in the working-class movement.

We know that as early as the spring of 1904, when Bolshevism was not yet an independent political party but worked together with the Mensheviks within a single Social-Democratic party—we know that Lenin was already calling upon the Party to undertake “self-criticism and ruthless exposure of its own shortcomings.” Here is what Lenin wrote in his pamphlet *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*:

“They (i.e., the opponents of the Marxists—*J. St.*) gloat and grimace over our controversies; and, of course, they will try to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with the defects and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for

their own ends. The Russian Social-Democrats are already steeled enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pin-pricks and to continue, in spite of them, their work of *self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings*,\* which will unquestionably and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement grows. As for those gentlemen, our opponents, let them try to give us a picture of the *true* state of affairs in their own 'parties' even remotely approximating that given by the minutes of our Second Congress!" (Vol. VI, p. 161.<sup>36</sup>)

Therefore, those comrades are absolutely wrong who think that self-criticism is a passing phenomenon, a fashion which is bound speedily to go out of existence as every fashion usually does. Actually, self-criticism is an indispensable and permanent weapon in the arsenal of Bolshevism, one that is intimately linked with the very nature of Bolshevism, with its revolutionary spirit.

It is sometimes said that self-criticism is something that is good for a party which has not yet come to power and has "nothing to lose," but that it is dangerous and harmful to a party which has already come to power, which is surrounded by hostile forces, and against which an exposure of its weaknesses may be exploited by its enemies.

That is not true. It is quite untrue! On the contrary, just because Bolshevism has come to power, just because Bolsheviks may become conceited owing to the successes of our work of construction, just because Bolsheviks may fail to observe their weaknesses and thus make things easier for their enemies—for these very reasons self-criticism is particularly needed now, after the assumption of power.

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

The purpose of self-criticism being to disclose and eliminate our errors and weaknesses, is it not clear that in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat it can only facilitate Bolshevism's fight against the enemies of the working class? Lenin took into account these specific features of the situation which had arisen after the Bolsheviks had seized power when, in April-May 1920, he wrote in his pamphlet "*Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*:"

"The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how serious the party is and how it *in practice* fulfils its obligations towards its *class* and the toiling *masses*. *Frankly admitting a mistake*,\* ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the circumstances which gave rise to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting it—that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train the *class*, and then the *masses*" (Vol. XXV, p. 200).

Lenin was a thousand times right when he said at the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922:

"The proletariat is not afraid to admit that this or that thing has succeeded splendidly in its revolution, and this or that has not succeeded. All revolutionary parties which have hitherto perished, did so because they *grew conceited*, failed to see where their strength lay, and *feared to speak of their weaknesses*.<sup>\*</sup> But we shall not perish, for we do not fear to speak of our weaknesses and shall learn to overcome them" (Vol. XXVII, pp. 260-61).

There is only one conclusion: that without self-criticism there can be no proper education of the Party, the class, and the masses; and that without proper

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

education of the Party, the class, and the masses, there can be no Bolshevism.

Why has the slogan of self-criticism acquired special importance just now, at this particular moment of history, in 1928?

Because the growing acuteness of class relations, both in the internal and external spheres, is more glaringly evident now than it was a year or two ago.

Because the subversive activities of the class enemies of the Soviet Government, who are utilising our weaknesses, our errors, against the working class of our country, are more glaringly evident now than they were a year or two ago.

Because we cannot and must not allow the lessons of the Shakhty affair and the "procurement manoeuvres" of the capitalist elements in the countryside, coupled with our mistakes in planning, to go unheeded.

If we want to strengthen the revolution and meet our enemies fully prepared, we must *rid ourselves as quickly as possible* of our errors and weaknesses, as disclosed by the Shakhty affair and the grain procurement difficulties.

If we do not want to be caught unawares by all sorts of "surprises" and "accidents," to the joy of the enemies of the working class, we must *disclose as quickly as possible* those weaknesses and errors of ours which *have not yet been disclosed*, but which undoubtedly exist.

If we are tardy in this, we shall be facilitating the work of our enemies and aggravating our weaknesses and errors. But all this will be impossible if self-crit-

icism is not developed and stimulated, if the vast masses of the working class and peasantry are not drawn into the work of bringing to light and eliminating our weaknesses and errors.

The April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was therefore quite right when it said in its resolution on the Shakhty affair:

“The *chief condition* for the successful accomplishment of all the indicated measures is the *effective implementation* of the slogan of self-criticism issued by the Fifteenth Congress.”\*<sup>37</sup>

But in order to develop self-criticism, we must first overcome a number of obstacles standing in the way of the Party. These include the cultural backwardness of the masses, the inadequate cultural forces of the proletarian vanguard, our conservatism, our “communist vainglory,” and so on. But one of the most serious obstacles, if not the most serious of all, is the *bureaucracy* of our apparatus. I am referring to the bureaucratic elements to be found in our Party, government, trade-union, co-operative and all other organisations. I am referring to the bureaucratic elements who batten on our weaknesses and errors, who fear like the plague all criticism by the masses, all control by the masses, and who hinder us in developing self-criticism and ridding ourselves of our weaknesses and errors. Bureaucracy in our organisations must not be regarded merely as routine and red-tape. Bureaucracy is a manifestation of bourgeois influence on our organisations. Lenin was right when he said:

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*



“... We must realise that the fight against bureaucracy is an *absolutely essential* one, and that it is just as complicated as the fight against the petty-bourgeois elemental forces. Bureaucracy in our state system has become a malady of such gravity that it is spoken of in our Party programme, and that is because *it is connected with these petty-bourgeois elemental forces and their wide dispersion*”\* (Vol. XXVI, p. 220).

With all the more persistence, therefore, must the struggle against bureaucracy in our organisations be waged, if we really want to develop self-criticism and rid ourselves of the maladies in our constructive work.

With all the more persistence must we rouse the vast masses of the workers and peasants to the task of criticism *from below*, of control *from below*, as the principal antidote to bureaucracy.

Lenin was right when he said:

“If we want to combat bureaucracy, we must *enlist the co-operation of the rank and file*” . . . for “what other way is there of putting an end to bureaucracy than by *enlisting the co-operation of the workers and peasants?*”\* (Vol. XXV, pp. 496 and 495.)

But in order to “enlist the co-operation” of the vast masses, we must develop proletarian democracy in all the mass organisations of the working class, and primarily within the Party itself. Failing this, self-criticism will be nothing, an empty thing, a mere word.

It is not just *any kind* of self-criticism that we need. We need such self-criticism as will raise the cultural level of the working class, enhance its fighting spirit, fortify its faith in victory, augment its strength and help it to become the real master of the country.

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

Some say that, once there is self-criticism, we do not need *labour discipline*, we can stop working and give ourselves over to prattling a little about everything. That would be not self-criticism but an insult to the working class. Self-criticism is needed not in order to shatter labour discipline, but to *strengthen* it, in order that labour discipline may become *conscious* discipline, capable of withstanding petty-bourgeois slackness.

Others say that, once there is self-criticism, we no longer need *leadership*, we can abandon the helm and let things "take their natural course." That would be not self-criticism but a disgrace. Self-criticism is needed not in order to relax leadership, but to *strengthen* it, in order to convert it from leadership on paper and of little authority into *vigorous* and really *authoritative* leadership.

But there is another kind of "self-criticism," one that tends to *destroy* the Party spirit, to *discredit* the Soviet regime, to *weaken* our work of construction, to *corrupt* our economic cadres, to *disarm* the working class, and to foster talk of *degeneration*. It was just this kind of "self-criticism" that the Trotsky opposition was urging upon us only recently. It goes without saying that the Party has nothing in common with such "self-criticism." It goes without saying that the Party will combat such "self-criticism" with might and main.

A strict distinction must be drawn between this "self-criticism," which is *alien* to us, destructive and anti-Bolshevik, and *our*, Bolshevik self-criticism, the object of which is to *promote* the Party spirit, to *consolidate* the Soviet regime, to *improve* our constructive

work, to *strengthen* our economic cadres, to *arm* the working class.

Our campaign for intensifying self-criticism began only a few months ago. We have not yet the necessary data for a review of the first results of the campaign. But it may already be said that the campaign is beginning to yield beneficial fruits.

It cannot be denied that the tide of self-criticism is beginning to mount and spread, extending to ever larger sections of the working class and drawing them into the work of socialist construction. This is borne out if only by such facts as the revival of the production conferences and the temporary control commissions.

True, there are still attempts to pigeon-hole well-founded and verified recommendations of the production conferences and temporary control commissions. Such attempts must be fought with the utmost determination, for their purpose is to discourage the workers from self-criticism. But there is scarcely reason to doubt that such bureaucratic attempts will be swept away completely by the mounting tide of self-criticism.

Nor can it be denied that, as a result of self-criticism, our business executives are beginning to smarten up, to become more vigilant, to approach questions of economic leadership more seriously, while our Party, Soviet, trade-union and all other personnel are becoming more sensitive and responsive to the requirements of the masses.

True, it cannot be said that inner-Party democracy and working-class democracy generally are already fully established in the mass organisations of the working class. But there is no reason to doubt that further

advances will be made in this field as the campaign unfolds.

Nor can it be denied that, as a result of self-criticism, our press has become more lively and vigorous, while such detachments of our press workers as the organisations of worker and village correspondents are already becoming a weighty political force.

True, our press still continues at times to skate on the surface; it has not yet learned to pass from individual critical remarks to deeper criticism, and from deep criticism to drawing general conclusions from the results of criticism and making plain what *achievements* have been attained in our constructive work as a result of criticism. But it can scarcely be doubted that advances will be made in this field as the campaign goes on.

However, along with these good aspects of our campaign, it is necessary to note some bad aspects. I am referring to those distortions of the slogan of self-criticism which are already occurring at the beginning of the campaign and which, if they are not resisted at once, may give rise to the danger of self-criticism being vulgarised.

1) It must be observed, in the first place, that a number of press periodicals are betraying a tendency to transplant the campaign from the field of business-like criticisms of shortcomings in our *socialist construction* to the field of ostentatious outcries against excesses *in private life*. This may seem incredible. But, unfortunately, it is a fact.

Take the newspaper *Vlast Truda*, for example, organ of the Irkutsk Okrug Party Committee and Okrug Soviet Executive Committee (No. 128). There you will

find a whole page peppered all over with ostentatious "slogans," such as: "Sexual Promiscuity—a Bourgeois Vice"; "One Glass Leads to Another"; "Own Cottage Calls for Own Cow"; "Double-Bed Bandits"; "A Shot That Misfired," and so on and so forth. What, one asks, can there be in common between these "critical" shrieks, which are worthy of *Birzhovka*,<sup>38</sup> and Bolshevik self-criticism, the purpose of which is to improve our *socialist construction*? It is very possible that the author of these ostentatious items is a Communist. It is possible that he is burning with hatred of the "class enemies" of the Soviet regime. But that he is straying from the right path, that he is vulgarising the slogan of self-criticism, and that his voice is the voice *not of our class*, of that there cannot be any doubt.

2) It must be observed, further, that even those organs of the press which, generally speaking, are not devoid of the ability to criticise correctly, that even they are sometimes inclined to criticise *for criticism's sake*, turning criticism into a sport, into *sensation-mongering*. Take *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, for example. Everyone knows the services rendered by *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in stimulating self-criticism. But take the last issues of this paper and look at its "criticism" of the leaders of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions—a whole series of impermissible caricatures on the subject. Who, one asks, needs "criticism" of this kind, and what effect can it have except to discredit the slogan of self-criticism? What is the use of such "criticism," looked at, of course, from the standpoint of the interests of our socialist construction and not of cheap sensation-mongering designed to give the phi-

listine something to chuckle over? Of course, all forms of arms are required for self-criticism, including the "light cavalry." But does this mean that the light cavalry must be turned into *light-minded* cavalry?

3) It must be observed, lastly, that there is a definite tendency on the part of a number of our organisations to turn self-criticism into a *witch-hunt* against our business executives, into an attempt to *discredit* them in the eyes of the working class. It is a fact that certain local organisations in the Ukraine and Central Russia have started a regular *witch-hunt* against some of our *best* business executives, whose only fault is that they are not 100 per cent immune from error. How else are we to understand the decisions of the local organisations to remove these executives from their posts, decisions which have no binding force whatever and which are obviously designed to discredit them? How else are we to understand the fact that these executives are criticised, but are given no opportunity to answer the criticism? When did we begin to pass off a "Shemyaka court"\* as self-criticism?

Of course, we cannot demand that criticism should be 100 per cent correct. If the criticism comes from below, we must not ignore it even if it is only 5 or 10 per cent correct. All that is true. But does this mean that we must demand that business executives should be 100 per cent immune from error? Is there any one in creation who is immune from error 100 per cent? Is it so hard to understand that it takes years and years to

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\* A "Shemyaka court": an unjust court. (From an ancient Russian story about a judge named Shemyaka.)—*Tr.*

train our economic cadres and that our attitude towards them must be one of the utmost consideration and solicitude? Is it so hard to understand that we need self-criticism not for the sake of a witch-hunt against our economic cadres, but in order to improve and perfect them?

Criticise the shortcomings of our constructive work, but do not vulgarise the slogan of self-criticism and do not turn it into a medium for ostentatious exercises on such themes as “Double-Bed Bandits,” “A Shot That Misfired,” and so on.

Criticise the shortcomings in our constructive work, but do not discredit the slogan of self-criticism and do not turn it into a means of cooking up cheap sensations.

Criticise the shortcomings in our constructive work, but do not pervert the slogan of self-criticism and do not turn it into a weapon for witch-hunts against our business or any other executives.

And the chief thing: do not substitute for mass criticism *from below* “critical” fireworks *from above*; let the working-class masses come into it and display their creative initiative in correcting our shortcomings and in improving our constructive work.

*Pravda*, No. 146,  
June 26, 1928

Signed: *J. Stalin*

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# PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)<sup>39</sup>

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Published for the first time





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## THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMINTERN

*Speech Delivered on July 5, 1928*

The first thing we have to consider, comrades, is the size of the draft programme of the Comintern.<sup>40</sup>

Some say that the draft programme is too large, too ponderous. They demand that it be compressed to a half or a third. They demand that some general formulas should be given in the programme and nothing more, and that these formulas be called a programme.

I think that these demands are devoid of foundation. Those who demand that the programme be compressed to a half or even a third do not understand the tasks that confronted those who drew up the draft. The point is that the programme of the Comintern cannot be the programme of any one national party, or, say, a programme for only the "civilised" nations. The programme must cover all the Communist Parties of the world, all nations, all peoples, both white and black. That is the basic and characteristic feature of the draft programme. But how is it possible to cover the basic needs and basic lines of work of all the sections of the Comintern, both Eastern and Western, if the programme is compressed to a half or a third? Let the comrades try to solve this insoluble problem. That is why I think that to compress

the programme to a half or a third would mean converting it from a programme into a mere list of abstract formulas without any value for the sections of the Comintern.

Those who drew up the programme were faced with a double problem: on the one hand, to cover the chief and basic features of all the Communist Parties of the world, and, on the other hand, to do so in such a way that the various propositions of the programme should not be empty formulas, but should provide practical guiding principles for the most diverse countries and peoples, for the most diverse Communist Parties and communist groups. You must agree that it is quite impossible to solve this double problem in a brief and concise draft.

What is most curious is that the very comrades who propose that the programme be compressed to a half or even a third, also put forward proposals which would tend to expand the present draft programme to twice, if not three times its size. In point of fact, if we are to give in the draft programme lengthy formulations on the trade unions, on the co-operatives, on culture, on the European national minorities and so on, is it not obvious that the effect of this cannot be to compress the programme? The size of the present draft would have to be doubled, if not trebled.

The same thing must be said of those comrades who demand either that the programme be a concrete instruction for the Communist Parties, or that it explain every possible thing, down to the individual propositions in it. In the first place, it is wrong to say that the programme must be only an instruction, or mainly an instruction.

That is wrong. That cannot be demanded of a programme, to say nothing of the fact that the result would be to enlarge the size of the programme incredibly. In the second place, a programme cannot explain every possible thing, down to its individual declarative or theoretical propositions. That is the business of commentaries to the programme. A programme must not be confused with a commentary.

The second question concerns the *structure of the programme and the order of arrangement* of the individual chapters within the draft programme.

Some comrades demand that the chapter on the ultimate aim of the movement, on communism, be transferred to the end of the programme. I think that this demand also is devoid of foundation. Between the chapter on the crisis of capitalism and the chapter on the transition period, there is in the draft programme a chapter on communism, on the communist economic system. Is this arrangement of chapters correct? I consider that it is quite correct. You cannot speak of the transition period without first speaking of the economic system, in this case the communist economic system, the *transition* to which the programme proposes. We speak of the transition period, the transition from capitalism to another economic system. But a transition to what, to what system exactly—that is what must be first discussed before proceeding to describe the transition period itself. The programme should proceed from the unknown to the known, from the less known to the better known. To speak of the crisis of capitalism and then of the transition period, without first speaking of the system to which the transition is

to be made, would confuse the reader and infringe an elementary requirement of pedagogy, one that is at the same time a requirement for the structure of the programme. Well, the programme should make it easier for the reader in leading him from the less known to the better known, and not make it more difficult for him.

Other comrades think that the paragraph on Social-Democracy ought not to be included in the second chapter of the draft programme, which deals with the first phase of the proletarian revolution and with the partial stabilisation of capitalism. They think that they are thereby raising a question of the structure of the programme. That is not so, comrades. Actually, it is a political question that confronts us here. To delete the paragraph on Social-Democracy from the second chapter would be to commit a political mistake in regard to one of the basic questions of the reasons for the partial stabilisation of capitalism. It is not a matter here of the structure of the programme, but of the appraisal of the political situation in the period of partial stabilisation, an appraisal of the counter-revolutionary role of Social-Democracy as one of the factors of this stabilisation. These comrades cannot but know that we cannot dispense with a paragraph on Social-Democracy in the chapter on the partial stabilisation of capitalism, because this stabilisation itself cannot be explained without describing the role of Social-Democracy as one of the major factors of the stabilisation. Otherwise, we should also have to exclude from this chapter the paragraph on fascism, and transfer it, like the paragraph on Social-Democracy, to the chapter on parties. But to exclude

these two paragraphs—on fascism and on Social-Democracy—from the chapter dealing with the partial stabilisation of capitalism would mean to disarm ourselves and deprive ourselves of all possibility of explaining the capitalist stabilisation. Obviously, we cannot agree to that.

The question of *NEP and war communism*. NEP is a policy of the proletarian dictatorship which is designed to overcome the capitalist elements and to build a socialist economy by utilising the market and through the market, and not by direct products-exchange, without a market and apart from the market. Can capitalist countries, even the most highly developed, dispense with NEP in the transition from capitalism to socialism? I do not think that they can. In one degree or another, the New Economic Policy, with its market connections, and the utilisation of these market connections, will be absolutely essential for every capitalist country in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We have comrades who deny this proposition. But what does denying this proposition mean?

It means, in the first place, to hold that immediately after the proletariat has come to power we shall have ready to function 100 per cent a machinery of distribution and supply between town and country, between industry and small-scale production, which will make it possible to establish at once direct products-exchange, without a market, without commodity circulation, and without a money economy. The matter has only to be raised to realise how utterly absurd such an assumption is.

It means, in the second place, to hold that after the seizure of power by the proletariat the proletarian revolution must adopt the course of expropriating the middle and petty bourgeoisie, must take upon its shoulders the incredible burden of finding work and assuring means of subsistence for an artificially created army of millions of new unemployed. The matter has only to be raised to realise how ridiculous and foolish it would be for the proletarian dictatorship to adopt such a policy. One of the good things about NEP is that it relieves the proletarian dictatorship of these and similar difficulties.

But it follows from this that NEP is an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution in all countries.

Can the same thing be said of war communism? Can it be said that war communism is an inevitable phase of the proletarian revolution? No, it cannot. War communism is a policy forced upon the proletarian dictatorship by a situation of war and intervention; it is designed for the establishment of direct products-exchange between town and country, not through the market but apart from the market, chiefly by measures of an extra-economic and partially military character, and aims at organising such a distribution of products as can ensure the supply of the revolutionary armies at the front and of the workers in the rear. Obviously, if there had not been a situation of war and intervention, there would have been no war communism. Consequently, it cannot be asserted that war communism is an economically inevitable phase of development of the proletarian revolution.

It would be incorrect to think that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. began its economic work

with war communism. Some comrades incline towards this opinion. But it is a wrong opinion. On the contrary, the proletarian dictatorship in our country began its constructive work not with war communism, but with the proclamation of the principles of what is called the New Economic Policy. Everyone is familiar with Lenin's pamphlet, *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power*,<sup>41</sup> which was published in the beginning of 1918, and in which Lenin first substantiated the principles of the New Economic Policy. True, this policy was temporarily interrupted by the conditions of intervention, and it was only three years later, when war and intervention had been ended, that it had to be resumed. But the fact that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. had to return to the principles of the New Economic Policy, which had already been proclaimed at the beginning of 1918—this fact plainly shows where the proletarian dictatorship must begin its constructive work on the day following the revolution, and on what it must base its constructive work—if, of course, it is *economic* considerations we have in mind.

Sometimes war communism is confused with the civil war, and the two are identified. That, of course, is incorrect. The seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 was undoubtedly a form of civil war. But it would be wrong to say that we began to apply war communism in October 1917. It is quite possible to conceive a state of civil war in which the methods of war communism are not applied, in which the principles of the New Economic Policy are not abandoned, as was the case in our country in the early part of 1918, before the intervention.



Some say that the proletarian revolutions will take place in isolation from one another, and that therefore not a single proletarian revolution will be able to escape intervention, and hence war communism. That is not true. Now that we have succeeded in consolidating Soviet power in the U.S.S.R., now that the Communist Parties in the principal capitalist countries have grown and the Comintern has increased in strength, there cannot and should not be isolated proletarian revolutions. We must not overlook such factors as the increasing acuteness of the crisis of world capitalism, the existence of the Soviet Union, and the growth of communism in all countries. (*A voice*: "But the revolution in Hungary was isolated.") That was in 1919.<sup>42</sup> Now we are in 1928. It suffices to recall the revolution in Germany in 1923,<sup>43</sup> when the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. was getting ready to render direct assistance to the German revolution, to realise how utterly relative and conditional the arguments of some comrades are. (*A voice*: "The isolated revolution in Germany—the isolation between France and Germany.") You are confusing spatial remoteness with political isolation. Spatial remoteness is, of course, a factor. Nevertheless, it should not be confused with political isolation.

And what about the workers in the interventionist countries?—do you think they will remain silent if there is intervention in a German revolution, say, and will not strike at the interventionists from the rear?

And what about the U.S.S.R. and its proletariat?—do you think that the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R. will look calmly on at the misdeeds of the interventionists?

To injure the interventionists, it is by no means essential to establish spatial connection with the revolutionary country. It is enough to sting the interventionists at those points in their own territory which are most vulnerable to make them sense the danger and comprehend the full reality of proletarian solidarity. Suppose that we offended bourgeois Britain in the Leningrad area and caused her serious damage. Does it follow that Britain would necessarily take revenge on us in Leningrad? No, it does not. She might take revenge on us somewhere else, in Batum, Odessa, Baku, or Vladivostok, say. The same is true of the forms of assistance and support rendered by the proletarian dictatorship to a proletarian revolution in one of the countries of Europe, say, against imperialist interventionists.

But while it cannot be admitted that intervention, and hence war communism, must *necessarily* occur in all countries, it can and should be admitted that they are more or less probable. Therefore, while not agreeing with the arguments of these comrades, I do agree with their conclusion, namely, that the formula in the draft programme which speaks of the *possibility*, in definite international conditions, of war communism in countries where a proletarian revolution has taken place, might be replaced by a formula saying that intervention and war communism are more or less *probable*.

The question of the *nationalisation of the land*. I do not agree with those comrades who propose that the formula on the nationalisation of the land in the case of capitalistically developed countries should be altered, and who demand that in such countries the nationali-

sation of *all* the land should be proclaimed on the first day of the proletarian revolution.

Nor do I agree with those comrades who propose that nothing at all should be said about the nationalisation of *all* the land in the capitalistically developed countries. In my opinion, it would be better to speak, as the draft programme does, of the eventual nationalisation of *all* the land, with an addition to the effect that the right of the small and middle peasants to use of the land will be guaranteed.

Those comrades are mistaken who think that the more capitalistically developed a country is, the easier it will be to nationalise *all* the land in that country. On the contrary, the more capitalistically developed a country is, the more difficult will it be to nationalise *all* the land, because the stronger are the traditions of private ownership of the land in that country, and the harder, therefore, will it be to combat those traditions.

Read Lenin's theses on the agrarian question at the Second Congress of the Comintern,<sup>44</sup> where he explicitly warns against hasty and incautious steps in this direction, and you will understand how mistaken the assertions of these comrades are. In the capitalistically developed countries private ownership of the land has existed for centuries, which cannot be said of the countries less developed capitalistically, where the principle of private ownership of the land has not yet become deeply rooted in the peasantry. Here, in Russia, the peasants at one time even used to say that the land belonged to no man, that it was God's land. This, in fact, explains why as early as 1906, in expectation of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in our country,

Lenin put forward the slogan of the nationalisation of *all* the land, with the proviso that the small and middle peasants should be guaranteed the use of the land, considering that the peasants would understand this and reconcile themselves to it.

Is it not noteworthy, on the other hand, that in 1920, at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin himself warned the Communist Parties of the capitalistically developed countries not to put forward immediately the slogan of nationalising *all* the land, since the peasants of these countries, imbued as they are with the private property instinct, would not stomach such a slogan at once. Can we ignore this difference and refuse to pay heed to Lenin's recommendations? Obviously, we cannot.

The question of the *inner substance* of the draft programme. It appears that certain comrades consider that in its inner substance the draft programme is not quite international, because, they say, it is "too Russian" in character. I have not heard such objections put forward here. But it appears that such objections exist in some circles round about the Comintern.

What can have furnished grounds for such an opinion?

Is it, perhaps, the fact that the draft programme contains a special chapter on the U.S.S.R.? But what can there be bad in that? Is our revolution, in its *character*, a national and only a national revolution, and not pre-eminently an international revolution? If so, why do we call it a *base* of the world revolutionary movement, an *instrument* for the revolutionary development of all countries, the *motherland* of the world proletariat?

There were people among us—our oppositionists, for instance—who considered that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. was exclusively or mainly a national revolution. It was on this point that they came to grief. It is strange that there are people round about the Comintern, it appears, who are prepared to follow in the footsteps of the oppositionists.

Perhaps our revolution is, *in type*, a national and only a national revolution? But our revolution is a Soviet revolution, and the Soviet form of proletarian state is more or less obligatory for the dictatorship of the proletariat in other countries. It is not without reason that Lenin said that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. had ushered in a new era in the history of development, the era of Soviets. Does it not follow from this that, not only as regards its character but also as regards its type, our revolution is pre-eminently an international revolution, one that presents a pattern of what, in the main, a proletarian revolution should be in any country?

Undoubtedly, the international character of our revolution imposes upon the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. certain duties towards the proletarians and oppressed masses of the whole world. This was what Lenin had in mind when he said that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. exists in order to do everything possible for the development and victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries. But what follows from this? It follows, at least, that our revolution is part of the world revolution, a base and an instrument of the world revolutionary movement.

Undoubtedly, too, not only has the revolution in

the U.S.S.R. duties towards the proletarians of all countries, duties which it is discharging, but the proletarians of all countries have certain fairly important duties towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. These duties consist in supporting the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. in its struggle against internal and external enemies, in war against a war designed to strangle the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., in advocating that imperialist armies should directly go over to the side of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. in the event of an attack on the U.S.S.R. But does it not follow from this that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. is inseparable from the revolutionary movement in other countries, that the triumph of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. is a triumph for the revolution throughout the world?

Is it possible, after all this, to speak of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. as being only a national revolution, isolated from and having no connection with the revolutionary movement throughout the world?

And, on the other hand, is it possible, after all this, to understand anything at all about the world revolutionary movement, if it is considered out of connection with the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R.?

What would be the value of the programme of the Comintern, which deals with the world proletarian revolution, if it *ignored* the fundamental question of *the character and tasks* of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., *its duties* towards the proletarians of all countries, and *the duties of the proletarians of all countries* towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.?

That is why I think that the objections concerning the “Russian character” of the draft programme of the Comintern bear the stamp—how shall I put it mildly?—well, a bad stamp, an unpleasant flavour.

Let us pass to a few separate remarks.

I consider that those comrades are right who suggest amending the sentence on page 55 of the draft programme which speaks of the labouring sections of the rural population “who follow the proletarian dictatorship.” This sentence is an obvious misunderstanding, or perhaps it is a proof-reader’s error. It should be amended.

But these comrades are quite wrong when they propose the inclusion in the draft programme of all the definitions of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin. (*Laughter.*) On page 52 we have the following definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, taken in the main from Lenin:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat is the continuation of its class struggle in new conditions. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society, against the external capitalist enemies, against the remnants of the exploiting classes at home, against the shoots of a new bourgeoisie that spring from the soil of commodity production which has not yet been eliminated.”<sup>45</sup>

The draft programme contains also a number of other definitions of the dictatorship, corresponding to the particular tasks of the dictatorship at various stages of the proletarian revolution. I think that this is quite

sufficient. (*A voice*: "One of Lenin's formulations has been omitted.") Lenin has whole pages on the dictatorship of the proletariat. If they were all to be included in the draft programme, I am afraid it would be increased to at least three times its size.

Incorrect, too, is the objection raised by some comrades to the thesis on the neutralisation of the middle peasantry. In his theses at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin explicitly states that on the eve of the seizure of power and in the first stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the capitalist countries the Communist Parties cannot count on anything more than neutralising the middle peasantry. Lenin explicitly states that only after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated can the Communist Parties count on organising a stable alliance with the middle peasant. Clearly, when compiling the draft programme, we could not ignore this directive of Lenin's, to say nothing of the fact that it coincides exactly with the experience of our revolution.

Incorrect, too, is the comment on the national question made by a number of comrades. These comrades have no grounds for asserting that the draft programme ignores the national factors in the revolutionary movement. The question of the colonies is fundamentally a national one. Imperialist oppression, oppression in the colonies, national self-determination, the right of nations and colonies to secession, etc., are given sufficient prominence in the draft programme.

If it is the national minorities in Central Europe that these comrades have in mind, this may be mentioned in the draft programme, but I am opposed to the



national question in Central Europe being given separate treatment in it.

Lastly, as to the remarks made by a number of comrades on the statement that Poland is a country representing the second type of development towards proletarian dictatorship. These comrades think that the classification of countries into three types—countries with a high capitalist development (America, Germany, Britain), countries with an average capitalist development (Poland, Russia before the February Revolution, etc.), and colonial countries—is wrong. They maintain that Poland should be included in the first type of countries, that one can speak only of two types of countries—capitalist and colonial.

That is not true, comrades. Besides capitalistically developed countries, where the victory of the revolution will lead at once to the proletarian dictatorship, there are countries which are little developed capitalistically, where there are feudal survivals and a special agrarian problem of the anti-feudal type (Poland, Rumania, etc.), countries where the petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry, is bound to have a weighty word to say in the event of a revolutionary upheaval, and where the victory of the revolution, in order to lead to a proletarian dictatorship, can and certainly will require certain intermediate stages, in the form, say, of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

In our country, too, there were people, such as Trotsky, who before the February Revolution said that the peasantry was not of serious consequence, and that the slogan of the moment was “no tsar, but a workers’ government.” You know that Lenin emphatically dis-

sociated himself from this slogan and objected to any underestimation of the role and importance of the petty bourgeoisie, especially of the peasantry. There were some in our country at that time who thought that after the overthrow of tsarism the proletariat would at once occupy the predominating position. But how did it turn out in reality? It turned out that immediately after the February Revolution the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie appeared on the scene and gave predominance to the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who had been tiny parties until then, "suddenly" became the predominating force in the country. Thanks to what? Thanks to the fact that the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie at first supported the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

This, incidently, explains why the proletarian dictatorship was established in our country as a result of the more or less rapid growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

There is scarcely reason to doubt that Poland and Rumania belong to the category of countries which will have to pass, more or less rapidly, through certain intermediate stages on the way to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That is why I think that these comrades are mistaken when they deny that there are three types of revolutionary movement on the way towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. Poland and Rumania are representative of the second type.

These, comrades, are my remarks on the draft programme of the Comintern.

As to the style of the draft programme, or of certain individual formulations, I cannot affirm that in this respect the draft programme is perfect. It is to be presumed that some things will have to be improved, more precisely defined, that the style, perhaps, will have to be simplified, and so on. But that is a matter for the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.<sup>46</sup>

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## INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE GRAIN PROBLEM

*Speech Delivered on July 9, 1928*

Comrades, before I pass to the specific question of our difficulties on the grain front, allow me to deal with some general questions of theoretical interest which arose here during the discussion at the plenum.

First of all, the general question *of the chief sources of development of our industry*, the means of guaranteeing our present rate of industrialisation.

Ossinsky and then Sokolnikov touched upon this question, perhaps without themselves realising it. It is a question of paramount importance.

I think that there are two chief sources nourishing our industry: firstly, the working class; secondly, the peasantry.

In the capitalist countries industrialisation was usually effected, in the main, by robbing other countries, by robbing colonies or defeated countries, or with the help of substantial and more or less enslaving loans from abroad.

You know that for hundreds of years Britain collected capital from all her colonies and from all parts of the world, and was able in this way to make additional investments in her industry. This, incidentally,

explains why Britain at one time became the “workshop of the world.”

You know also that Germany developed her industry with the help, among other things, of the 5,000 million francs she levied as an indemnity on France after the Franco-Prussian war.

One respect in which our country differs from the capitalist countries is that it cannot and must not engage in colonial robbery, or the plundering of other countries in general. That way, therefore, is closed to us.

Neither, however, does our country have or want to have enslaving loans from abroad. Consequently, that way, too, is closed to us.

What then remains? Only one thing, and that is to develop industry, to industrialise the country with the help of *internal* accumulations.

Under the bourgeois system in our country, industry, transport, etc., were usually developed with the help of loans. Whether you take the building of new factories or the re-equipment of old ones, whether you take the laying of new railways or the erection of big electric power stations—not one of these undertakings was able to dispense with foreign loans. But they were enslaving loans.

Quite different is the situation in our country under the Soviet system. We are building the Turkestan Railway, with a length of 1,400 versts, which requires hundreds of millions of rubles. We are erecting the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, which also requires hundreds of millions of rubles. But have they involved us in any enslaving loans? No, they have not. All this is being done with the help of internal accumulations.

But what are the chief sources of these accumulations? As I have said, there are two such sources: firstly, the working class, which creates values and advances our industry; secondly, the peasantry.

The way matters stand with the peasantry in this respect is as follows: it not only pays the state the usual taxes, direct and indirect; it also *overpays* in the relatively high prices for manufactured goods—that is in the first place, and it is more or less *underpaid* in the prices for agricultural produce—that is in the second place.

This is an additional tax levied on the peasantry for the sake of promoting industry, which caters for the whole country, the peasantry included. It is something in the nature of a “tribute,” of a supertax, which we are compelled to levy for the time being in order to preserve and accelerate our present rate of industrial development, in order to ensure an industry for the whole country, in order to raise further the standard of life of the rural population and then to abolish altogether this additional tax, these “scissors” between town and country.

It is an unpalatable business, there is no denying. But we should not be Bolsheviks if we slurred over it and closed our eyes to the fact that, unfortunately, our industry and our country cannot *at present* dispense with this additional tax on the peasantry.

Why do I speak of this? Because some comrades, apparently, do not understand this indisputable truth. They based their speeches on the fact that the peasants are overpaying for manufactured goods, which is absolutely true, and are being underpaid for agricultural

produce, which is also true. But what do they demand? They demand the establishment of replacement prices for grain, so that these “scissors,” these underpayments and overpayments, would be done away with *at once*. But what would be the effect of doing away with the “scissors” this year or next year, say? The effect would be to retard the industrialisation of the country, including the industrialisation of agriculture, to undermine our young industry which is not yet firmly on its feet, and thus to strike at our entire national economy. Can we agree to this? Obviously, we cannot. Should the “scissors” between town and country, should all these underpayments and overpayments be done away with? Yes, they certainly should. Can we do away with them at once without weakening our industry, and hence our national economy? No, we cannot.

What, then, should our policy be? It should be gradually to close the “scissors,” to diminish the gap from year to year, by lowering the prices for manufactured goods and improving agricultural technique—which cannot but result in reducing the cost of producing grain—and then, within the space of a number of years, to do away completely with this additional tax on the peasantry.

Are the peasants capable of bearing this burden? They undoubtedly are: firstly, because this burden will grow lighter from year to year, and, secondly, because this additional tax is being levied not under conditions of capitalist development, where the masses of the peasantry are condemned to poverty and exploitation, but under Soviet conditions, where exploitation of the peasants by the socialist state is out of the question, and

where this additional tax is being paid in a situation in which the living standards of the peasantry are steadily rising.

That is how matters stand with regard to the basic sources of the industrialisation of our country at the present time.

The second question concerns the problem of the *bond with the middle peasant*—the problem of the aims of the bond and the means for effecting it.

It would follow from what some comrades say that the bond between town and country, between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, is based *exclusively* on textiles, on satisfying the *personal* requirements of the peasantry. Is this true? It is quite untrue, comrades. Of course, it is of immense importance to satisfy the peasants' personal requirements for textiles. That is how we began to establish the bond with the peasantry in the new conditions. But to assert on these grounds that the bond based on textiles is the beginning and end of the matter, that the bond based on satisfying the peasants' personal requirements is the all-inclusive or chief foundation of the economic alliance between the working class and the peasantry, is to commit a most serious error. Actually, the bond between town and country is based not only on satisfying the peasants' *personal* requirements, not only on textiles, but also on satisfying the *economic* requirements of the peasants as *producers* of agricultural products.

It is not only cotton fabrics that we give the peasants. We also give them machines of all kinds, seeds, ploughs, fertilisers, etc., which are of the weightiest



importance for the advancement and socialist transformation of peasant farming.

Hence, the bond is based not only on textiles, but also on metals. Without this, the bond with the peasantry would be insecure.

In what way does the bond based on textiles differ from the bond based on metals? Primarily in the fact that the bond based on textiles chiefly concerns the peasants' personal requirements, without affecting, or affecting to a comparatively small extent, the production side of peasant farming, whereas the bond based on metals chiefly concerns the production side of peasant farming, improving it, mechanising it, making it more remunerative and paving the way for uniting the scattered and small peasant farms into large socially-conducted farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the purpose of the bond is to preserve classes, the peasant class in particular. That is not so, comrades. That is not the purpose of the bond at all. The purpose of the bond is to bring the peasantry closer to the working class, the leader of our entire development, to strengthen the alliance of the peasantry with the working class, the leading force in the alliance, gradually to *remould* the peasantry, its mentality and its production, *along collectivist lines*, and thus to bring about the conditions for the abolition of classes.

The purpose of the bond is not to preserve classes, but to abolish them. Whereas the bond based on textiles affects the production side of peasant farming very little and therefore, generally speaking, cannot result in the remoulding of the peasantry along collectivist lines and in the abolition of classes, the bond based upon

metals, on the contrary, affects primarily the production side of peasant farming, its mechanisation and its collectivisation, and for this very reason should result in the gradual remoulding of the peasantry, in the gradual elimination of classes, including the peasant class.

How, in general, can the peasant—his mentality, his production—be remoulded, remade, along the lines of bringing his mentality closer to that of the working class, along the lines of the socialist principle of production? What does this require?

It requires, firstly, the widest agitation on behalf of collectivism among the peasant masses.

It requires, secondly, implanting a co-operative communal life and the ever wider extension of our co-operative supply and marketing organisations to the millions of peasant farms. There can be no doubt that had it not been for the broad development of our co-operatives, we should not have that swing towards the collective-farm movement that we observe among the peasants at the present time, for the development of supply and marketing co-operatives is in our conditions a means of preparing the peasants for going over to collective farming.

But all this is still far from enough to remould the peasantry. The principal force for remoulding the peasantry along socialist lines lies in new technical means in agriculture, the mechanisation of agriculture, collective peasant labour, and the electrification of the country.

Lenin has been referred to here, and a passage on the bond with peasant farming has been quoted from his works. But to take Lenin in part, without desiring to take him as a whole, is to misrepresent Lenin. Lenin

was fully aware that the bond with the peasantry based on textile goods is a very important matter. But he did not stop there, for, side by side with this, he insisted that the bond with the peasantry should be based also on metals, on supplying the peasant with machines, on the electrification of the country, that is, on all those things which promote the remaking and remoulding of peasant *farming* on collectivist lines.

Please listen, for example, to the following quotation from Lenin:

“The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and with immense rapidity” (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Quite clearly, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry cannot be stable and lasting, the bond cannot be stable and lasting and cannot attain its purpose of gradually remoulding the peasantry, bringing it closer to the working class and putting it on collectivist lines, if the bond based on textiles is not supplemented by the bond based on metals.

That is how Comrade Lenin understood the bond.

The third question is that of *the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the class struggle under NEP conditions*.

It is necessary first of all to establish the point that the principles of NEP were laid down by our Party not after war communism, as certain comrades sometimes assert, but before it, already at the beginning of 1918,

when we were able for the first time to set about building a new, socialist economy. I could refer to Ilyich's pamphlet, *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power*, published in the beginning of 1918, where the principles of NEP are set forth. When the intervention ended and the Party introduced NEP, it described it as a new economic policy because this policy had been interrupted by the intervention and we were in a position to apply it only after the intervention, after war communism, compared with which NEP really was a new economic policy. In confirmation of this, I consider it necessary to refer to the resolution of the Ninth Congress of Soviets, where it is stated in black and white that the principles of the New Economic Policy were laid down before war communism. This resolution, "Preliminary Results of the New Economic Policy," says the following:

"What is known as the New Economic Policy, the basic principles of which were precisely defined *already at the time of the first respite, in the spring of 1918*,\* is based on a strict evaluation of the economic resources of Soviet Russia. The implementation of this policy, which was interrupted by the combined attack of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Russian landlords and bourgeoisie and European imperialism on the workers' and peasants' state, became possible only after the armed suppression of the counter-revolutionary attempts, at the beginning of 1921" (see *Resolutions of the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets*, p. 16<sup>47</sup>).

You will thus see how mistaken is the assertion of some comrades that it was only after war communism that the Party realised the necessity for building socialism in the conditions of a market and a money economy,

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

that is, in the conditions of the New Economic Policy.

And what follows from this?

It follows, first of all, that NEP cannot be regarded as only a retreat.

It follows, further, that NEP presumes a victorious and systematic socialist offensive on the capitalist elements in our economy.

The opposition, in the shape of Trotsky, thinks that once NEP has been introduced, only one thing remains for us to do, and that is to retreat step by step, as we retreated at the beginning of NEP, “extending” NEP and surrendering positions. It is on this incorrect conception of NEP that Trotsky bases his assertion that the Party “extended” NEP and retreated from Lenin’s position by permitting the renting of land and the hiring of labour in the countryside. Please listen to Trotsky’s words:

“But what is the significance of the Soviet Government’s latest measures in the countryside—sanctioning the renting of land and the hiring of labour—all that which we call *extending* rural NEP. . . . But could we have *abstained from extending* NEP in the countryside? No, because then peasant farming would have fallen into decay, the market would have narrowed, and industry would have been retarded” (Trotsky, *Eight Years*, pp. 16-17).

That is the length to which one may go if one gets into one’s head the mistaken notion that NEP is a retreat and nothing but a retreat.

Can it be asserted that, in permitting the hiring of labour and the renting of land in the countryside, the Party “extended” NEP, “retreated” from Lenin’s position and so on? Of course not! People who talk such nonsense have nothing in common with Lenin and Leninism.

I might refer to Lenin's letter to Ossinsky of April 1, 1922, where he speaks explicitly of the necessity of permitting the hiring of labour and the renting of land in the countryside. That was towards the end of the Eleventh Party Congress, where the question of work in the countryside, of NEP and its consequences had been widely discussed by the delegates.

Here is a quotation from this letter, forming the draft of a resolution for the delegates at the Party congress:

"On the question of the conditions for permitting the hiring of labour in agriculture and the renting of land, the Party Congress recommends all functionaries engaged in this field not to hamper either of these trends with excessive formalities, and to confine themselves to carrying out the decision of the last congress of Soviets, and also to studying what practical measures would be expedient in order to restrict the possibility of extremes and harmful excesses in this matter" (see *Lenin Miscellany*, IV, p. 396<sup>48</sup>).

You see how foolish and baseless is the talk about an "extension" of NEP, about a "retreat" from Lenin's position in connection with the introduction of the renting of land and the hiring of labour in the countryside, etc.

Why do I speak of this?

Because the people who are talking about an "extension" of NEP are seeking to use this talk as a justification for retreating in face of the capitalist elements in the countryside.

Because people have arisen inside and around our Party who see in the "extension" of NEP a means of "saving" the bond between the workers and the peasants, people who, on the grounds of the repeal of the emergency

measures, demand that the restrictions on the kulaks be discarded, and who demand that the capitalist elements in the countryside be given a free hand—in the interests of the bond.

Because the Party must be safeguarded against these anti-proletarian sentiments by all ways and means in our power.

Not to go too far afield, I shall refer to a note from a comrade, Osip Chernov, a member of the staff of *Bednota*,<sup>49</sup> in which he demands a series of relaxations for the kulaks, relaxations which would be nothing but a real and undisguised “extension” of NEP. I do not know whether he is a Communist or not. But this comrade, Osip Chernov, who is a supporter of the Soviet regime and of the alliance between the workers and the peasants, is so muddled over the peasant question that it is difficult to distinguish him from an ideologist of the rural bourgeoisie. What, in his opinion, are the reasons for our difficulties on the grain front? “The first reason,” he says, “is unquestionably the progressive income tax system. . . . The second reason is the legal changes in the election regulations, the lack of clarity in the regulations as to who is to be regarded as a kulak.”

What must be done to remove the difficulties? “It is necessary in the first place,” he says, “*to abolish the progressive income tax system* as it now stands, and replace it by a land taxation system, and to put a light tax on draught animals and major agricultural implements. . . . A second, and no less important, measure is to *revise the election regulations*, so as to make more prominent the signs showing where an exploiting, kulak farm begins.”

There you have the "extension" of NEP. As you see, the seed cast by Trotsky has not fallen on barren soil. Incorrect understanding of NEP gives rise to talk about "extension" of NEP, and talk about "extension" of NEP results in all sorts of notes, articles, letters and proposals recommending that the kulak should be allowed a free hand, that he should be relieved of restrictions and enabled to enrich himself without hindrance.

In reference to this same question, the question of NEP and the class struggle under NEP conditions, I should like to mention another fact. I am referring to the statement made by one of the comrades to the effect that, in connection with the grain procurements, the class struggle under NEP is only of minor importance, that this class struggle is not and cannot be of any serious importance in our grain procurement difficulties.

I must say, comrades, that I cannot at all agree with this statement. I think that, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, there is not and cannot be a single political or economic fact of any importance which does not reflect the existence of a class struggle in town or country. Does NEP abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not! On the contrary, NEP is a specific form of expression and an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And is not the dictatorship of the proletariat a continuation of the class struggle? (*Voices*: "True!") How, then, can it be said that the class struggle plays only a minor role in such important political and economic facts as the kulaks' attack on Soviet policy at the time of the grain procurements and the counter-measures and offensive actions undertaken by



the Soviet Government against the kulaks and speculators in connection with the grain procurements?

Is it not a fact that at the time of the grain procurement crisis we had the first serious attack by the capitalist elements of the countryside on Soviet policy under NEP conditions?

Have classes and the class struggle ceased to exist in the countryside?

Is it not true that Lenin's slogan about *relying* on the poor peasant, an *alliance* with the middle peasant and *fighting* against the kulaks is the basic slogan of our work in the countryside under the present conditions? And what is this slogan if not an expression of the class struggle in the countryside?

Of course, our policy must by no means be regarded as a policy of fanning the class struggle. Why? Because fanning the class struggle would lead to civil war. Because, inasmuch as we are in power, and inasmuch as we have consolidated our power and the key positions are in the hands of the working class, it is not in our interest that the class struggle should assume the forms of civil war. But this in no way implies that the class struggle has been abolished, or that it will not grow sharper. Still less does it imply that the class struggle is not the decisive factor in our advancement. No, it does not.

We often say that we are promoting socialist forms of economy in the sphere of trade. But what does that imply? It implies that we are squeezing out of trade thousands upon thousands of small and medium traders. Is it to be expected that these traders who have been squeezed out of the sphere of trade will keep silent and not attempt to organise resistance? Obviously not.

We often say that we are promoting socialist forms of economy in the sphere of industry. But what does that imply? It implies that, by our advance towards socialism, we are squeezing out and ruining, perhaps without ourselves noticing it, thousands upon thousands of small and medium capitalist manufacturers. Is it to be expected that these ruined people will keep silent and not attempt to organise resistance? Of course not.

We often say that it is necessary to restrict the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks in the countryside, that they must be heavily taxed and the right to rent land limited, that kulaks must not be allowed the right to vote in the election of Soviets, and so on and so forth. But what does that imply? It implies that we are gradually pressing upon and squeezing out the capitalist elements in the countryside, sometimes driving them to ruin. Is it to be presumed that the kulaks will be grateful to us for this and will not endeavour to organise part of the poor peasants or middle peasants against the Soviet Government's policy? Of course not.

Is it not obvious that our whole forward movement, our every success of any importance in the sphere of socialist construction, is an expression and result of the class struggle in our country?

But it follows from all this that the more we advance, the greater will be the resistance of the capitalist elements and the sharper the class struggle, while the Soviet Government, whose strength will steadily increase, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of demoralising the enemies of the working class, a policy, lastly, of crushing the resistance of the exploiters, thereby creating a basis for the further

advance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

It must not be imagined that the socialist forms will develop, squeezing out the enemies of the working class, while our enemies retreat in silence and make way for our advance, that then we shall again advance and they will again retreat until “unexpectedly” all the social groups without exception, both kulaks and poor peasants, both workers and capitalists, find themselves “suddenly” and “imperceptibly,” without struggle or commotion, in the lap of a socialist society. Such fairy-tales do not and cannot happen in general, and in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular.

It never has been and never will be the case that a dying class surrenders its positions voluntarily without attempting to organise resistance. It never has been and never will be the case that the working class could advance towards socialism in a class society without struggle or commotion. On the contrary, the advance towards socialism cannot but cause the exploiting elements to resist the advance, and the resistance of the exploiters cannot but lead to the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle.

That is why the working class must not be lulled with talk about the class struggle playing a secondary role.

The fourth question concerns the problem of *emergency measures* against the kulaks and speculators.

Emergency measures must not be regarded as something absolute and established once for all. Emergency measures are necessary and expedient in definite, emergency circumstances, when no other means of manoeuvr-

ing are available. Emergency measures are unnecessary and harmful in other circumstances, when other, flexible means of manoeuvring in the market are available. Those who think that emergency measures are a bad thing in all circumstances are mistaken. A systematic struggle must be waged against such people. But mistaken, too, are those who think that emergency measures are necessary and expedient at all times. A resolute struggle against such people is essential.

Was it a mistake to resort to emergency measures in the conditions of the grain procurement crisis? It is now recognised by all that it was not a mistake, that, on the contrary, the emergency measures saved the country from a crisis of our whole economy. What induced us to resort to these measures? The deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain by January of this year, which we had to make good before the roads were spoiled by the spring thaws, at the same time ensuring a normal rate of grain procurement. Could we refrain from resorting to emergency measures in the absence of a reserve of about 100,000,000 poods of grain essential for being able to hold out and to intervene in the market with the object of reducing grain prices, or in the absence of an adequate reserve of foreign currency essential for importing large quantities of grain from abroad? Obviously, we could not. And what would have happened if we had not made good this deficit? We should now be having a most serious crisis of our entire national economy, hunger in the towns and hunger in the army.

If we had had a reserve of about 100,000,000 poods of grain with which to hold out and then wear down the kulak by intervening in the market with a view to

reducing grain prices, we should not, of course, have resorted to emergency measures. But you know very well that we had no such reserve.

If at that time we had had a foreign currency reserve of 100,000,000 or 150,000,000 rubles with which to import grain from abroad, most likely we should not have resorted to emergency measures. But you know very well that we had no such reserve.

Does that mean that we should continue to remain without a reserve in the future and again resort to the aid of emergency measures? No, it does not. On the contrary, we must do everything in our power to accumulate reserves and to rule out completely the necessity of resorting to any emergency measures. People who contemplate converting the emergency measures into a permanent or prolonged policy of our Party are dangerous, because they are playing with fire and are a source of danger to the bond.

Does it follow from this that we must renounce once for all resort to emergency measures? No, it does not. We have no grounds for asserting that emergency circumstances necessitating resort to emergency measures will never recur. To assert that would be sheer quackery.

Lenin demonstrated the necessity for the New Economic Policy; yet he did not consider it possible under NEP to renounce resort even to the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees in certain conditions and under certain circumstances. Still less can we renounce once for all resort to emergency measures, which cannot be put on a par with so drastic a measure for combating the kulaks as the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees.

It may not be superfluous to recall an incident involving Preobrazhensky at the Eleventh Congress of our Party that has a direct bearing on the matter in hand. You know that at the Eleventh Congress in his theses on work in the countryside Preobrazhensky attempted to reject "once for all" under NEP conditions the policy of combating the kulaks by the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees. Preobrazhensky wrote in his theses: "The policy of repudiating this stratum (the kulaks and well-to-do peasants) and of gross extra-economic suppression of it by the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees of 1918 would be a most harmful mistake" (§2).

You know that Lenin replied to this as follows:

"The second sentence of the second paragraph (directed against the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees') is harmful and wrong, since war, for example, *might compel us to resort to the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees*. This should be spoken of quite differently—in this way, for example: in view of the paramount importance of improving agriculture and increasing its output, the policy of the proletariat towards the kulaks and well-to-do peasants *at the present moment*\* should aim chiefly at *r e s t r i c t i n g* their exploiting efforts, and so forth. The whole point lies in the ways and means by which our state can and should restrict those efforts and protect the poor peasants. This must be studied and we must see to it that it is studied practically, but general phrases are *f u t i l e*" (see *Lenin Miscellany*, IV, p. 391<sup>50</sup>).

Clearly, emergency measures must be regarded dialectically, for everything depends on the conditions of time and place.

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

That, comrades, is how matters stand with the questions of a general character that arose in the course of the discussion.

Allow me to pass now to the question *of the grain problem and the basic causes of our difficulties on the grain front*.

I think that a number of comrades have committed the error of lumping together different kinds of causes of our difficulties on the grain front, of confusing temporary and circumstantial (specific) causes with chronic and fundamental causes. There are two sets of causes of our grain difficulties: chronic, fundamental causes, the elimination of which will require a number of years, and specific, circumstantial causes, which can be eliminated now, if a number of necessary measures are adopted and carried out. To lump all these causes together is to confuse the whole question.

What is the underlying significance of our difficulties on the grain front? It is that they confront us squarely with the problem of grain, of grain production, with the problem of agriculture in general, and of cereal production in particular.

Do we have a grain problem at all, as an urgent question? We undoubtedly do. One must be blind to doubt that the grain problem is now harassing every aspect of Soviet social life. We cannot live like gypsies, without grain reserves, without certain reserves in case of harvest failure, without reserves with which to manoeuvre in the market, without reserves against the contingency of war, and, lastly, without some reserves for export. Even the small peasant, for all the meagreness of his husbandry, cannot do without reserves, without certain stocks.

Is it not clear that a great country covering one-sixth of the world cannot do without grain reserves for its internal and external requirements?

Supposing the winter crop in the Ukraine had not perished and we had ended the grain procurement year just "breaking even"—could this have been considered enough? No, it could not. We cannot continue to live just "breaking even." We must have at our disposal a certain minimum of reserves if we want to uphold the position of the Soviet Government both internally and externally.

Firstly, we are not guaranteed against armed attack. Do you think we can defend the country if we have no reserves of grain for the army? Those comrades were perfectly right who said here that the peasant today is not what he was six years ago, say, when he was afraid that he might lose his land to the landlord. The peasant is already forgetting the landlord. He is now demanding new and better conditions of life. Can we, in the event of enemy attack, wage war against the external enemy on the battle front, and at the same time against the muzhik in the rear in order to get grain urgently for the army? No, we cannot and must not. In order to defend the country, we must have certain stocks for supplying the army, if only for the first six months. Why do we need this six-months' breathing space? In order to give the peasant time to awaken to the situation, to realise the danger of the war, to see how matters stand and to be ready to do his bit for the common cause of the country's defence. If we content ourselves with just "breaking even," we shall never have reserves against the contingency of war.



Secondly, we are not guaranteed against complications in the grain market. A certain reserve is absolutely essential to enable us to intervene in the grain market and make our price policy effective. For we cannot, and must not, resort every time to emergency measures. But we shall never have such a reserve if we always find ourselves on the edge of a precipice and are content if we can end the procurement year just "breaking even."

Thirdly, we are not guaranteed against crop failure. A certain grain reserve is absolutely essential to enable us in the event of crop failure to supply the famine areas at least to some extent and at least for some time. But we shall not have such a reserve if we do not increase the production of marketable grain and do not positively and decisively abandon the old habit of living without reserves.

Lastly, a reserve is absolutely essential to enable us to export grain. We have to import equipment for industry. We have to import agricultural machines, tractors and spare parts for them. But this cannot be done if we do not export grain, if we do not accumulate a certain reserve of foreign currency obtained by exporting grain. Before the war we used to export from 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 poods of grain annually. We were able to export so much because we went short ourselves. That is true. It should, however, be realised that all the same our marketable grain before the war was *double* what it is today. And it is just because we have now only half as much marketable grain that grain is ceasing to be an item of export. And what does ceasing to export grain mean? It means losing the source which ena-

bled us to import—as we must import—equipment for industry and tractors and machines for agriculture. Can we go on living in this way—without accumulating grain reserves for export? No, we cannot.

So you see how insecure and unstable our position in the matter of grain reserves is.

This is apart from the fact that not only have we no grain reserves for all these four purposes; we have not even a minimum reserve to enable us to carry over without distress from one procurement year to the next and to supply the towns uninterruptedly in such difficult months as June and July.

Can it then be denied that the grain problem is acute and that our difficulties on the grain front are serious?

But, because of our grain difficulties, we are also having difficulties of a political character. Under no circumstances must this be forgotten, comrades. I am referring to the discontent which was to be observed among a certain section of the peasantry, among a certain section of the poor peasants, and also of the middle peasants, and which created a certain threat to the bond.

Of course, it would be quite wrong to say, as Frumkin does in his note, that there is already an estrangement instead of the bond. That is not true, comrades. An estrangement would be a serious thing. An estrangement would mean the beginning of civil war, if not civil war itself. Don't let us frighten ourselves with "terrible" words. Don't let us give way to panic. That would be unworthy of Bolsheviks. An estrangement would mean that the peasantry had broken with the Soviet Government. But if the peasant really had broken with

the Soviet Government, *which is the chief purchaser of peasant grain*, he would not be enlarging his crop area. Yet we find that this year the spring crop area has been enlarged *in all the grain areas without exception*. Does that look like estrangement? Can one call this state of things a “hopeless prospect” for peasant farming, as Frumkin, for example, says it is? Does that look like a “hopeless prospect”?

What is the *basis* of our grain difficulties, meaning by that the *chronic* and *fundamental* causes of the difficulties, and not the temporary, circumstantial ones?

*The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the increasingly scattered and divided character of agriculture.* It is a fact that agriculture, especially grain farming, is growing smaller in scale, becoming increasingly less remunerative and less productive of marketable surpluses. Whereas before the revolution we had about 15,000,000 or 16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have some 24,000,000 or 25,000,000; moreover, the process of division tends to become more marked.

It is true that our crop area today falls little short of pre-war, and that the *gross* output of grain is only some five per cent less than it was before the war. But the trouble is that, in spite of all this, our output of *marketable* grain is only *half*, that is, about 50 per cent, of pre-war. That is the root of the matter.

What is the point? The point is that small-scale farming is less remunerative, produces smaller marketable surpluses and is less stable than large-scale farming. The Marxist thesis that small-scale production is less profitable than large-scale production fully applies to

agriculture also. That is why, from one and the same area, small-scale peasant farming yields much less marketable grain than large-scale farming.

What is the way out of this situation?

There are three ways, as the Political Bureau resolution tells us.

1. The way out is to raise the productivity of small- and middle-peasant farming as far as possible, to replace the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply small and medium machines, fertiliser, seed and agronomic help, to organise the peasantry into co-operatives, to conclude contracts with whole villages, supplying them with the best-grade seed on loan and thus ensuring the peasants collective credit, and, lastly, to place big machines at their disposal through machine-hiring stations.

Those comrades are mistaken who assert that small-peasant farming has exhausted its potentialities for further development, and that therefore it is not worth while to give it any further help. That is quite untrue. Individual peasant farming still possesses no inconsiderable potentialities for development. One only has to know how to help it to realise these potentialities.

Nor is *Krasnaya Gazeta*<sup>51</sup> right in asserting that the policy of organising the individual peasant farms in supply and marketing co-operatives has not justified itself. That is quite untrue, comrades. On the contrary, the policy of organising supply and marketing co-operatives has justified itself fully, by creating a real basis among the peasantry for a swing towards the side of the collective-farm movement. There is no doubt that if we had not developed supply and marketing co-operatives, we should not have that swing in the attitude of the peasantry

towards collective farming which now exists, and which is helping us to lead the collective-farm movement forward.

2. The way out, further, is to help the poor and middle peasants gradually to unite their scattered small farms into large collective farms based on new technical equipment and collective labour, as being more profitable and yielding larger marketable surpluses. I have in mind all forms of uniting small farms into large, socially-conducted farms, from simple co-operatives to artels, which are incomparably more productive and yield far larger marketable surpluses than the scattered small-peasant farms.

That is the basis for the solution of the problem.

Comrades are mistaken when, while advocating collective farms, they accuse us of "rehabilitating" small-peasant farming. They evidently think that the attitude towards the individual peasant farms should be one of fighting and destroying them, and not of assisting them and drawing them over to our side. That is quite wrong, comrades. Individual peasant farming is in no need of "rehabilitation." It is not very remunerative, it is true. But that does not mean that it is altogether unprofitable. We should be destroying the bond if we adopted the attitude of fighting and destroying individual peasant farming, departing from the Leninist position that the collective farms must render day-to-day assistance and support to the individual peasant farms.

Even more mistaken are those who, while extolling the collective farms, declare that individual peasant farming is our "curse." This already smacks of downright war on peasant farming. Where do they get this

idea from? If peasant farming is a "curse," how do they explain the alliance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry? Alliance of the working class with a "curse"—can there be anything so fantastic? How can they say such things and at the same time preach in favour of the bond? They recall what Lenin said about the necessity of our gradually changing over from the peasant nag to the steel steed of industry. That is very good. But is that the way to change over from one horse to another? To proclaim peasant farming a "curse" before a broad and powerful base has been created in the shape of a ramified system of collective farms—would not the upshot be that we should be left without any horse, without any base at all? (*Voices*: "Quite right!") The mistake of these comrades is that they *counterpose* collective farming to individual peasant farming. But what we want is that these two forms of farming should not be counterposed to one another, but should be *linked together in a bond*, and that within the framework of this bond the collective farms should assist the individual peasant and help him little by little to go over to collectivist lines. Yes, what we want is that the peasants should look upon the collective farms not as their enemy, but as their friend who helps them and will help them to emancipate themselves from poverty. (*Voices*: "True!") If that is true, then you should not say that we are "rehabilitating" individual peasant farming, or that peasant farming is our "curse."

What should be said is that, compared with the big collective farm, the small-peasant farm is less profitable, or even the least profitable, but that all the same it is of some, not inconsiderable, benefit. But from what

you say it follows that small-peasant farming is altogether unprofitable, and perhaps even harmful.

That was not Lenin's opinion of small-peasant farming. Here is what he said on this score in his speech on "The Tax in Kind":

"If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how Socialists have always conceived it. And that is how our Communist Party conceives it" (Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

It follows that individual peasant farming is after all of some benefit.

It is one thing when a higher form of enterprise, large-scale enterprise, contends against a lower form and ruins, kills it. That is what happens under capitalism. It is quite another thing when the higher form of enterprise does not ruin the lower form, but helps it to raise itself, to go over to collectivist lines. That is what happens under the Soviet system.

And here is what Lenin says about the relations between the collective farms and the individual peasant farms:

"In particular, we must see to it that the law of the Soviet Government (on collective farms and state farms—*J. St.*) requiring that the state farms, agricultural communes and similar associations should *render immediate and all-round assistance to the surrounding middle peasants*, is actually, and moreover fully, carried out. Only if such *assistance is in fact rendered is agreement with the middle peasant feasible*.\* Only in this way can, and should, his confidence be won" (Vol. XXIV, p. 175).

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

It follows from this that the collective farms and state farms must assist the peasant farms precisely as individual farms.

Lastly, a third quotation from Lenin:

“Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry” (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

You see how highly Lenin appreciated the value of the collective-farm movement for the socialist transformation of our country.

It is extremely strange that some comrades in their long speeches focussed attention exclusively on the question of the individual peasant farms and did not say a single word, literally not a single word, about the task of promoting collective farms, as an urgent and decisive task of our Party.

3. The way out, lastly, is to strengthen the old state farms and to promote new, large state farms, as being the economic units that are the most remunerative and yield the largest marketable surpluses.

Such are the three principal tasks, the accomplishment of which will enable us to solve the grain problem, and thus do away with the very basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task, that of improving individual peasant farming, although it still remains our chief task, *is already insufficient* for the solution of the grain problem.



The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task must be *supplemented* in practice by the two new tasks of promoting collective farms and promoting state farms.

Unless we combine these tasks, unless we work persistently along all these three channels, it will be impossible to solve the grain problem, whether in the sense of supplying the country with marketable grain or in the sense of transforming our entire national economy on socialist lines.

What was Lenin's view of this matter? We have a document which shows that the Political Bureau resolution submitted to this plenum fully coincides with the practical plan for the development of agriculture which Lenin outlined in this document. I am referring to the "Mandate of the C.L.D." (Council of Labour and Defence) written in Lenin's own hand. It was published in May 1921. In this document Lenin analyses three groups of practical questions: the first group concerns trade and industry, the second group concerns the promotion of agriculture, and the third group concerns the various economic councils<sup>52</sup> and regional conferences on the regulation of economic affairs.

What does this document say on the subject of agriculture? Here is a quotation from the "Mandate of the C.L.D.":

"Second group of questions. Promotion of agriculture: a) peasant farming, b) state farms, c) communes, d) artels, e) co-operatives, f) other forms of socially-conducted farming" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 374).

You will see that the practical conclusions contained in the Political Bureau resolution on the solution of

the grain problem, and of the agricultural problem in general, fully coincide with Lenin's plan as set forth in the "Mandate of the C.L.D." of 1921.

It was very interesting to observe the truly youthful joy with which that giant, Lenin, who could move mountains and bring them face to face, greeted every item of news of the formation of a couple or so of collective farms, or of the arrival of tractors in some state farm. Here, for instance, is an excerpt from a letter to the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia:

"Dear Comrades, extremely gratifying reports have appeared in our newspapers regarding the work of members of your Society in the state farms of the Kirsanov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, and at Mitino Station, Odessa Gubernia, as well as regarding the work of a group of miners from the Donets Basin. . . . I am applying to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee requesting that the most outstanding farms should be classed as model farms and rendered special and priority assistance necessary for the favourable development of their work. I once more profoundly thank you in the name of our Republic, and request you to bear in mind that your assistance to us in the way of tractor cultivation of the soil is especially timely and valuable. I am particularly pleased to have this opportunity of congratulating you on your project to organise 200 agricultural communes" (Vol. XXVII, p. 309).

And here is an excerpt from a letter to the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia in America:

"Dear Comrades: I have just verified by a special request to the Perm Executive Committee, the extraordinary favourable news published in our press with reference to the work of the members of your Society headed by Harold Ware and organised as a Tractor Unit, in the Government of Perm, *on a Soviet Farm*\*

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

‘Toykino.’ . . . I am appealing to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to place this Soviet Farm in the ranks of Model Farms and to render it in every possible way special and extraordinary assistance in its constructive work, as well as supplying it with gasoline, metals and other material necessary for the organisation of a Repair Shop. Once more, I wish to thank you in the name of our Republic and to point out that no other form of relief is so timely and so important for us as the one rendered by you”\* (Vol. XXVII, p. 308).

So you see with what joy Lenin received every item of news, however small, regarding the development of collective farms and state farms.

Let this be a lesson to all who think they can deceive history and dispense with collective farms and state farms in victoriously building socialism in our country.

I am concluding, comrades. I think that the grain difficulties will not have been without their value for us. Our Party has learned and progressed by overcoming difficulties and crises of every kind. I think that the present difficulties will steel our Bolshevik ranks and induce them to tackle the solution of the grain problem in thorough fashion. And the solution of this problem will remove one of the biggest difficulties standing in the way of the socialist transformation of our country.

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\* The text is as sent in English.—*Tr.*

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## ON THE BOND BETWEEN THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS AND ON STATE FARMS

*From a Speech Delivered on July 11, 1928*

Some of the comrades reverted in their speeches on the state farms to yesterday's dispute on the question of the grain procurements. Well, let us revert to yesterday's dispute.

What was the dispute about yesterday? First of all, about the "scissors" between town and country. It was said that the peasant was still overpaying for manufactured goods and being underpaid for his agricultural produce. It was said that these overpayments and underpayments constitute a supertax on the peasantry, something in the nature of a "tribute," an additional tax for the sake of industrialisation, a tax which we must certainly abolish, but which we cannot abolish *at once* if we have no intention of undermining our industry, of undermining a definite rate of development of our industry, which works for the whole country and which advances our national economy towards socialism.

There were some who did not like this. These comrades apparently fear to admit the truth. Well, that is a matter of taste. Some think that it is not advisable to tell the whole truth at a plenum of the Central Committee. But I think that at the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party it is our duty to tell the whole truth. It

should not be forgotten that the plenum of the Central Committee cannot be regarded as a mass meeting. Of course, "supertax," "additional tax" are unpleasant words, for they hit hard. But, in the first place, it is not a question of words. In the second place, the words fully correspond to the facts. In the third place, they, these unpleasant words, are intended to hit hard and to compel Bolsheviks to set to work seriously to *do away* with this "supertax," to *do away* with the "scissors."

And how can these unpleasant things be done away with? By systematically rationalising our industry and lowering prices of manufactured goods. By systematically improving agricultural technique and raising harvest yields, and gradually lowering the cost of agricultural produce. By systematically rationalising our trade and procurement apparatus. And so on and so forth.

All this, of course, cannot be done in a year or two. But it has to be done without fail in the course of a few years if we want to save ourselves from all sorts of unpleasant things and from facts that hit us hard.

Some of the comrades yesterday pressed hard for the abolition of the "scissors" *at once* and as good as demanded the establishment of *replacement prices* for agricultural produce. I, as well as other comrades, objected to this and said that this demand was contrary to the interests of the industrialisation of the country *at the present moment*, and, consequently, was contrary to the interests of our state.

That is what our dispute was about yesterday.

Today, these comrades say that they no longer insist on a policy of replacement prices. Well, that is very

good. It appears that yesterday's criticism was not without effect on these comrades.

A second question concerns the collective farms and state farms. I remarked in my speech that it was unnatural and strange that, when speaking of measures for promoting agriculture in connection with the grain procurements, some comrades did not say a single word about such weighty measures as developing collective farms and state farms. How is it possible to "forget" such a serious thing as the task of developing collective and state farms in agriculture? Do we not know that the task of developing individual peasant farming, important though it is at the present moment, is already *insufficient*, and that if we *do not supplement* this task in practice with the new tasks of developing collective farms and state farms, we *shall not solve* the grain farming problem and *shall not escape* from our difficulties, either in the sense of the socialist transformation of our entire national economy (and, hence, of peasant farming), or in the sense of ensuring the country definite reserves of marketable grain.

In view of all this, how can the question of developing collective farms and state farms be "forgotten," evaded, passed over in silence?

Let us pass now to the question of large state farms. The comrades who assert that there are no large grain farms in North America are mistaken. In point of fact, there are such farms both in North and South America. I might quote such a witness as Professor Tulaikov, who made a study of American agriculture and published his findings in the magazine *Nizhneye Povolzhye*<sup>53</sup> (No. 9)

Permit me to quote from Tulaikov's article.

"The Montana wheat farm is owned by the Campbell Farming Corporation. It has an area of 95,000 acres, or about 32,000 dessiatins. The farm is one continuous tract, divided for purposes of operation into four sections, what we would call khutors, each of which has a separate manager, the whole farm being managed by one person, the director of the corporation, Thomas Campbell.

"This year, according to a press report, which emanates of course from the farm itself, about half the total area is under cultivation, and it is expected to secure about 410,000 bushels of wheat (about 800,000 poods). 20,000 bushels of oats and 70,000 bushels of linseed. The income from the enterprise is expected to total 500,000 dollars.

"On this farm, horses and mules are almost totally replaced by tractors, motor lorries and automobiles. Ploughing, planting and all field work in general, and harvesting in particular, are carried on day and night, the fields at night being flood-lit to enable the machines to work. Because of the vast extent of the fields, the machines can cover long distances without making a turn. For instance, reaper-threshers with a 24-foot header, if the state of the crops permits their use, travel 20 miles, that is, a little over 30 versts. Formerly, 40 horses and men would have been required for this work. Four sheaf-binders are hitched to one tractor, and cover a strip 40 feet wide and 28 miles long, that is, a distance of roughly 42 versts. Binders are used if the grain is not dry enough to be threshed at the same time as it is reaped. In that case, the binding device is removed from the reapers and the cut stalks are laid in rows with the help of a special conveyer. The rows are left lying 24 or 48 hours, during which time the grain dries and the seeds of the weeds-cut together with it fall to the ground. After this, the grain is taken up with a reaper-thresher the cutter of which has been replaced by an automatic lifting device which delivers the dried grain straight into the thresher drum. The machine is operated by only two men, one driving the tractor and the other tending the thresher. The grain pours straight from the thresher into six-ton trucks which carry it to

the elevator, trains of ten trucks each being drawn by one tractor. The report says that in this way from 16,000 to 20,000 bushels of grain are threshed daily" (see *Nizhneye Povolzhye*, No. 9, September 1927, pp. 38-39).

There you have a description of one giant wheat farm of the capitalist type. There are giant farms of this kind in both North and South America.

Some comrades said here that in the capitalist countries conditions for the development of such giant farms are not always favourable, or not altogether favourable, and therefore such farms are sometimes divided up into smaller units ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 dessiatins each. That is quite true.

These comrades conclude from this that large-scale grain farming has no future under Soviet conditions either. There they are quite wrong.

These comrades evidently fail to understand, or do not see, the difference in conditions between the capitalist system and the Soviet system. Under capitalism there is private ownership of land, and therefore absolute ground rent, which increases the cost of agricultural production and creates insuperable barriers to its serious progress. Under the Soviet system, however, there is neither private ownership of land nor absolute ground rent, which cannot but lower the cost of agricultural production and, consequently, cannot but facilitate the advance of large-scale agriculture along the road of technical and all other progress.

Furthermore, under capitalism the object of large grain farms is to obtain the maximum profit, or, at any rate, such a profit on capital as might correspond to what is known as the average rate of profit, without which,



generally speaking, they cannot carry on or exist at all. This circumstance cannot but increase the cost of production, thereby creating the most serious obstacles to the development of large grain farms. Under the Soviet system, on the other hand, large grain farms, being at the same time state farms, do not at all require for their development either the maximum profit or the average profit, but can content themselves with a minimum profit (and sometimes do without any profit at all for a while), and this, coupled with the absence of absolute ground rent, creates exceptionally favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Lastly, whereas under capitalism there is no such thing as credit privileges or tax privileges for large grain farms, under the Soviet system, which is designed to give the utmost encouragement to socialist economy, such privileges exist and will continue to exist.

All these and similar factors create under the Soviet system (as distinct from the capitalist system) very favourable conditions for promoting the development of state farms as large grain farms.

Finally, there is the question of the state farms and collective farms as strong points for strengthening the bond, as strong points for ensuring the leading role of the working class. We need collective farms and state farms not only in order to ensure our long-range aim of the socialist transformation of the countryside. We need collective farms and state farms also in order to have socialist economic strong points in the countryside *at this moment*, these points being necessary for strengthening the bond and for ensuring the leading role of the working class within the framework of the bond. Can we

count at this very moment on being able to create and develop such strong points? I have no doubt that we can, and should. Khlebotsentr<sup>54</sup> reports that it has contracts with collective farms, artels and co-operatives, under which it is to receive from them 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 poods of grain. As to the state farms, the data show that this year our old and new state farms should provide another 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

If we add to that the 30,000,000-35,000,000 poods that the agricultural co-operatives should obtain from the individual peasant farms with which they have contractual arrangements, we shall have a full guarantee of over 100,000,000 poods of grain capable of serving as a definite reserve, at any rate in the home market. That, after all, is something.

There you have the *first results* given by our socialist economic strong points in the countryside.

And what follows from this? It follows that those comrades are mistaken who think that the working class is powerless in the matter of defending its socialist positions in the countryside, that only one thing remains for it to do, namely, endlessly to retreat and continuously to surrender its positions to the capitalist elements. No, comrades, that is not true. The working class is not so weak in the countryside as might appear to a superficial observer. That cheerless philosophy has nothing in common with Bolshevism. The working class has quite a number of *economic* strong points in the countryside, in the shape of state farms, collective farms, and supply and marketing co-operatives, relying on which it can strengthen the bond with the countryside, isolate the

kulak, and ensure its leadership. The working class, lastly, has a number of *political* strong points in the countryside, in the shape of the Soviets, in the shape of the organised poor peasants, and so on, relying on which it can strengthen its positions in the countryside.

Relying on these economic and political bases in the countryside, and utilising all the means and resources (key positions, etc.) at the disposal of the proletarian dictatorship, the Party and the Soviet Government can confidently carry on the work of the socialist transformation of the countryside, step by step strengthening the alliance of the working class and peasantry, and step by step strengthening the leadership of the working class within that alliance.

Particular attention in this connection should be paid to work among the poor peasants. It must be taken as a rule that, the better and more effective our work among the poor peasants is, the greater will be the prestige of the Soviet Government in the countryside, and, on the contrary, the worse our relations with the poor peasants are, the lower will be the prestige of the Soviet Government.

We often speak of the alliance with the middle peasants. But in our conditions in order to strengthen this alliance a determined struggle must be waged against the kulaks, against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was therefore quite right when it issued the slogan of intensifying the offensive against the kulaks. But can a successful struggle be waged against the kulaks if work among the poor peasants is not intensified, if the poor peasants are not roused against the kulaks, if systematic aid is not ren-

dered the poor peasants? Obviously not! The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If our relations with the poor peasants are bad, if the poor peasants are not yet an organised support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is strong, and the middle peasant swings towards the kulak. And on the contrary: if our relations with the poor peasants are good, if the poor peasants are an organised support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is in a state of siege, and the middle peasant swings towards the working class.

That is why I think that it is one of the most vital immediate tasks of our Party to intensify the work among the poor peasants, to organise the rendering of systematic assistance to the poor peasants, and, lastly, to turn the poor peasants themselves into an organised support of the working class in the countryside.

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## **RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)**

*Report to a Meeting  
of the Active of the Leningrad Organisation  
of the C.P.S.U.(B.)  
July 13, 1928*

Comrades, the plenum of the Central Committee which has just concluded concerned itself with two sets of questions.

The first set consists of questions relating to major problems of the Communist International in connection with the impending Sixth Congress.

The second set consists of questions relating to our constructive work in the U.S.S.R. in the sphere of agriculture—the grain problem and grain procurements—and in the sphere of providing a technical intelligentsia, cadres of intellectuals coming from the ranks of the working class, for our industry.

Let us begin with the first set of questions.

### **I THE COMINTERN**

#### **1. MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN**

What are the major problems which confront the Sixth Congress of the Comintern at the present time?

If one looks at the stage passed through between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses, it is necessary first of all to

consider the contradictions which have ripened in this interval within the imperialist camp.

What are these contradictions?

At the time of the Fifth Congress very little was said about the Anglo-American contradiction as the principal one. It was even the custom at that time to speak of an Anglo-American alliance. On the other hand quite a lot was said about contradictions between Britain and France, between America and Japan, between the victors and the vanquished. The difference between that period and the present period is that, of the contradictions in the capitalist camp, that between American capitalism and British capitalism has become the principal one. Whether you take the question of oil, which is of decisive importance both for the development of the capitalist economy and for purposes of war; whether you take the question of markets, which are of the utmost importance for the life and development of world capitalism, because goods cannot be produced if there is no assured sale for them; whether you take the question of spheres of capital export, which is one of the most characteristic features of the imperialist stage; or whether, lastly, you take the question of the lines of communication with markets or sources of raw material—you will find that all these main questions drive towards one principal problem, the struggle between Britain and America for world hegemony. Wherever America, a country where capitalism is growing gigantically, tries to butt in—whether it be China, the colonies, South America, or Africa—everywhere she encounters formidable obstacles in the shape of Britain's firmly established positions.

This, of course, does not do away with the other contradictions in the capitalist camp: between America and Japan, Britain and France, France and Italy, Germany and France and so on. But it does mean that these contradictions are linked in one way or another with the principal contradiction, that between capitalist Britain, whose star is declining, and capitalist America, whose star is rising.

With what is this principal contradiction fraught? It is very likely fraught with war. When two giants come into collision, when they find the earth too small for both of them, they strive to cross swords in order to decide their dispute over world hegemony by war.

That is the first thing to bear in mind.

A second contradiction is that between imperialism and the colonies. This contradiction existed at the time of the Fifth Congress too. But only now has it assumed an acute character. We did not at that time have such a powerful development of the revolutionary movement in China, such a powerful shaking up of the vast masses of the Chinese workers and peasants as occurred a year ago and as is occurring now. And that is not all. We did not at that time, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, have that powerful stirring of the labour movement and the national-liberation struggle in India which we have now. These two major facts bring squarely to the fore the question of the colonies and semi-colonies.

With what is the growth of this contradiction fraught? It is fraught with national wars of liberation in the colonies and with intervention on the part of imperialism.

This circumstance also must be borne in mind.

There is, lastly, a third contradiction—that between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., one that is growing not less but more acute. Whereas at the time of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern it could be said that a certain equilibrium, unstable, it is true, but more or less prolonged, had been established between the two worlds, the two antipodes, the world of Soviets and the world of capitalism, now we have every ground for affirming that the days of this equilibrium are drawing to a close.

It goes without saying that the growth of this contradiction cannot fail to be fraught with the danger of armed intervention.

It is to be presumed that the Sixth Congress will take this circumstance also into consideration.

Thus all these contradictions inevitably lead to one principal danger—the danger of new imperialist wars and intervention.

Therefore, the danger of new imperialist wars and intervention is the main question of the day.

The most widespread method of lulling the working class and of diverting it from the struggle against the danger of war is present-day bourgeois pacifism, with its League of Nations, its preaching of “peace,” its “prohibition” of war, its talk of “disarmament” and so forth.

Many think that imperialist pacifism is an instrument of peace. That is absolutely wrong. Imperialist pacifism is an instrument for the preparation of war and for disguising this preparation by hypocritical talk of peace. Without this pacifism and its instrument, the League of Nations, preparation for war in the conditions of today would be impossible.



There are naïve people who think that since there is imperialist pacifism, there will be no war. That is quite untrue. On the contrary, whoever wishes to get at the truth must reverse this proposition and say: since imperialist pacifism and its League of Nations are flourishing, new imperialist wars and intervention are certain.

And the most important thing in all this is that Social-Democracy is the main channel of imperialist pacifism within the working class—consequently, it is capitalism's main support among the working class in preparing for new wars and intervention.

But for the preparation of new wars pacifism alone is not enough, even if it is supported by so serious a force as Social-Democracy. For this, certain means of suppressing the masses in the imperialist centres are also needed. It is impossible to wage war for imperialism unless the rear of imperialism is strengthened. It is impossible to strengthen the rear of imperialism without suppressing the workers. And that is what fascism is for.

Hence the growing acuteness of the inherent contradictions in the capitalist countries, the contradictions between labour and capital.

On the one hand, preaching of pacifism through the mouths of the Social-Democrats in order more effectively to prepare for new wars; on the other hand, suppression of the working class in the rear, of the Communist Parties in the rear, by the use of fascist methods, in order then to conduct war and intervention more effectively—such are the ways of preparing for new wars.

Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties:

Firstly, to wage an unceasing struggle against Social-Democratism in all spheres—in the economic and in

the political sphere, including in the latter the exposure of bourgeois pacifism with the task of winning the majority of the working class for communism.

Secondly, to form a united front of the workers of the advanced countries and the labouring masses of the colonies in order to stave off the danger of war, or, if war breaks out, to convert imperialist war into civil war, smash fascism, overthrow capitalism, establish Soviet power, emancipate the colonies from slavery, and organise all-round defence of the first Soviet Republic in the world.

Such are the principal problems and tasks confronting the Sixth Congress.

These problems and tasks are being taken into account by the Executive Committee of the Comintern, as you will easily see if you examine the agenda of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern.

## 2. THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMINTERN

Closely linked with the question of the main problems of the international working-class movement is the question of the programme of the Comintern.

The cardinal significance of the programme of the Comintern is that it scientifically formulates the basic tasks of the communist movement, indicates the principal means of accomplishing these tasks, and thus creates for the Comintern sections that clarity of aims and methods without which it is impossible to move forward with confidence.

A few words about the specific features of the draft programme of the Comintern submitted by the Programme

Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. At least seven such specific features might be noted.

1) The draft provides a programme not for particular national Communist Parties, but for all Communist Parties taken together, covering what is common and basic to all of them. Hence it is a programme based on principle and theory.

2) It was the custom formerly to provide a programme for the "civilised" nations. The draft programme differs from this in that it is intended for all the nations of the world—both white and black, both of the metropolitan countries and of the colonies. Hence its all-embracing, profoundly international character.

3) The draft takes as its point of departure not some particular capitalism of some particular country or portion of the world, but the entire world system of capitalism, counterposing to it the world system of socialist economy. Hence its distinction from all hitherto existing programmes.

4) The draft proceeds from the uneven development of the capitalist countries and draws the conclusion that the victory of socialism is possible in separate countries, thus envisaging the prospect of the formation of two parallel centres of attraction—the centre of world capitalism and the centre of world socialism.

5) Instead of the slogan of a United States of Europe, the draft puts forward the slogan of a federation of Soviet Republics which consists of advanced countries and colonies that have dropped, or are dropping, out of the imperialist system, and which is opposed in its struggle for world socialism to the world capitalist system.

6) The draft stresses opposition to Social-Democracy-as the main support of capitalism in the working class-and as the chief enemy of communism, and holds that-all other trends in the working class (anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, guild socialism,<sup>55</sup> etc.) are in essence varieties of Social-Democratism.

7) The draft puts in the forefront the task of consolidating the Communist Parties both in the West and in the East as a preliminary condition for ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat, and then also the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The plenum of the Central Committee approved in principle the draft programme of the Comintern, and charged comrades having amendments to the draft to submit them to the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress.

So much for questions concerning the Comintern.

Now let us turn to questions concerning our internal development.

## II

### QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE U.S.S.R.

#### 1. GRAIN PROCUREMENT POLICY

Permit me to give a little historical information.

What was the position by January 1 of this year? You know from the Party documents that by January 1 of this year we had a deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain as compared with the corresponding period last year. I shall not dilate on the reasons for this: they are set forth in the Party documents published in the press. The

important thing for us now is that we had a deficit of 128,000,000 poods. Yet only two or three months remained until the spring thaw on the roads. We were thus faced with the alternative: either to make up for lost time and establish a normal rate of grain procurement in future, or to face the inevitability of a serious crisis of our entire national economy.

What had to be done to make up for lost time? It was necessary, in the first place, to strike at the kulaks and speculators who were forcing up grain prices and threatening the country with hunger. It was necessary, in the second place, to consign the maximum quantity of manufactured goods to the grain-growing regions. It was necessary, lastly, to rouse all our Party organisations into activity and bring about a radical change in all our grain procurement work by putting an end to the practice of allowing things to go of their own accord. Thus we were compelled to resort to emergency measures. The measures we took proved effective, and by the end of March we had been able to secure 275,000,000 poods of grain. We not only made up for lost time, we not only averted a crisis of our whole economy, we not only caught up with last year's rate of grain procurement; we also had every possibility of emerging from the procurement crisis painlessly, if we maintained any normal rate of procurement in the subsequent months (April, May and June).

Owing, however, to the failure of the winter crops in the South Ukraine, and partly in the North Caucasus, the Ukraine completely, and the North Caucasus partially, dropped out as supplying regions, depriving the Republic of 20,000,000-30,000,000 poods of grain. This

circumstance, combined with the fact that we had permitted an over-expenditure of grain, faced us with the unavoidable necessity of pressing harder on the other regions and thus of encroaching on the peasants' emergency stocks, and this could not but worsen the situation.

Whereas we had succeeded in January-March in securing nearly 300,000,000 poods affecting only the peasants' *manoeuvring* stocks, in April-June we failed to secure even a hundred million poods, owing to the fact that we had to encroach on the peasants' *emergency* stocks, and at a time, moreover, when the harvest prospects were not yet clear. Nevertheless, grain had to be secured. Hence the renewed recourse to emergency measures, the arbitrary administrative measures, the infringements of revolutionary law, the house-to-house visitations, the unlawful searches and so on, which worsened the political situation in the country and created a threat to the bond.

Was this a rupture of the bond? No, it was not. Was it, perhaps, some trifling matter not worthy of consideration? No, it was not a trifling matter. It was a threat to the bond between the working class and the peasantry. That, in fact, explains why some of our Party workers lacked the calmness and firmness necessary for appraising the situation soberly and without exaggeration.

The subsequent good harvest prospects and the partial withdrawal of the emergency measures helped to calm the atmosphere and improve the situation.

What is the nature of our difficulties on the grain front? What is the basis of these difficulties? Is it not a fact that we now have a grain crop area nearby

as large as before the war (only five per cent smaller)? Is it not a fact that we are now producing nearly as much grain as before the war (about 5,000 million poods, or only 200,000,000-300,000,000 poods less)? How is it that, in spite of this, we are producing only half as much marketable grain as in the pre-war period?

It is because of the highly scattered character of our agriculture. Whereas before the war we had about 16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have not less than 24,000,000; moreover, the splitting up of the peasant households and peasant holdings is showing no tendency to cease. And what is small-peasant farming? It is the form of husbandry that produces the smallest marketable surplus, is the least remunerative, and is in the highest degree a natural, consuming form of husbandry, yielding a surplus of only 12-15 per cent of marketable grain. Yet our towns and industry are growing rapidly, construction is developing and the demand for marketable grain is growing at incredible speed. That is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

Here is what Lenin said on this score in his speech on "The Tax in Kind":

"If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how Socialists have always conceived it. That is how our Communist Party conceives it" (Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

There, then, is the basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

What is the way out?

The way out is, firstly, to improve small- and middle-peasant farming, giving it every encouragement to expand its yield, its productivity. Our task is to replace the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply pure seed, fertiliser and small types of machines, to embrace the individual peasant farms in a broad co-operative network by concluding agreements (contracts) with whole villages. There exists the method of concluding contracts between agricultural co-operatives and entire villages, the purpose of which is to supply the peasants with seed and thus obtain higher crop yields, to ensure the prompt delivery of grain by the peasants to the state, giving them in return a bonus in the shape of a certain addition to the contractual price, and to create stable relations between the state and the peasantry. Experience shows that this method is productive of tangible results.

There are people who think that individual peasant farming has exhausted its potentialities and that there is no point in supporting it. That is not true, comrades. These people have nothing in common with the line of our Party.

There are people, on the other hand, who think that individual peasant farming is the be-all and end-all of agriculture. That also is not true. More, these people are obviously sinning against the principles of Leninism.

We need neither detractors nor eulogisers of individual peasant farming. We need sober-minded politicians capable of obtaining from individual peasant farming the maximum that can be obtained from it, and at the same time capable of gradually transferring individual farming to collectivist lines.



The way out, secondly, is gradually to unite the isolated small- and middle-peasant farms into large collective and co-operative farms, which should be absolutely voluntary associations operating on a new technical basis, on the basis of tractors and other agricultural machines.

In what does the advantage of collective farms over small farms consist? In the fact that they are large farms and are therefore able to utilise all the results of science and technology; they are more remunerative and stable; they are more productive and yield larger marketable surpluses. It should not be forgotten that the collective farms yield a surplus of from 30 to 35 per cent of marketable grain, and that their yield is sometimes as high as 200 poods per dessiatin or more.

The way out, lastly, is to improve the old state farms and establish new large state farms. It should be remembered that the state farms are the economic units which produce the largest marketable surpluses. We have state farms which yield a surplus of not less than 60 per cent of marketable grain.

The task is correctly to combine all these three tasks and to work strenuously along all these three lines.

The specific feature of the present moment is that fulfilment of the first task, that of improving individual small- and middle-peasant farming, while it is still our chief task in the sphere of agriculture, is already insufficient for the solution of the problem as a whole.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task must be supplemented by two new practical tasks: promotion of collective farming and improvement of state farming.

But besides the basic causes, there were also specific, temporary causes which converted our procurement difficulties into a procurement crisis. What are these causes? The resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee includes among them the following:

a) a disturbance of market equilibrium, aggravated by a more rapid increase of the peasants' effective demand than of the supply of manufactured goods, owing to the rise of rural incomes resulting from a series of good harvests, and especially to the rise of incomes of the well-to-do and kulak strata;

b) an unfavourable relation between grain prices and the prices of other agricultural produce, which lessened the incentive to sell grain surpluses, and which the Party, however, could not change in the spring of this year without damaging the interests of the economically weaker strata of the rural population;

c) mistakes in planned management, chiefly as regards the timely consignment of manufactured goods to the countryside and the incidence of taxation (the low tax on the wealthier strata of the rural population), and also as regards proper expenditure of grain stocks;

d) defects of the Party and Soviet procurement organisations (no united front, lack of energetic action, reliance on things going of their own accord);

e) infringement of revolutionary law, arbitrary administrative measures, house-to-house visitations, partial closing of local markets, etc.;

f) exploitation of all these unfavourable factors by the capitalist elements of town and country (kulaks, speculators) in order to undermine grain procurement and worsen the political situation in the country,

While it will require several years to put an end to the general causes, it is quite possible to do away at once with the specific, temporary causes and thus avert the possibility of a repetition of the grain procurement crisis.

What is required in order to put an end to these specific causes?

It requires:

a) putting an immediate stop to the practice of house-to-house visitations, unlawful searches and all other infringements of revolutionary law;

b) putting an immediate stop to any kind of reversion to the surplus-appropriation system and to all attempts whatsoever to close peasant markets, with the adoption by the state of flexible forms of regulating trade;

c) a certain increase of grain prices, differentiated according to region and kind of grain;

d) proper organisation of the consignment of manufactured goods to the grain procurement areas;

e) proper organisation of the supply of grain, not permitting over-expenditure;

f) formation, without fail, of a state grain reserve.

An honest and systematic carrying out of these measures, taking into account this year's favourable harvest, should create a situation that will rule out the necessity of resorting to emergency measures of any kind in the coming grain procurement campaign.

It is the immediate task of the Party to see to it that these measures are carried out faithfully.

The grain difficulties have faced us with the question of the bond, of the future of the alliance between the workers and peasants, of the means of strengthening this alliance. Some say that the bond no longer exists, that

the bond has been replaced by estrangement. That, of course, is foolish and worthy only of panicmongers. When there is no bond, the peasant loses faith in the morrow, he retires into himself, he ceases to believe in the stability of the Soviet Government, which is the chief purchaser of peasant grain, he begins to reduce his crop area, or at any rate does not risk enlarging it, fearing that there will again be house-to-house visitations, searches and so on and that his grain will be taken away from him.

But what do we find in reality? We find that the spring crop area has been enlarged in all areas. It is a fact that in the principal grain-growing areas the peasant has enlarged his spring crop area by from 2 per cent to 15 and 20 per cent. Is it not clear that the peasant does not believe that the emergency measures will be permanent, and has every ground for believing that grain prices will be raised. Does that look like estrangement? This, of course, does not mean that there is no threat, or that there has been no threat, to the bond. But to conclude from this that there is estrangement is to lose one's head and become a slave to elemental forces.

Some comrades think that, in order to strengthen the bond, the main stress must be shifted from heavy industry to light industry (textiles), believing that textiles are the principal and exclusive "bond" industry. That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue!

Of course, the textile industry is of enormous importance for the establishment of goods exchange between socialist industry and peasant farming. But to think for this reason that textiles are the exclusive basis of the bond is to commit a very gross error. Actually, the bond

between industry and peasant farming is maintained not only through cotton goods, which the peasant requires for his personal consumption, but also through metals and through seed, fertiliser and agricultural machines of all kinds, which the peasant requires as a producer of grain. That is apart from the fact that the textile industry itself cannot develop or exist unless heavy industry, machine-building, develops.

The need for the bond is not in order to preserve and perpetuate classes. The bond is needed in order to bring the peasantry closer to the working class, to re-educate the peasant, to remould his individualist mentality, to remake him in the spirit of collectivism, and thus pave the way for the elimination, the abolition of classes on the basis of a socialist society. Whoever does not realise this, or refuses to recognise it, is not a Marxist, not a Leninist, but a "peasant philosopher," who looks backward instead of forward.

And how is the peasant to be remade, remoulded? First and foremost, he can be remoulded only through new technical equipment and through collective labour.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

"The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and with immense rapidity" (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Quite clearly, he who thinks that the bond can be guaranteed only through textiles, and forgets about met-

als and machines, which transform peasant farming through collective labour, helps to perpetuate classes; he is not a proletarian revolutionary, he is a "peasant philosopher."

Here is what Lenin says in another passage:

"Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

That is how to ensure that the vast masses of the peasantry are really and durably won over to the side of the working class, to the side of socialism.

It is sometimes said that to guarantee the bond we have only one reserve—concessions to the peasantry. On this assumption the theory of continuous concessions is sometimes advanced, in the belief that the working class can strengthen its position by making continuous concessions. That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue! Such a theory can only ruin matters. It is a theory of despair.

In order to strengthen the bond, we must have at our disposal, besides the reserve of concessions, a number of other reserves, in the shape of economic strong points in the countryside (developed co-operatives, collective farms, state farms), and also in the shape of political strong points (energetic work among the poor peasants and assured support on the part of the poor peasants).

The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If we do not have the support of the poor peasant, if the Soviet Government is weak in the countryside, the middle peasant may swing towards the kulak. And, on the contrary, if we have the sure support of the poor peasant, it may be said with certainty that the middle peasant will swing towards the Soviet Government. Hence, systematic work among the poor peasants and ensuring them both seed and low-cost grain is an immediate task of the Party.

## **2. TRAINING OF CADRES FOR THE WORK OF INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION**

Let us pass now to the question of providing our industry with new cadres of a technical intelligentsia.

This question concerns our difficulties in industry, difficulties which came to light in connection with the Shakhty affair.

What is the essence of the Shakhty affair from the point of view of the improvement of industry? The essence and significance of the Shakhty affair lies in the fact that we proved to be practically unarmed and absolutely backward, scandalously backward, in the matter of providing our industry with a certain minimum of experts devoted to the cause of the working class. The lesson of the Shakhty affair is that we must expedite the formation, the training, of a new technical intelligentsia consisting of members of the working class devoted to the cause of socialism and capable of technically directing our socialist industry.

That does not mean that we shall discard those experts who are not Soviet-minded or not Communists, but

who are willing to co-operate with the Soviet Government. It does not mean that. We shall continue to strive with might and main to enlist the co-operation of non-Party experts, non-Party technicians, who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government in building our industry. We by no means demand that they should renounce their social and political opinions at once, or change them immediately. We demand only one thing, and that is that they should co-operate with the Soviet Government honestly, once they have voluntarily agreed to do so.

But the point is that such old experts who are prepared to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government are becoming relatively fewer and fewer. The point is that it is absolutely necessary to have a new force of young experts to succeed them. Well, the Party considers that the new replacements must be brought into being at an accelerated rate if we do not want to be faced with new surprises, and that they must come from the working class, from among the working people. That means creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of satisfying the needs of our industry.

The facts show that the People's Commissariat of Education has failed to cope with this important task. We have no reason to believe that, if left to itself, the People's Commissariat of Education, which has very little connection with industry, and which is inert and conservative into the bargain, will be able to cope with this task in the near future. The Party, therefore, has come to the conclusion that the work of speedily forming a new technical intelligentsia must be divided among three People's Commissariats—the People's Com-



missariat of Education, the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Transport. The Party considers that this is the most expedient way of ensuring the required speed in this important work. That is why a number of technical colleges have been transferred to the Supreme Council of National Economy and the People's Commissariat of Transport.

This, of course, does not mean that transfer of technical colleges is all that is required for speedily forming new cadres of a technical intelligentsia. Undoubtedly, material provision for the students will be a highly important factor. The Soviet Government has therefore decided to rate the expenditure on the training of new cadres on the same level of importance as expenditure on the capital development of industry, and has decided to allocate annually an additional sum of over 40,000,000 rubles for this purpose.

### III CONCLUSION

It must be admitted, comrades, that we have always learned from our difficulties and blunders. At any rate, it has been the case so far that history has taught us and tempered our Party in the school of difficulties, of crises of one kind or another, of mistakes of one kind or another that we have committed.

So it was in 1918, when, as a result of our difficulties on the Eastern Front, of our reverses in the fight against Kolchak, we realised at last the necessity of creating a regular infantry, and really did create it.

So it was in 1919, when, as a result of the difficulties on the Denikin Front, of Mamontov's raid into the rear of our armies, we realised at last the necessity of having a strong regular cavalry, and really did create it.

I think that this is more or less the case today. The grain difficulties will not have been without their value for us. They will stir Bolsheviks into action and impel them to tackle in earnest the work of developing agriculture, especially of developing grain farming. Had it not been for these difficulties, it is doubtful whether the Bolsheviks would have tackled the grain problem seriously.

The same must be said of the Shakhty affair and the difficulties resulting from it. The lessons of the Shakhty affair will not and cannot be without their value for our Party. I think that these lessons will impel us to face squarely the problem of creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of serving our socialist industry.

By the way, you see that we have already taken the first serious step towards the solution of the problem of creating a new technical intelligentsia. Let us hope that this step will not be the last. (*Stormy and prolonged applause.*)

*Leningradskaya Pravda*, No. 162,  
June 26, 1928

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## TO THE LENINGRAD OSOAVIAKHIM<sup>56</sup>

The strengthening of the defence of the Soviet Union is the cause of all the working people.

The proletarians of Leningrad were in the foremost ranks in the battles of the civil war.

The proletarians of Leningrad must now, too, set an example of organisation, discipline and solidarity in preparing for defence of the Soviet Union against the enemies of the working class.

I have no doubt that the Leningrad Osoaviakhim, which is a mass organisation of the Leningrad proletarians, will fulfil its duty to the land of the proletarian dictatorship.

***J. Stalin***

*Krasnaya Gazeta* (Leningrad),  
No. 163, July 15, 1928

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## LETTER TO COMRADE KUIBYSHEV

Greetings, Comrade Kuibyshev!

Cooper arrived today. The talk will take place tomorrow. We shall see what he has to say about the American plans.

I have read Cooper's sixth report letter on the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station. Of course, the other side must be heard too. However, it seems to me (such is my first impression) that *Cooper is right* and Winter is wrong. The generally recognised fact that the Cooper type of coffer-dam (which Winter opposed) has proved to be the only suitable one—this fact alone shows that what Cooper has to say must certainly be listened to attentively. It would be well if Cooper's sixth letter were examined in the proper quarters and accepted *in principle*.

How are things with you? I have heard that Tomsky has it in for you. He is a malicious fellow and not always clean in his methods. It seems to me he is wrong. I have read your report on rationalisation. It is the right sort of report. What more does Tomsky want of you?

How are things going at the Tsaritsyn tractor works and the Leningrad tractor workshops? Can we hope they will be a success?

Cordially,

***Stalin***

August 31, 1928

Published for the first time

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## TO THE MEMORY OF COMRADE I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV

Death has snatched from our ranks a staunch and steadfast Leninist, a member of the Central Committee of our Party, Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov.

For decades Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov fought in our ranks, enduring all the hardships of the life of a professional revolutionary. Many thousands of comrades know him as one of the oldest and most popular of our Marxist writers. They know him also as a most active participant in the October Revolution. They know him, lastly, as a most devoted champion of the Leninist unity and iron solidarity of our Party.

Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov devoted his whole life of brilliant labour to the cause of the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

May the memory of Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov live in the hearts of the working class!

***J. Stalin***

*Pravda*, No. 235,  
October 9, 1928

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## THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

*Speech Delivered at the Plenum  
of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control  
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.)  
October 19, 1928*

I think, comrades, that we must first rid our minds of trivialities, of personal matters, and so forth, in order to settle the question which interests us, that of the Right deviation.

Is there a Right, opportunist danger in our Party? Do there exist objective conditions favourable to the development of such a danger? How should this danger be fought? These are the questions that now confront us.

But we shall not settle this question of the Right deviation unless we purge it of all the trivialities and adventitious elements which have surrounded it and which prevent us from understanding its essence.

Zapolsky is wrong in thinking that the question of the Right deviation is an accidental one. He asserts that it is all not a matter of a Right deviation, but of petty squabbles, personal intrigues, etc. Let us assume for a moment that petty squabbles and personal intrigues do play some part here, as in all struggles. But to explain everything by petty squabbles and to fail to see the essence of the question behind the squabbles, is to depart from the correct, Marxist path.

A large, united organisation of long standing, such as the Moscow organisation undoubtedly is, could not be

stirred up from top to bottom and set into motion by the efforts of a few squabblers or intriguers. No, comrades, such miracles do not happen. That is apart from the fact that the strength and power of the Moscow organisation cannot be estimated so lightly. Obviously, more profound causes have been at work here causes which have nothing to do with either petty squabbles or intrigues.

Fruntov is also wrong; for although he admits the existence of a Right danger, he does not think it worth while for serious, busy people to concern themselves with it seriously. In his opinion, the question of the Right deviation is a subject for noise-makers, not for serious people. I quite understand Fruntov: he is so absorbed in the day-to-day practical work that he has no time to think about the prospects of our development. But that does not mean that we must convert the narrow, practical empiricism of certain of our Party workers into a dogma of our work of construction. A healthy practicalism is a good thing; but if it loses sight of the prospects in the work and fails to subordinate the work to the basic line of the Party, it becomes a drawback. And yet it should not be difficult to understand that the question of the Right deviation is a question of the basic line of our Party; it is the question as to whether the prospects of development outlined by our Party at the Fifteenth Congress are correct or incorrect.

Those comrades who in discussing the problem of the Right deviation concentrate on the question of the individuals representing the Right deviation are also wrong. Show us who are the Rights and the conciliators, they say, name them, so that we can deal with them accordingly. That is not the correct way of presenting the

question. Individuals, of course, play some part. Nevertheless, the question is not one of individuals, but of the conditions, of the situation, giving rise to the Right danger in the Party. Individuals can be kept out, but that does not mean that we have thereby cut the roots of the Right danger in our Party. Hence, the question of individuals does not settle the matter, although it is undoubtedly of interest.

In this connection I cannot help recalling an incident which occurred in Odessa at the end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, when our forces, having driven Denikin's forces out of the Ukraine, were crushing the last remnants of his armies in the area of Odessa. One group of Red Army men searched high and low for the "Entente" in Odessa, convinced that if they could only capture it—the Entente—the war would be over. (*General laughter.*) It is conceivable that our Red Army men might have captured some representatives of the Entente in Odessa, but that, of course, would not have settled the question of the Entente, for the roots of the Entente did not lie in Odessa, although Odessa at that time was the Denikinites' last terrain, but in world capitalism.

The same can be said of certain of our comrades, who in the question of the Right deviation concentrate on the individuals representing that deviation, and forget about the conditions that give rise to it.

That is why we must first of all elucidate here the conditions that give rise to the Right, and also to the "Left" (Trotskyite), deviation from the Leninist line.

*Under capitalist conditions* the Right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not



yet consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency of a section of the Communists to depart from the revolutionary line of Marxism in the direction of Social-Democracy. When certain groups of Communists deny the expediency of the slogan "Class against class" in election campaigns (France), or are opposed to the Communist Party nominating its own candidates (Britain), or are disinclined to make a sharp issue of the fight against "Left" Social-Democracy (Germany), etc., etc., it means that there are people in the Communist Parties who are striving to adapt communism to Social-Democratism.

A victory of the Right deviation in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries would mean the ideological rout of the Communist Parties and an enormous strengthening of Social-Democratism. And what does an enormous strengthening of Social-Democratism mean? It means the strengthening and consolidation of capitalism, for Social-Democracy is the main support of capitalism in the working class.

Consequently, a victory of the Right deviation in the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries would lead to a development of the conditions necessary for the *preservation* of capitalism.

*Under the conditions of Soviet development*, when capitalism has already been overthrown, but its roots have not yet been torn out, the Right deviation in communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not yet consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency of a section of the Communists to depart from the general line of our Party in the direction of bourgeois

ideology. When certain circles of our Communists strive to drag the Party back from the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress, by denying the need for an offensive against the capitalist elements in the countryside; or demand a contraction of our industry, in the belief that its present rapid rate of development is fatal for the country; or deny the expediency of subsidies to the collective farms and state farms, in the belief that such subsidies are money thrown to the winds; or deny the expediency of fighting against bureaucracy by methods of self-criticism, in the belief that self-criticism undermines our apparatus; or demand that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc., it means that there are people in the ranks of our Party who are striving, perhaps without themselves realising it, to adapt our socialist construction to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

A victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean an enormous strengthening of the capitalist elements in our country. And what does the strengthening of the capitalist elements in our country mean? It means weakening the proletarian dictatorship and increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism.

Consequently, a victory of the Right deviation in our Party would mean a development of the conditions necessary *for the restoration* of capitalism in our country.

Have we in our Soviet country any of the conditions that would make the restoration of capitalism *possible*? Yes, we have. That, comrades, may appear strange, but it is a fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we have established the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are developing our socialist industry at a rapid pace and are

linking peasant economy with it. But we have not yet torn out the roots of capitalism. Where are these roots imbedded? They are imbedded in commodity production, in small production in the towns and, especially, the countryside.

As Lenin says, the strength of capitalism lies "in the strength of *small production*. For, unfortunately, small production is still very, very widespread in the world, and small production *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale" (see Vol. XXV, p. 173).

It is clear that, since small production bears a mass, and even a predominant character in our country, and since it *engenders* capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, particularly under the conditions of NEP, we have in our country conditions which make the restoration of capitalism *possible*.

Have we in our Soviet country the necessary means and forces to abolish, to eliminate the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism? Yes, we have. And it is this fact that proves the correctness of Lenin's thesis on the *possibility* of building a complete socialist society in the U.S.S.R. For this purpose it is necessary to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat strengthen the alliance between the working class and peasantry, develop our key positions from the standpoint of industrialising the country, develop industry at a rapid rate, electrify the country, place the whole of our national economy on a new technical basis, organise the peasantry into co-operatives on a mass scale and increase the yield of its farms gradually unite the individual peasant farms into socially conducted, collective farms,

develop state farms, restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country, etc., etc.

Here is what Lenin says on this subject:

“As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed from a small-peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry shall we achieve final victory” (Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47).

It follows, firstly, that as long as we live in a small-peasant country, as long as we have not torn out the roots of capitalism, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism than for communism. It may happen that you cut down a tree but fail to tear out the roots; your strength does not suffice for this. Hence the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Secondly, it follows that besides the possibility of the restoration of capitalism there is also the *possibility of the victory of socialism* in our country, because

we *can* destroy the *possibility* of the restoration of capitalism, we can tear out the roots of capitalism and achieve final victory over capitalism in our country, *if* we intensify the work of electrifying the country, *if* we place our industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern, large-scale industry. Hence the *possibility* of the victory of socialism in our country.

Lastly, it follows that we cannot build socialism in industry alone and leave agriculture to the mercy of spontaneous development on the assumption that the countryside will “move by itself” following the lead of the towns. The existence of socialist industry in the towns is the principal factor in the socialist transformation of the countryside. But it does not mean that that factor is quite sufficient. If the socialist towns are to take the lead of the peasant countryside all the way, it is essential, as Lenin says, “to place the economy of the country, *including agriculture*,\* on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production.”

Does this quotation from Lenin contradict another of his statements, to the effect that “NEP fully ensures us the *possibility*\* of laying the foundation of a socialist economy”? No, it does not. On the contrary, the two statements fully coincide. Lenin by no means says that NEP gives us socialism ready-made. Lenin merely says that NEP ensures us the *possibility* of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. There is a great difference between the *possibility* of building socialism

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\* My italics.—J. St.

and the *actual building of socialism*. Possibility and actuality must not be confused. It is precisely for the purpose of transforming possibility into actuality that Lenin proposes the electrification of the country and the placing of industry, agriculture and transport on the technical basis of modern large-scale production as a condition for the final victory of socialism in our country.

But this condition for the building of socialism cannot be fulfilled in one or two years. It is impossible in one or two years to industrialise the country, build up a powerful industry, organise the vast masses of the peasantry into co-operatives, place agriculture on a new technical basis, unite the individual peasant farms into large collective farms, develop state farms, and restrict and overcome the capitalist elements in town and country. Years and years of intense constructive work by the proletarian dictatorship will be needed for this. And until that is accomplished—and it can not be accomplished all at once—we shall remain a small peasant country, where small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism remains.

And since our proletariat does not live in a vacuum, but in the midst of the most actual and real life with all its variety of forms, the bourgeois elements arising on the basis of small production “encircle the proletariat on every side with petty bourgeois elemental forces, by means of which they permeate and corrupt the proletariat and continually cause relapses among the proletariat into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and

dejection" (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 189), thereby introducing into the ranks of the proletariat and of its Party a certain amount of vacillation, a certain amount of wavering.

There you have the root and the basis of all sorts of vacillations and deviations from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party.

That is why the Right and "Left" deviations in our Party cannot be regarded as a trifling matter.

Where does the danger of the *Right*, frankly opportunist, deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *underestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism: it does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism; it does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism, demanding a slowing down of the rate of development of our industry, demanding concessions for the capitalist elements in town and country, demanding that the question of collective farms and state farms be relegated to the background, demanding that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would unleash the forces of capitalism, undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat and increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

Where does the danger of the "*Left*" (Trotskyite) deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it *overestimates* the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it sees only the possibility of the restoration

of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of building socialism by the efforts of our country; it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with chatter about Thermidor tendencies in our Party.

From the words of Lenin that "as long as we live in a small peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," the "Left" deviation draws the false conclusion that it is impossible to build socialism in the U.S.S.R. at all; that we cannot get anywhere with the peasantry; that the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an obsolete idea; that unless a victorious revolution in the West comes to our aid the dictatorship of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. must fall or degenerate; that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of super-industrialisation, even at the cost of a split with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the U.S.S.R. must be regarded as doomed.

Hence the adventurism in the policy of the "Left" deviation. Hence its "superhuman" leaps in the sphere of policy.

There is no doubt that the triumph of the "Left" deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism.

You see, therefore, that both these dangers, the "Left" and the Right, both these deviations from the Leninist line, the Right and the "Left," lead to the same result, although from different directions.



Which of these dangers is worse? In my opinion one is as bad as the other.

The difference between these deviations from the point of view of successfully combating them consists in the fact that the danger of the "Left" deviation is at the present moment more obvious to the Party than the danger of the Right deviation. The fact that an intense struggle has been waged against the "Left" deviation for several years now has, of course, not been without its value for the Party. It is clear that the Party has learned a great deal in the years of the fight against the "Left," Trotskyite deviation and cannot now be easily deceived by "Left" phrases.

As for the Right danger, which existed before, but which has now become more prominent because of the growth of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces resulting from last year's grain-procurement crisis, I think it is not quite so obvious to certain sections of our Party. That is why our task must be—while not in the least relaxing the fight against the "Left," Trotskyite danger—to lay the emphasis on the fight against the Right deviation and to take all measures to make the danger of this deviation as obvious to the Party as the Trotskyite danger.

The question of the Right deviation would not, perhaps, be as acute as it is now, were it not for the fact that it is connected *with the difficulties* accompanying our development. But the whole point is that the existence of the Right deviation complicates the difficulties accompanying our development and hinders our efforts to overcome these difficulties. And for the very reason that the Right danger hinders the efforts to overcome the difficulties, the question of overcoming the

Right danger has assumed particularly great importance for us.

A few words about the nature of our difficulties. It should be borne in mind that our difficulties should by no means be regarded as difficulties of stagnation or decline. There are difficulties that arise at a time of economic decline or stagnation, and in such cases efforts are made to render the stagnation less painful, or the decline less profound. Our difficulties have nothing in common with difficulties of that kind. The characteristic feature of our difficulties is that they are difficulties of *expansion*, difficulties of growth. When we speak about difficulties we usually mean by what percentage industry ought to be *expanded*, by what percentage the crop area ought to be *enlarged*, by how many poods the crop yield ought to be *increased*, etc., etc. And because our difficulties are those of expansion, and not of decline or stagnation, they should not be anything particularly dangerous for the Party.

But difficulties are difficulties, nevertheless. And since in order to overcome difficulties it is necessary to exert all efforts, to display firmness and endurance, and since not everybody possesses sufficient firmness and endurance—perhaps as a result of fatigue and overstrain, or because of a preference for a quiet life, free from struggle and commotion—it is just here that vacillations and waverings begin to take place, tendencies to adopt the line of least resistance, talk about slowing down the rate of industrial development, about making concessions to the capitalist elements, about rejecting collective farms and state farms and, in general, everything that goes beyond the calm and familiar conditions of the daily routine.

But unless we overcome the difficulties in our path we shall make no progress. And in order to overcome the difficulties we must first defeat the Right danger, we must first overcome the Right deviation, which is hindering the fight against the difficulties and is trying to undermine our Party's will to fight and overcome the difficulties.

I am speaking, of course, of a real fight against the Right deviation, not a verbal, paper fight. There are people in our Party who, to soothe their conscience, are quite willing to proclaim a fight against the Right danger in the same way as priests sometimes cry, "Hallelujah! Hallelujah!" But they will not undertake any practical measures at all to organise the fight against the Right deviation on a firm basis, and to overcome this deviation in actual fact. We call this tendency a *conciliatory* tendency towards the Right, frankly opportunist, deviation. It is not difficult to understand that the fight against this conciliatory tendency is an integral part of the general fight against the Right deviation, against the Right danger. For it is impossible to overcome the Right, opportunist deviation without waging a systematic fight against the conciliatory tendency, which takes the opportunists under its wing.

The question who are the exponents of the Right deviation is undoubtedly of interest, although it is not of decisive importance. We came across exponents of the Right danger in our lower Party organisations during the grain-procurement crisis last year, when a number of Communists in the volosts and villages opposed the Party's policy and worked towards forming a bond with kulak elements. As you know, such people were

cleared out of the Party last spring, a matter specially referred to in the document of the Central Committee of our Party in February this year.

But it would be wrong to say that there are no such people left in our Party. If we go higher up, to the uyezd and gubernia Party organisations, or if we dig deeper into the Soviet and co-operative apparatus, we could without difficulty find exponents of the Right danger and conciliation towards it. We know of "letters," "declarations," and other documents written by a number of functionaries in our Party and Soviet apparatus, in which the drift towards the Right deviation is quite distinctly expressed. You know that these letters and documents were referred to in the verbatim report of the July plenum of the Central Committee.

If we go higher still, and ask about the members of the Central Committee, we shall have to admit that within the Central Committee, too, there are certain elements, very insignificant it is true, of a conciliatory attitude towards the Right danger. The verbatim report of the July plenum of the Central Committee provides direct proof of this.

Well, and what about the Political Bureau? Are there any deviations in the Political Bureau? In the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor "Left" deviations nor conciliators towards those deviations. This must be said quite categorically. It is time to put a stop to the tittle-tattle spread by enemies of the Party and by the oppositionists of all kinds about there being a Right deviation, or a conciliatory attitude towards the Right deviation, in the Political Bureau of our Central Committee.

Were there vacillations and waverings in the Moscow organisation, or in its top leadership, the Moscow Committee? Yes, there were. It would be absurd to assert now that there were no waverings, no vacillations there. The candid speech made by Penkov is direct proof of this. Penkov is by no means the least important person in the Moscow organisation and in the Moscow Committee. You heard him plainly and frankly admit that he had been wrong on a number of important questions of our Party policy. That does not mean, of course, that the Moscow Committee as a whole was subject to vacillation. No, it does not mean that. A document like the appeal of the Moscow Committee to the members of the Moscow organisation in October of this year undoubtedly shows that the Moscow Committee has succeeded in overcoming the vacillations of certain of its members. I have no doubt that the leading core of the Moscow Committee will be able completely to straighten out the situation.

Certain comrades are dissatisfied with the fact that the district organisations interfered in this matter and demanded that an end be put to the mistakes and vacillations of certain leaders of the Moscow organisation. I do not see how this dissatisfaction can be justified. What is there wrong about district activists of the Moscow organisation raising the demand that an end be put to mistakes and vacillations? Does not our work proceed under the slogan of self-criticism from below? Is it not a fact that self-criticism increases the activity of the Party rank and file and of the proletarian rank and file in general? What is there wrong or dangerous in the fact that the district activists proved equal to the situation?

Did the Central Committee act rightly in interfer-

ing in this matter? I think that it did. Berzin thinks that the Central Committee acted too drastically in demanding the removal of one of the district leaders to whom the district organisation was opposed. That is absolutely wrong. Let me remind Berzin of certain incidents in 1919 or 1920, when some members of the Central Committee who were guilty of certain, in my opinion, not very serious errors in respect of the Party line were, on Lenin's suggestion, subjected to exemplary punishment, one of them being sent to Turkestan, and the other almost paying the penalty of expulsion from the Central Committee.

Was Lenin right in acting as he did? I think he was quite right. The situation in the Central Committee then was not what it is now. Half the members of the Central Committee followed Trotsky, and the situation in the Central Committee was not a stable one. The Central Committee today is acting much more mildly. Why? Is it, perhaps, because we want to be more gentle than Lenin? No, that is not the point. The point is that the position of the Central Committee is more stable now than it was then, and the Central Committee can afford to act more mildly.

Nor is Sakharov right in asserting that the intervention of the Central Committee was belated. Sakharov is wrong because he evidently does not know that, properly speaking, the intervention of the Central Committee began in February of this year. Sakharov can convince himself of that if he desires. It is true that the intervention of the Central Committee did not immediately yield required results. But it would be strange to blame the Central Committee for that.

*Conclusions:*

1) the Right danger is a serious danger in our Party, for it is rooted in the social and economic situation in our country;

2) the danger of the Right deviation is aggravated by the existence of difficulties which cannot be overcome unless the Right deviation and conciliation towards it are overcome;

3) in the Moscow organisation there were vacillations and waverings, there were elements of instability;

4) the core of the Moscow Committee, with the help of the Central Committee and the district activists, took all measures to put an end to these vacillations;

5) there can be no doubt that the Moscow Committee will succeed in overcoming the mistakes which began to take shape in the past;

6) our task is to put a stop to the internal struggle, to unite the Moscow organisation into a single whole, and to carry through the elections in the Party units successfully on the basis of fully developed self-criticism. (*Applause.*)

*Pravda*, No. 247  
October 23, 1928

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## REPLY TO COMRADE SH.

Comrade Sh.,

I have received your letter and must say that I cannot possibly agree with you.

1) It is clear from the quotation from Lenin that so long as we remain a small-peasant country the danger of the restoration of capitalism will exist. You say that this opinion of Lenin's "cannot be applied to the present period in the U.S.S.R." Why, one asks? Are we not still a small-peasant country?

*Of course, inasmuch as our socialist industry is developing and collective forms of economy are beginning to take root in the countryside, the chances of the restoration of capitalism are diminishing.* That is a fact. But does that mean that we have already ceased to be a small-peasant country? Does it mean that the socialist forms have developed to such an extent that the U.S.S.R. can no longer be considered a small-peasant country? It obviously does not.

But what follows from this? Only one thing, namely, the danger of the restoration of capitalism in our country does exist. How can one contest such an obvious fact?

2) You say in your letter: "It would appear from what you said about the Right and the 'Left' deviations that our difference both with the Rights and with the 'Lefts' is only over the question of the rate of industrialisation. The question of the peasantry, on the



other hand, was referred to in your assessment of the Trotskyist position only sketchily. That gives rise to a very objectionable interpretation of your speech."

It is very possible that my speech\* is interpreted differently by different people. That is a matter of taste. But that the thoughts expressed in your letter are not in accordance with reality is quite evident to me. I said plainly in my speech that the Right deviation "underestimates the strength of capitalism" in our country, "does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism," "does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle," "and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism." I said plainly in my speech that "the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party" would "increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country." You will realise, of course, that what is referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialisation.

What more should be said about the Right deviation to satisfy you?

As to the "Left," Trotskyist, deviation, I said plainly in my speech that it denies the possibility of building socialism in our country, rejects the idea of an alliance of the working class and the peasantry, and is prepared to carry out its fantastic plan of industrialisation at the cost of a split with the peasantry. I said in my speech (if you have read it) that "the triumph of the 'Left' deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the

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\* See pp. 231-48 in this volume.—*Ed.*

proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration of capitalism.” You will realise, of course, that what is referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialisation.

I think that everything fundamental we have ever said against Trotskyism is said here.

Of course, less was said in my speech about the “Left” deviation than about the Right. But that is because the theme of my speech was the Right deviation, as I definitely specified at the beginning of my speech, and as was fully in accordance with the agenda of the joint plenum of the M.C. and M.C.C. But one thing cannot be denied, and that is that, despite this, everything fundamental that at all distinguishes Trotskyism from Leninism on the one hand, and from the Right deviation on the other, was said in my speech.

What more should be said about Trotskyism in a speech devoted to the Right deviation to satisfy you?

3) You are not satisfied with my statement that in the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor “Left” deviations nor conciliation towards them. Was I justified in making such a statement? I was. Why? Because *when the text of the Central Committee’s message to the members of the Moscow organisation was adopted by the Political Bureau, not one of the members of the Political Bureau present voted against it.* Is this a good or a bad thing? I think it is a good thing. Can such a fact be disregarded *when characterising the Political Bureau in October 1928?* Obviously not.

With communist greetings,

***J. Stalin***

October 27, 1928

Published for the first time

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## TO THE LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE

*Greetings on the Day of the Tenth Anniversary  
of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League*

Greetings to the Leninist Young Communist League on its tenth anniversary!

The Leninist Young Communist League was, and is, the young reserve of our revolution. Tens and hundreds of thousands of the finest representatives of the younger generation of workers and peasants have been trained in the ranks of the Young Communist League, received their revolutionary steeling and entered our Party, our Soviets, our trade unions, our Red Army, our Red Navy, our co-operatives, and our cultural organisations, to serve as the successors of the Bolshevik old guard.

The Young Communist League has succeeded in this difficult task because it has worked under the guidance of the Party; it has been able in its activities to combine study in general, and the study of Leninism in particular, with its day-to-day practical work; it has been able to educate the younger generation of working men and women and peasant men and women in the spirit of internationalism; it has been able to find a common language between the old and the young Leninists, between the old and the young guard; it has been able to subordinate all its work to the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the victory of socialist construction.

It is owing to this alone that the Young Communist League has succeeded in holding aloft the banner of Lenin.

Let us hope that in the future, too, the Young Communist League will succeed in performing its duty towards our proletariat and the international proletariat.

Greetings to the two-million reserve of our Party, the Leninist Young Communist League!

Long live the young communist generation!

***J. Stalin***

*Pravda*, No. 252,  
October 28, 1928

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## ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN<sup>57</sup>

Fraternal greetings to the women workers and all women toilers of town and country!

I wish them success in the struggle for the abolition of exploitation, oppression, inequality, darkness and ignorance!

In a united front with all the working people and under the leadership of the working class, forward to the abolition of capitalism, the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the building of a new, socialist society!

***J. Stalin***

*Pravda*, No. 267  
November 17, 1928

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## INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

*Speech Delivered  
at the Plenum of the C.P.S.U.(B.)<sup>58</sup>  
November 19, 1928*

I shall deal, comrades, with three main questions raised in the theses of the Political Bureau.

Firstly, the industrialisation of the country and the fact that the key factor in industrialisation is the development of the production of the means of production, while ensuring the greatest possible speed of this development.

Next, the fact that the rate of development of our agriculture lags extremely behind the rate of development of our industry, and that because of this the most burning question in our home policy today is that of agriculture, and especially the grain problem, the question how to improve, to reconstruct agriculture on a new technical basis.

And, thirdly and lastly, the deviations from the line of the Party, the struggle on two fronts, and the fact that our chief danger at the present moment is the Right danger, the Right deviation.

**I****THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT  
OF INDUSTRY**

Our theses proceed from the premise that a fast rate of development of industry in general, and of the production of the means of production in particular, is the underlying principle of, and the key to, the industrialisation of the country, the underlying principle of, and the key to, the transformation of our entire national economy along the lines of socialist development.

But what does a fast rate of development of industry involve? It involves the maximum capital investment in industry. And that leads to a state of tension in all our plans, budgetary and non-budgetary. And, indeed, the characteristic feature of our control figures in the past three years, in the period of reconstruction, is that they have been compiled and carried out at a high tension. Take our control figures, examine our budget estimates, talk with our Party comrades—both those who work in the Party organisations and those who direct our Soviet, economic and co-operative affairs—and you will invariably find this one characteristic feature—everywhere, namely, the state of tension in our plans.

The question arises: is this state of tension in our plans really necessary for us? Cannot we do without it? Is it not possible to conduct the work at a slower pace, in a more “restful” atmosphere? Is not the fast rate of industrial development that we have adopted due to the restless character of the members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People’s Commissars?

Of course not! The members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars are calm and sober people. Abstractly speaking, that is, if we disregarded the external and internal situation, we could, of course, conduct the work at a slower speed. But the point is that, firstly, we cannot disregard the external and internal situation, and, secondly, if we take the surrounding situation as our starting-point, it has to be admitted that it is precisely this situation that dictates a fast rate of development of our industry.

Permit me to pass to an examination of this situation, of these conditions of an external and internal order that dictate a fast rate of industrial development.

*External conditions.* We have assumed power in a country whose technical equipment is terribly backward. Along with a few big industrial units more or less based upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is beneath all criticism from the point of view of modern achievements. At the same time we have around us a number of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far more developed and up-to-date than that of our country. Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of



socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?

What has to be done to end this contradiction? To end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced technology of the developed capitalist countries. We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist countries in the sense of establishing a new political system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall.

This applies not only to the building of socialism. It applies also to upholding the independence of our country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement. The independence of our country cannot be upheld unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defence. And such an industrial basis cannot be created if our industry is not more highly developed technically.

That is why a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary and imperative.

The technical and economic backwardness of our country was not invented by us. This backwardness is age-old and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country. This backwardness was felt to be an evil both earlier, before the revolution, and later, after the revolution. When Peter the Great, having to deal with the more highly developed countries of the West, feverishly built mills and factories to supply the army and strengthen the country's defences, that was in its way an attempt to break out of the grip of this backwardness. It is quite understandable, however,

that none of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the problem of putting an end to the backwardness of our country. More than that, not only were these classes unable to solve this problem, they were not even able to formulate the task in any satisfactory way. The age-old backwardness of our country can be ended only on the lines of successful socialist construction. And it can be ended only by the proletariat, which has established its dictatorship and has charge of the direction of the country.

It would be foolish to console ourselves with the thought that, since the backwardness of our country was not invented by us and was bequeathed to us by the whole history of our country, we cannot be, and do not have to be, responsible for it. That is not true, comrades. Since we have come to power and taken upon ourselves the task of transforming the country on the basis of socialism, we are responsible, and have to be responsible, for everything, the bad as well as the good. And just because we are responsible for everything, we must put an end to our technical and economic backwardness. We must do so without fail if we really want to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. And only we Bolsheviks can do it. But precisely in order to accomplish this task, we must systematically achieve a fast rate of development of our industry. And that we are already achieving a fast rate of industrial development is now clear to everyone.

The question of overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically is for us Bolsheviks neither new nor unexpected. It was raised in our country as early as in 1917, before

the October Revolution. It was raised by Lenin as early as in September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, during the imperialist war, in his pamphlet *The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It*.

Here is what Lenin said on this score:

“The result of the revolution has been that the *p o l i t i c a l* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries. But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *e c o n o m i c a l l y a s w e l l*. . . . Perish or drive full-steam ahead. That is the alternative with which history has confronted us” (Vol. XXI, p. 191).

You see how bluntly Lenin put the question of ending our technical and economic backwardness.

Lenin wrote all this on the eve of the October Revolution, in the period before the proletariat had taken power, when the Bolsheviks had as yet neither state power, nor a socialised industry, nor a widely ramified co-operative network embracing millions of peasants, nor collective farms, nor state farms. Today, when we already have something substantial with which to end completely our technical and economic backwardness, we might paraphrase Lenin’s words roughly as follows:

“We have overtaken and *outstripped* the advanced capitalist countries *politically* by establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. But that is not enough. We must utilise the dictatorship of the proletariat, our socialised industry, transport, credit system, etc., the co-operatives, collective farms, state farms, etc., in order to overtake and *outstrip* the advanced capitalist countries *economically* as well.”

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely as it does now if we had such a highly developed industry and such a highly developed technology as Germany, say, and if the relative importance of industry in the entire national economy were as high in our country as it is in Germany, for example. *If that were the case*, we could develop our industry at a slower rate without fearing to fall behind the capitalist countries and knowing that we could outstrip them at one stroke. But then we should not be so seriously backward technically and economically as we are now. The whole point is that we are behind Germany in this respect and are still far from having overtaken her technically and economically.

The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely if we were not the *only* country but *one of the countries* of the dictatorship of the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France, say.

*If that were the case*, the capitalist encirclement could not be so serious a danger as it is now, the question of the economic independence of our country would naturally recede into the background, we could integrate ourselves into the system of more developed proletarian states, we could receive from them machines for making our industry and agriculture more productive, supplying them in turn with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we could, consequently, expand our industry at a slower rate. But you know very well that that is not yet the case and that we are still the *only* country of the proletarian dictatorship and are surrounded by capitalist

countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically and economically.

That is why Lenin raised the question of overtaking and outstripping the economically advanced countries as one of life and death for our development.

Such are the *external* conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

*Internal conditions.* But besides the external conditions, there are also internal conditions which dictate a fast rate of development of our industry as the main foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, of its technical and cultural level. I am referring to the existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance of small commodity producers, with their scattered and utterly backward production, compared with which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island in the midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding daily, but which is nevertheless an island in the midst of the sea.

We are in the habit of saying that industry is the main foundation of our entire national economy, including agriculture, that it is the key to the reconstruction of our backward and scattered system of agriculture on a collectivist basis. That is perfectly true. From that position we must not retreat for a single moment. But it must also be remembered that, while industry is the main foundation, agriculture constitutes the basis for industrial development, both as a market which absorbs the products of industry and as a supplier of raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as a source of the export reserves essential in order to import machinery

for the needs of our national economy. Can we advance industry while leaving agriculture in a state of complete technical backwardness, without providing an agricultural base for industry, without reconstructing agriculture and bringing it up to the level of industry? No, we cannot.

Hence the task of supplying agriculture with the maximum amount of instruments and means of production essential in order to accelerate and promote its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But for the accomplishment of this task a fast rate of development of our industry is necessary. Of course, the reconstruction of a disunited and scattered agriculture is an incomparably more difficult matter than the reconstruction of a united and centralised socialist industry. But that is the task that confronts us, and we must accomplish it. And it cannot be accomplished except by a fast rate of industrial development.

We cannot go on indefinitely, that is, for too long a period, basing the Soviet regime and socialist construction on two *different* foundations, the foundation of the most large-scale and united socialist industry and the foundation of the most scattered and backward, small commodity economy of the peasants. We must gradually, but systematically and persistently, place our agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of large-scale production, and bring it up to the level of socialist industry. Either we accomplish this task—in which case the final victory of socialism in our country will be assured, or we turn away from it and do not accomplish it—in which case a return to capitalism may become inevitable.

Here is what Lenin says on this score:

“As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country” (Vol. XXVI, p. 46).

As you see, when Lenin speaks of the electrification of the country he means not the isolated construction of individual power stations, but the gradual “placing of the economy of the country, *including agriculture*,\* on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production,” which in one way or another, directly or indirectly, is connected with electrification.

Lenin delivered this speech at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in December 1920, on the very eve of the introduction of NEP, when he was substantiating the so-called plan of electrification, that is, the GOELRO plan. Some comrades argue on these grounds that the views expressed in this quotation have become inapplicable under present conditions. Why, we ask? Because, they say, much water has flown under the bridges since then. It is, of course, true that much water has

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

flown under the bridges since then. We now have a developed socialist industry, we have collective farms on a mass scale, we have old and new state farms, we have a wide network of well-developed co-operative organisations, we have machine-hiring stations at the service of the peasant farms, we now practise the contract system as a new form of the bond, and we can put into operation all these and a number of other levers for gradually placing agriculture on a new technical basis. All this is true. But it is also true that, in spite of all this, we are still a small-peasant country where small-scale production predominates. And that is the fundamental thing. And as long as it continues to be the fundamental thing, Lenin's thesis remains valid that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism," and that, consequently, the danger of the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase.

Lenin says the same thing, but in a sharper form, in the plan of his pamphlet, *The Tax in Kind*, which was written *after* the introduction of NEP (March-April 1921):

"*If* we have electrification in 10-20 years, then the individualism of the small tiller, and freedom *f o r h i m* to trade locally are not a whit terrible. *If* we do not have electrification, a return to capitalism will be inevitable *anyhow*."

And further on he says:

"Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed); otherwise, 20-40 years of the torments of whiteguard terrorism" (Vol. XXVI, p. 313).



You see how bluntly Lenin puts the question: either electrification, that is, the “placing of the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production,” or a return to capitalism.

That is how Lenin understood the question of “correct relations with the peasantry.”

It is not a matter of coddling the peasant and regarding this as establishing correct relations with him, for coddling will not carry you very far. It is a matter of helping the peasant to place his husbandry “on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production”; for that is the principal way to rid the peasant of his poverty.

And it is impossible to place the economy of the country on a new technical basis unless our industry and, in the first place, the production of means of production, are developed at a fast rate.

Such are the internal conditions dictating a fast rate of development of our industry.

It is these external and internal conditions which are the cause of the control figures of our national economy being under such tension.

That explains, too, why our economic plans, both budgetary and non-budgetary, are marked by a state of tension, by substantial investments in capital development, the object of which is to maintain a fast rate of industrial development.

It may be asked where this is said in the theses, in what passage of the theses. (*A voice*: “Yes, where is it said?”) Evidence of this in the theses is the sum-total of capital investments in industry for 1928-29. After

all, our theses are called theses on the control figures. That is so, is it not, comrades? (*A voice*: "Yes.") Well, the theses say that in 1928-29 we shall be investing 1,650 million rubles in capital construction in industry. In other words, this year we shall be investing in industry 330,000,000 rubles more than last year.

It follows, therefore, that we are not only maintaining the rate of industrial development, but are going a step farther by investing more in industry than last year, that is, by expanding capital construction in industry both absolutely and relatively.

That is the crux of the theses on the control figures of the national economy. Yet certain comrades failed to observe this staring fact. They criticised the theses on the control figures right and left as regards petty details, but the most important thing they failed to observe.

## II THE GRAIN PROBLEM

I have spoken so far of the first main question in the theses, the rate of development of industry. Now let us consider the second main question, the grain problem. A characteristic feature of the theses is that they lay stress on the problem of the development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular. Are the theses right in doing so? I think they are. Already at the July plenum it was said that the weakest spot in the development of our national economy is the *excessive* backwardness of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular.

When, in speaking of our agriculture lagging behind our industry, people complain about it, they are, of course, not talking seriously. Agriculture always has lagged and always: will lag behind industry. That is particularly true in our conditions, where industry is concentrated to a maximum degree, while agriculture is scattered to a maximum degree. Naturally, a united industry will develop faster than a scattered agriculture. That, incidently, gives rise to the leading position of industry in relation to agriculture. Consequently, the customary lag of agriculture behind industry does not give sufficient grounds for raising the grain problem.

The problem of agriculture, and of grain farming in particular, makes its appearance only when the customary lag of agriculture behind industry turns into an *excessive* lag in the rate of its development. The characteristic feature of the present state of our national economy is that we are faced by the fact of an *excessive* lag in the rate of development of grain farming behind the rate of development of industry, while at the same time the demand for marketable grain on the part of the growing towns and industrial areas is increasing by leaps and bounds. The task then is not to *lower* the rate of development of industry to the level of the development of grain farming (which would upset everything and reverse the course of development), but to bring the rate of development of grain farming into line with the rate of development of industry and to *raise* the rate of development of grain farming to a level that will guarantee rapid progress of the entire national economy, both industry and agriculture.

Either we accomplish this task, and thereby solve

the grain problem, or we do not accomplish it, and then a rupture between the socialist town and the small-peasant countryside will be inevitable.

That is how the matter stands, comrades. That is the essence of the grain problem.

Does this not mean that what we have now is "stagnation" in the development of agriculture or even its "retrogression"? That is what Frumkin actually asserts in his second letter, which at his request we distributed today to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. He says explicitly in this letter that there is "stagnation" in our agriculture. "We cannot and must not," he says, "talk in the press about retrogression, but within the Party we ought not to hide the fact that this lag is equivalent to retrogression."

Is this assertion of Frumkin's correct? It is, of course, incorrect! We, the members of the Political Bureau, absolutely disagree with this assertion, and the Political Bureau theses are totally at variance with such an opinion of the state of grain farming.

In point of fact, what is retrogression, and how would it manifest itself in agriculture? It would obviously be bound to manifest itself in a backward, downward movement of agriculture, a movement away from the new forms of farming to the old, medieval forms. It would be bound to manifest itself by the peasants abandoning, for instance, the three-field system for the long-fallow system, the steel plough and machines for the wooden plough, clean and selected seed for unsifted and low-grade seed, modern methods of farming for inferior methods, and so on and so forth. But do we observe anything of the kind? Does not everyone know that tens and

hundreds of thousands of peasant farms are annually abandoning the three-field for the four-field and multi-field system, low-grade seed for selected seed, the wooden plough for the steel plough and machines, inferior methods of farming for superior methods? Is this retrogression?

Frumkin has a habit of hanging on to the coat tails of some member or other of the Political Bureau in order to substantiate his own point of view. It is quite likely that in this instance, too, he will get hold of Bukharin's coat tails in order to show that Bukharin in his article, "Notes of an Economist," says "the same thing." But what Bukharin says is very far from "the same thing." Bukharin in his article raised the abstract, theoretical question of the possibility or danger of retrogression. In the abstract, such a formulation of the question is quite possible and legitimate. But what does Frumkin do? He turns the abstract question of the possibility of the retrogression of agriculture into a *fact*. And this he calls an analysis of the state of grain farming! Is it not ludicrous, comrades?

It would be a fine Soviet government indeed if, in the eleventh year of its existence, it had brought agriculture into a state of retrogression! Why, a government like that would deserve not to be supported, but to be sent packing. And the workers would have sent such a government packing long ago, if it had reduced agriculture to a state of retrogression. Retrogression is a tune all sorts of bourgeois experts are harping on; they dream of our agriculture retrogressing. Trotsky at one time harped on the theme of retrogression. I did not expect to see Frumkin taking this dubious line.

On what does Frumkin base his assertion about retrogression? First of all, on the fact that the grain crop area this year is less than it was last year. What is this fact due to? To the policy of the Soviet Government, perhaps? Of course not. It is due to the perishing of the winter crops in the steppe area of the Ukraine and partially in the North Caucasus, and to the drought in the summer of this year in the same area of the Ukraine. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, upon which agriculture is wholly and entirely dependent, our grain crop area this year would have been at least 1,000,000 dessiatins larger than it was last year.

He bases his assertion, further, on the fact that our gross production of grain this year is only slightly (70,000,000 poods) greater, and that of wheat and rye 200,000,000 poods less, than last year. And what is all this due to? Again to the drought and to the frosts which killed the winter crops. Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, our gross production of grain this year would have exceeded last year's by 300,000,000 poods. How can one ignore such factors as drought, frost, etc., which are of decisive significance for the harvest in this or that region?

We are now making it our task to enlarge the crop area by 7 per cent, to raise crop yields by 3 per cent, and to increase the gross production of grain by, I think, 10 per cent. There need be no doubt that we shall do everything in our power to accomplish these tasks. But in spite of all our measures, it is not out of the question that we may again come up against a partial crop failure, frosts or drought in this or that region, in which case it is possible that these circumstances may cause

the gross grain output to fall short of our plans or even of this year's gross output. Will that mean that agriculture is "retrogressing," that the policy of the Soviet Government is to blame for this "retrogression," that we have "robbed" the peasant of economic incentive, that we have "deprived" him of economic prospects?

Several years ago Trotsky fell into the same error, declaring that "a little rain" was of no significance to agriculture. Rykov controverted him, and had the support of the overwhelming majority of the members of the C.C. Now Frumkin is falling into the same error, ignoring weather conditions, which are of decisive importance for agriculture, and trying to make the policy of our Party responsible for everything.

What ways and means are necessary to accelerate the rate of development of agriculture in general, and of grain farming in particular?

There are three such ways, or channels:

- a) by increasing crop yields and enlarging the area sown by the individual poor and middle peasants;
- b) by further development of collective farms;
- c) by enlarging the old and establishing new state farms.

All this was already mentioned in the resolution of the July plenum. The theses repeat what was said at the July plenum, but put the matter more concretely, and state it in terms of figures in the shape of definite investments. Here, too, Frumkin finds something to cavil at. He thinks that, since individual farming is put in the first place and the collective farms and state farms in the second and third, this can only mean that his view-point has triumphed. That is ridiculous, comrades.

It is clear that if we approach the matter from the point of view of the relative importance of each form of agriculture, individual farming must be put in the first place, because it provides nearly six times as much marketable grain as the collective farms and state farms. But if we approach the matter from the point of view of the type of farming, of which form of economy is most akin to our purpose, first place must be given to the collective farms and state farms, which represent a higher type of agriculture than individual peasant farming. Is it really necessary to show that both points of view are equally acceptable to us?

What is required in order that our work should proceed along all these three channels, in order that the rate of development of agriculture, and primarily of grain farming, should be raised in practice?

It is necessary, first of all, to direct the attention of our Party cadres to agriculture and focus it on concrete aspects of the grain problem. We must put aside abstract phrases and talking about agriculture *in general* and get down, at last, to working out *practical* measures for the furtherance of grain farming adapted to the diverse conditions in the different areas. It is time to pass from words to deeds and to tackle at last the concrete question *how* to raise crop yields and to enlarge the crop areas of the individual poor- and middle-peasant farms, *how* to improve and develop further the collective farms and state farms, *how* to organise the rendering of assistance by the collective farms and state farms to the peasants by way of supplying them with better seed and better breeds of cattle, *how* to organise assistance for the peasants in the shape of machines



and other implements through machine-hiring stations, *how* to extend and improve the contract system and agricultural co-operation in general, and so on and so forth. (*A voice*: "That is empiricism.") Such empiricism is absolutely essential, for otherwise we run the risk of drowning the very serious matter of solving the grain problem in empty talk about agriculture in general.

The Central Committee has set itself the task of arranging for concrete reports on agricultural development by our principal workers in the Council of People's Commissars and the Political Bureau who are responsible for the chief grain regions. At this plenum you are to hear a report by Comrade Andreyev on the ways of solving the grain problem in the North Caucasus. I think that we shall next have to hear similar reports in succession from the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth region, the Volga region, Siberia, etc. This is absolutely necessary in order to turn the Party's attention to the grain problem and to get our Party workers at last to formulate concretely the questions connected with the grain problem.

It is necessary, in the second place, to ensure that our Party workers in the countryside make a strict distinction in their practical work between the middle peasant and the kulak, do not lump them together and do not hit the middle peasant when it is the kulak that has to be struck at. It is high time to put a stop to these errors, if they may be called such. Take, for instance, the question of the individual tax. We have the decision of the Political Bureau, and the corresponding law, about levying an individual tax on not more than 2-3 per cent of the households, that is, on

the wealthiest section of the kulaks. But what actually happens? There are a number of districts where 10, 12 and even more per cent of the households are taxed, with the result that the middle section of the peasantry is affected. Is it not time to put a stop to this crime?

Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to these and similar outrages, our dear "critics" indulge in word play, proposing that the words "the wealthiest section of the kulaks" be replaced by the words "the most powerful section of the kulaks" or "the uppermost section of the kulaks." As if it were not one and the same thing! It has been shown that the kulaks constitute about 5 per cent of the peasantry. It has been shown that the law requires the individual tax to be levied on only 2-3 per cent of the households, that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. It has been shown that in practice this law is being violated in a number of areas. Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for putting a stop to this, the "critics" indulge in verbal criticism and refuse to understand that this does not alter things one iota. Sheer hair-splitters! (*A voice*: "They propose that the individual tax should be levied on all kulaks.") Well then, they should demand the repeal of the law imposing an individual tax on 2-3 per cent. Yet I have not heard that anybody has demanded the repeal of the individual tax law. It is said that individual taxation is arbitrarily extended in order to supplement the local budget. But you must not supplement the local budget by breaking the law, by infringing Party directives. Our Party exists, it has not been liquidated yet. The Soviet Government exists, it has not been liquidated yet. And if you have not enough funds for your local

budget, then you must ask to have your local budget reconsidered, and not break the law or disregard Party instructions.

It is necessary, next, to give further incentives to individual poor- and middle-peasant farming. Undoubtedly, the increase in grain prices already introduced, practical enforcement of revolutionary law, practical assistance to the poor- and middle-peasant farms in the shape of the' contract system, and so on, will considerably increase the peasant's economic incentive. Frumkin thinks that we have killed or nearly killed the peasant's incentive by robbing him of economic prospects. That, of course, is nonsense. If it were true, it would be incomprehensible what the bond, the alliance between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, actually rests on. It cannot be thought, surely, that this alliance rests on sentiment. It must be realised, after all, that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an alliance on a business basis, an alliance of the interests of two classes, a class alliance of the workers and the main mass of the peasantry aiming at mutual advantage. It is obvious that if we had killed or nearly killed the peasant's economic incentive by depriving him of economic prospects, there would be no bond, no alliance between the working class and the peasantry. Clearly, what is at issue here is not the "creation" or "release" of the economic incentive of the poor- and middle-peasant masses, but the strengthening and further development of this incentive, to the mutual advantage of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry. And that is precisely what the theses on the control figures of the national economy indicate.

It is necessary, lastly, to increase the supply of goods to the countryside. I have in mind both consumer goods and, especially, production goods (machines, fertilisers, etc.) capable of increasing the output of agricultural produce. It cannot be said that everything in this respect is as it should be. You know that symptoms of a goods shortage are still far from having been eliminated, and will probably not be eliminated so soon. The illusion exists in certain Party circles that we can put an end to the goods shortage at once. That, unfortunately, is not true. It should be borne in mind that the symptoms of a goods shortage are connected, firstly, with the growing prosperity of the workers and peasants and the gigantic increase of effective demand for goods, production of which is growing year by year but which are not enough to satisfy the whole demand, and, secondly, with the present period of the reconstruction of industry.

The reconstruction of industry involves the transfer of funds from the sphere of producing means of consumption to the sphere of producing means of production. Without this there can be no serious reconstruction of industry, especially in our, Soviet conditions. But what does this mean? It means that money is being invested in the building of new plants, and that the number of towns and new consumers is growing, while the new plants can put out additional commodities in quantity only after three or four years. It is easy to realise that this is not conducive to putting an end to the goods shortage.

Does this mean that we must fold our arms and acknowledge that we are impotent to cope with the symp-

toms of a goods shortage? No, it does not. The fact is that we can and should adopt concrete measures to mitigate, to moderate the goods shortage. That is something we can and should do at once. For this, we must speed up the expansion of those branches of industry which directly contribute to the promotion of agricultural production (the Stalingrad Tractor Works, the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Works, the Voronezh Seed Sorter Factory, etc., etc.). For this, further, we must as far as possible expand those branches of industry which contribute to an increase in output of goods in short supply (cloth, glass, nails, etc.). And so on and so forth.

Kubyak said that the control figures of the national economy propose to assign less funds this year to individual peasant farming than last year. That, I think, is untrue. Kubyak apparently loses sight of the fact that this year we are giving the peasants credit under the contract system to the sum of about 300,000,000 rubles (nearly 100,000,000 more than last year). If this is taken into account, and it must be taken into account, it will be seen that this year we are assigning more for the development of individual peasant farming than last year. As to the old and new state farms and collective farms, we are investing in them this year about 300,000,000 rubles (some 150,000,000 more than last year).

Special attention needs to be paid to the collective farms, the state farms and the contract system. These things should not be regarded only as means of increasing our stocks of marketable grain. They are at the same time *a new form of bond* between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

Enough has already been said about the contract system and I shall not dwell upon it any further. Everyone realises that the application of this system on a mass scale makes it easier to unite the efforts of the individual peasant farms, introduces an element of permanency in the relations between the state and the peasantry, and so strengthens the bond between town and country.

I should like to draw your attention to the collective farms, and especially to the state farms, as levers which facilitate the reconstruction of agriculture on a new technical basis, causing a revolution in the minds of the peasants and helping them to shake off conservatism, routine. The appearance of tractors, large agricultural machines and tractor columns in our grain regions cannot but have its effect on the surrounding peasant farms. Assistance rendered the surrounding peasants in the way of seed, machines and tractors will undoubtedly be appreciated by the peasants and taken as a sign of the power and strength of the Soviet state, which is trying to lead them on to the high road of a substantial improvement of agriculture. We have not taken this circumstance into account until now and, perhaps, still do not sufficiently do so. But I think that this is the chief thing that the collective farms and state farms are contributing and could contribute at the present moment towards solving the grain problem and the strengthening of the bond in its new forms.

Such, in general, are the ways and means that we must adopt in our work of solving the grain problem.

### III

## COMBATING DEVIATIONS AND CONCILIATION TOWARDS THEM

Let us pass now to the third main question of our theses, that of deviations from the Leninist line.

The social basis of the deviations is the fact that small-scale production predominates in our country, the fact that small-scale production gives rise to capitalist elements, the fact that our Party is surrounded by petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and, lastly, the fact that certain of our Party organisations have been infected by these elemental forces.

There, in the main, lies the social basis of the deviations.

All these deviations are of a petty-bourgeois character.

What is the Right deviation, which is the one chiefly in question here? In what direction does it tend to go? It tends towards adaptation to bourgeois ideology, towards adaptation of our policy to the tastes and requirements of the "Soviet" bourgeoisie.

What threat does the Right deviation hold out, if it should triumph in our Party? It would mean the ideological rout of our Party, a free rein for the capitalist elements, the growth of chances for the restoration of capitalism, or, as Lenin called it, for a "return to capitalism."

Where is the tendency towards a Right deviation chiefly lodged? In our Soviet, economic, co-operative and trade-union apparatuses, and in the Party appara-

tus as well, especially in its lower links in the countryside.

Are there spokesmen of the Right deviation among our Party members? There certainly are. Rykov mentioned the example of Shatunovsky, who declared against the building of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station. There can be no question but that Shatunovsky was guilty of a Right deviation, a deviation towards open opportunism. All the same, I think that Shatunovsky is not a typical illustration of the Right deviation, of its physiognomy. I think that in this respect the palm should go to Frumkin. (*Laughter.*) I am referring to his first letter (June 1928) and then to his second letter, which was distributed here to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. (November 1928).

Let us examine both these letters. Let us take the "basic propositions" of the first letter.

1) "*The sentiment in the countryside, apart from a small section of the poor peasants, is opposed to us.*" Is that true? It is obviously untrue. If it were true, the bond would not even be a memory. But since June (the letter was written in June) nearly six months have passed, yet anyone, unless he is blind, can see that the bond between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry continues and is growing stronger. Why does Frumkin write such nonsense? In order to scare the Party and make it give way to the Right deviation.

2) "*The line taken lately has led to the main mass of the middle peasants being without hope, without prospects.*" Is that true? It is quite untrue. It is obvious that if in the spring of this year the main mass of the middle peasants had been without economic hope or



prospects they would not have enlarged the spring crop area as they did in all the principal grain-growing regions. The spring sowing takes place in April-May. Well, Frumkin's letter was written in June. In our country, under the Soviet regime, who is the chief purchaser of cereals? The state and the co-operatives, which are linked with the state. It is obvious that if the mass of middle peasants had been without economic prospects, if they were in a state of "estrangement" from the Soviet Government, they would not have enlarged the spring crop area for the benefit of the state, as the principal purchaser of grain. Frumkin is talking obvious nonsense. Here again he is trying to scare the Party with the "horrors" of hopeless prospects in order to make it give way to his, Frumkin's, view.

3) "*We must return to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses.*" That the Fifteenth Congress has simply been tacked on here without rhyme or reason, of that there can be no doubt. The crux here is not in the Fifteenth Congress, but in the slogan: Back to the Fourteenth Congress. And what does that mean? It means renouncing "intensification of the offensive against the kulak" (see Fifteenth Congress resolution). I say this not in order to deprecate the Fourteenth Congress. I say it because, in calling for a return to the Fourteenth Congress, Frumkin is rejecting the step forward which the Party made between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, and, in rejecting it, he is trying to pull the Party back. The July plenum of the Central Committee pronounced its opinion on this question. It stated plainly in its resolution that people who try to evade the Fifteenth Congress decision—"to develop further the of-

fensive against the kulaks"—are "an expression of bourgeois tendencies in our country." I must tell Frumkin plainly that when the Political Bureau formulated this item of the resolution of the July plenum, it had him and his first letter in mind.

4) "*Maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives.*" We have always to the best of our ability and resources rendered the maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering, or even not entering, collectives. There is nothing new in this. What is new in the Fifteenth Congress decisions compared with those of the Fourteenth Congress is not this but that the Fifteenth Congress made the utmost development of the collective-farm movement one of the cardinal tasks of the day. When Frumkin speaks of maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives, he is in point of fact turning away from, evading, the task set the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of developing the collective-farm movement to the utmost. In point of fact, Frumkin is against developing the work of strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of collective farms.

5) "*State farms should not be expanded by shock or super-shock tactics.*" Frumkin cannot but know that we are only *beginning* to work seriously to expand the old state farms and to create new ones. Frumkin cannot but know that we are assigning for this purpose far less money than we ought to assign if we had any reserves for it. The words "by shock or super-shock tactics" were put in here to strike people with "horror" and to conceal his own disinclination for any serious expansion of the state farms. Frumkin, in point of fact, is

here expressing his opposition to strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside along the line of the state farms.

Now gather all these propositions of Frumkin's together, and you get a bouquet characteristic of the Right deviation.

Let us pass to Frumkin's second letter. In what way does the second letter differ from the first? In that it aggravates the errors of the first letter. The first said that middle-peasant farming was without prospects. The second speaks of the "retrogression" of agriculture. The first letter said that we must return to the Fourteenth Congress in the sense of relaxing the offensive against the kulak. The second letter, however, says that "we must not hamper production on the kulak farms." The first letter said nothing about industry. But the second letter develops a "new" theory to the effect that less should be assigned for industrial construction. Incidentally, there are two points on which the two letters agree: concerning the collective farms and concerning the state farms. In both letters Frumkin pronounces against the development of collective farms and state farms. It is clear that the second letter aggravates the errors of the first.

About the theory of "retrogression" I have already spoken. There can be no doubt that this theory is the invention of bourgeois experts, who are always ready to raise a cry that the Soviet regime is doomed. Frumkin has allowed himself to be scared by the bourgeois experts who have their roost around the People's Commissariat of Finance, and now he is himself trying to scare the Party so as to make it give way to the Right

deviation. Enough has been said, too, about the collective farms and state farms. So there is no need to repeat it. Let us examine the two remaining points: about kulak farming and about capital investment in industry.

*Kulak farming.* Frumkin says that “*we must not hamper production on the kulak farms.*” What does that mean? It means not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy. But what does not preventing the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy mean? It means allowing a free rein to capitalism in the countryside, allowing it freedom, liberty. We get the old slogan of the French liberals: “*laissez faire, laissez passer,*” that is, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from doing its business, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from moving freely.

This slogan was put forward by the old French liberals at the time of the French bourgeois revolution, at the time of the struggle against the feudal regime, which was fettering the bourgeoisie and not allowing it to develop. It follows, then, that we must now go over from the *socialist* slogan—“ever-increasing restrictions on the capitalist elements” (see the theses on the control figures)—to the *bourgeois-liberal* slogan: do not hamper the development of capitalism in the countryside. Why, are we really thinking of turning from Bolsheviks into bourgeois liberals? What can there be in common between this bourgeois-liberal slogan of Frumkin’s and the line of the Party?

(*Frumkin.* “Comrade Stalin, read the other points also.”) I shall read the whole point: “We must not hamper production on the kulak farms either, *while at the same time combating their enslaving exploitation.*”

My dear Frumkin, do you really think the second part of the sentence improves matters and does not make them worse? What does combating enslaving exploitation mean? Why, the slogan of combating enslaving exploitation is a slogan of the bourgeois revolution, directed against feudal-serf or semi-feudal methods of exploitation. We did indeed put forward this slogan when we were advancing towards the bourgeois revolution, differentiating between the enslaving form of exploitation, which we were striving to abolish, and the non-enslaving, so-called "progressive" form of exploitation, which we could not at that time restrict or abolish, inasmuch as the bourgeois system remained in force. But at that time we were advancing towards a bourgeois-democratic republic. Now, however, if I am not mistaken, we have a socialist revolution, which is heading, and cannot but I head, for the abolition of all forms of exploitation, including "progressive" forms. Really, do you want us to turn back from the socialist revolution, which we are developing and advancing, and revert to the slogans of the bourgeois revolution? How can one bring oneself to talk such nonsense?

Further, what does not hampering kulak economy mean? It means giving the kulak a free hand. And what does giving the kulak a free hand mean? It means giving him power. When the French bourgeois liberals demanded that the feudal government should not hamper the development of the bourgeoisie, they expressed it concretely in the demand that the bourgeoisie should be given power. And they were right. In order to be able to develop properly, the bourgeoisie must have power. Consequently, to be consistent, you should say: admit the

kulak to power. For it must be understood, after all, that you cannot but restrict the development of kulak economy if you take power away from the kulaks and concentrate it in the hands of the working class. Those are the conclusions that suggest themselves on reading Frumkin's second letter.

*Capital construction in industry.* When we discussed the control figures we had three figures before us: the Supreme Council of National Economy asked for 825,000,000 rubles; the State Planning Commission was willing to give 750,000,000 rubles; the People's Commissariat of Finance would give only 650,000,000 rubles. What decision on this did the Central Committee of our Party adopt? It fixed the figure at 800,000,000 rubles, that is, exactly 150,000,000 rubles more than the People's Commissariat of Finance proposed. That the People's Commissariat of Finance offered less is, of course, not surprising: the stinginess of the People's Commissariat of Finance is generally known; it has to be stingy. But that is not the point just now. The point is that Frumkin defends the figure of 650,000,000 rubles not out of stinginess, but because of his new-fangled theory of "feasibility," asserting in his second letter and in a special article in the periodical of the People's Commissariat of Finance that *we shall certainly do injury to our economy if we assign to the Supreme Council of National Economy more than 650,000,000 rubles for capital construction*. And what does that mean? It means that Frumkin is against maintaining the present rate of the development of industry, evidently failing to realise that if it were slackened this really would do injury to our entire national economy.

Now combine these two points in Frumkin's second letter, the point concerning kulak farming and the point concerning capital construction in industry, add the theory of "retrogression," and you get the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

You want to know what the Right deviation is and what it looks like? Read Frumkin's two letters, study them, and you will understand.

So much for the physiognomy of the Right deviation.

But the theses speak not only of the Right deviation. They speak also of the so-called "Left" deviation. What is the "Left" deviation? Is there really a so-called "Left" deviation in the Party? Are there in our Party, as our theses say, anti-middle-peasant trends, super-industrialisation trends and so on? Yes, there are. What do they amount to? They amount to a deviation towards Trotskyism. That was said already by the July plenum. I am referring to the July plenum's resolution on grain procurement policy, which speaks of a struggle on two fronts: against those who want to hark back from the Fifteenth Congress—the Rights, and against those who want to convert the emergency measures into a permanent policy of the Party—the "Lefts," the trend towards Trotskyism.

Clearly, there are elements of Trotskyism and a trend towards the Trotskyist ideology within our Party. About four thousand persons, I think, voted against our platform during the discussion which preceded the Fifteenth Party Congress. (*A voice*: "Ten thousand.") I think that if ten thousand voted against, then twice ten thousand Party members who sympathise with Trotskyism did not vote at all, because they did not attend

the meetings. These are the Trotskyist elements who have not left the Party, and who, it must be supposed, have not yet rid themselves of the Trotskyist ideology. Furthermore, I think that a section of the Trotskyists who later broke away from the Trotskyist organisation and returned to the Party have not yet succeeded in shaking off the Trotskyist ideology and are also, presumably, not averse to disseminating their views among Party members. Lastly, there is the fact that we have a certain recrudescence of the Trotskyist ideology in some of our Party organisations. Combine all this, and you get all the necessary elements for a deviation towards Trotskyism in the Party.

And that is understandable: with the existence of petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and the pressure that these forces exert on our Party, there cannot but be Trotskyist trends in it. It is one thing to arrest Trotskyist cadres or expel them from the Party. It is another thing to put an end to the Trotskyist ideology. That will be more difficult. And we say that wherever there is a Right deviation, there is bound to be also a "Left" deviation. The "Left" deviation is the shadow of the Right deviation. Lenin used to say, referring to the Otzovists, that the "Lefts" are Mensheviks, only turned inside-out. That is quite true. The same thing must be said of the present "Lefts." People who deviate towards Trotskyism are in fact also Rights, only turned inside-out, Rights who cloak themselves with "Left" phrases.

Hence the fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the "Left" deviation.

It may be said: if the "Left" deviation is in essence the same thing as the Right opportunist deviation, then



what is the difference between them, and where do you actually get two fronts? Indeed, if a victory of the Rights means increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism, and a victory of the "Lefts" would lead to the same result, what difference is there between them, and why are some called Rights and others "Lefts"? And if there is a difference between them, what is it? Is it not true that the two deviations have the same social roots, that they are both petty-bourgeois deviations? Is it not true that both these deviations, if they were to triumph, would lead to one and the same result? What, then, is the difference between them?

The difference is in their platforms, their demands, their approach and their methods.

If, for example, the Rights say: "*It was a mistake to build the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station,*" and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "*What is the use of one Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, let us have a Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station every year*" (laughter), it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: "*Let the kulak alone, allow him to develop freely,*" and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "*Strike not only at the kulak, but also at the middle peasant, because he is just as much a private owner as the kulak,*" it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

If the Rights say: "*Difficulties have arisen, is it not time to quit?*" and the "Lefts," on the contrary, declare: "*What are difficulties to us, a fig for your difficulties—full speed ahead!*" (laughter), it must be admitted that there obviously is a difference.

There you have a picture of the specific platform and the specific methods of the “Lefts.” This, in fact, explains why the “Lefts” sometimes succeed in luring a part of the workers over to their side with the help of high-sounding “Left” phrases and by posing as the most determined opponents of the Rights, although all the world knows that they, the “Lefts,” have the same social roots as the Rights, and that they not infrequently join in an agreement, a bloc, with the Rights in order to fight the Leninist line.

That is why it is obligatory for us, Leninists, to wage a fight on two fronts—both against the Right deviation and against the “Left” deviation.

But if the Trotskyist trend represents a “Left” deviation, does not this mean that the “Lefts” are more to the Left than Leninism? No, it does not. Leninism is the *most Left* (without quotation marks) trend in the world labour movement. We Leninists belonged to the Second International down to the outbreak of the imperialist war as the extreme Left group of the Social-Democrats. We did not remain in the Second International and we advocated a split in the Second International precisely because, being the extreme Left group, we did not want to be in the same party as the petty-bourgeois traitors to Marxism, the social-pacifists and social-chauvinists.

It was these tactics and this ideology that subsequently became the basis of all the Bolshevik parties of the world. In our Party, we Leninists are the *sole* Lefts without quotation marks. Consequently, we Leninists are neither “Lefts” nor Rights in our own Party. We are a party of Marxist-Leninists. And within our

Party we combat not only those whom we call openly opportunist deviators, but also those who pretend to be “Lefter” than Marxism, “Lefter” than Leninism, and who camouflage their Right, opportunist nature with high-sounding “Left” phrases.

Everybody realises that when people who have not yet rid themselves of Trotskyist trends are called “Lefts,” it is meant ironically. Lenin referred to the “Left Communists” as Lefts sometimes with and sometimes without quotation marks. But everyone realises that Lenin called them Lefts ironically, thereby emphasising that they were Lefts only in words, in appearance, but that in reality they represented petty-bourgeois Right trends.

In what possible sense can the Trotskyist elements be called Lefts (without quotation marks), if only yesterday they joined in a united anti-Leninist bloc with openly opportunist elements and linked themselves directly and immediately with the anti-Soviet strata of the country? Is it not a fact that only yesterday we had an open bloc of the “Lefts” and the Rights against the Leninist Party, and that that bloc undoubtedly had the support of the bourgeois elements? And does not this show that they, the “Lefts” and the Rights, could not have joined together in a united bloc if they did not have common social roots, if they were not of a common opportunist nature? The Trotskyist bloc fell to pieces a year ago. Some of the Rights, such as Shatunovsky, left the bloc. Consequently, the Right members of the bloc will now come forward as Rights, while the “Lefts” will camouflage their Rightism with “Left” phrases. But what guarantee is there that the “Lefts”

and the Rights will not find each other again? (*Laughter.*) Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, any guarantee of that.

But if we uphold the slogan of a fight on two fronts, does this mean that we are proclaiming the necessity of *Centrism* in our Party? What does a fight on two fronts mean? Is this not Centrism? You know that that is exactly how the Trotskyists depict matters: there are the “Lefts,” that is, “we,” the Trotskyists, the “real Leninists”; there are the “Rights,” that is, all the rest; and, lastly, there are the “Centrists,” who vacillate between the “Lefts” and the Rights. Can that be considered a correct view of our Party? Obviously not. Only people who have become confused in all their concepts and who have long ago broken with Marxism can say that. It can be said only by people who fail to see and to understand the *difference in principle* between the Social-Democratic party of the pre-war period, which was the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and the Communist Party, which is the *monolithic* party of the revolutionary proletariat.

Centrism must not be regarded as a spatial concept: the Rights, say, sitting on one side, the “Lefts” on the other, and the Centrists in between. Centrism is a political concept. Its ideology is one of adaptation, of subordination of the interests of the proletariat to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie *within one common party*. This ideology is alien and abhorrent to Leninism.

Centrism was a phenomenon that was natural in the Second International of the period before the war. There were Rights (the majority), Lefts (without quotation marks), and Centrists, whose whole policy consisted

in embellishing the opportunism of the Rights with Left phrases and subordinating the Lefts to the Rights.

What, at that time, was the policy of the Lefts, of whom the Bolsheviks constituted the core? It was one of determinedly fighting the Centrists, of fighting for a split with the Rights (especially after the outbreak of the imperialist war) and of organising a new, revolutionary International consisting of genuinely Left, genuinely proletarian elements.

Why was it possible that there could arise at that time such an alignment of forces within the Second International and such a policy of the Bolsheviks within it? Because the Second International was at that time the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests serving the interests of the petty-bourgeois social-pacifists, social-chauvinists. Because the Bolsheviks could not at that time but concentrate their fire on the Centrists, who were trying to subordinate the proletarian elements to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. Because the Bolsheviks were obliged at that time to advocate the idea of a split, for otherwise the proletarians could not have organised their own monolithic revolutionary Marxist party.

Can it be asserted that there is a similar alignment of forces in our Communist Party, and that the same policy must be practised in it as was practised by the Bolsheviks in the parties of the Second International of the period before the war? Obviously not. It cannot, because it would signify a failure to understand the *difference in principle* between Social-Democracy, as the party of a *bloc* of proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, and the *monolithic* Communist Party of the revo-

lutionary proletariat. They (the Social-Democrats) had one underlying class basis for the party. We (the Communists) have an entirely different underlying basis. With them (the Social-Democrats) Centrism was a natural phenomenon, because the party of a bloc of heterogeneous interests cannot get along without Centrists, and the Bolsheviki were obliged to work for a split. With us (the Communists) Centrism is purposeless and incompatible with the Leninist Party principle, since the Communist Party is the *monolithic* party of the proletariat, and not the party of a bloc of heterogeneous class elements.

And since the prevailing force in our Party is the most Left of the trends in the world labour movement (the Leninists), a splitting policy in our Party has not and cannot have any justification from the standpoint of Leninism. (*A voice*: "Is a split possible in our Party, or not?") The point is not whether a split is possible; the point is that a splitting policy in our monolithic Leninist Party cannot be justified from the standpoint of Leninism.

Whoever fails to understand this difference in principle is going against Leninism and is breaking with Leninism.

That is why I think that only people who have taken leave of their senses and have lost every shred of Marxism can seriously assert that the policy of our Party, the policy of waging a fight on two fronts, is a Centrist policy.

Lenin always waged a fight on two fronts in our Party—both against the "Lefts" and against outright Menshevik deviations. Study Lenin's pamphlet, "*Left-*

*Wing*” *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, study the history of our Party, and you will realise that our Party grew and gained strength in a struggle against both deviations—the Right and the “Left.” The fight against the Otzovists and the “Left” Communists, on the one hand, and the fight against the openly opportunist deviation before, during and after the October Revolution, on the other hand—such were the phases that our Party passed through in its development. Everyone is familiar with the words of Lenin that we must wage a fight both against open opportunists and against “Left” doctrinaires.

Does this mean that Lenin was a Centrist, that he pursued a Centrist policy? It obviously does not.

That being the case, what do our Right and “Left” deviators represent?

As to the Right deviation, it is not, of course, the opportunism of the pre-war Social-Democrats. A deviation towards opportunism is not yet opportunism. We are familiar with the explanation Lenin gave of the concept of deviation. A deviation to the Right is something which has not yet taken the shape of opportunism and which can be corrected. Consequently, a deviation to the Right must not be identified with out-and-out opportunism.

As to the “Left” deviation, it is something diametrically opposite to what the extreme Lefts in the pre-war Second International, that is, the Bolsheviks, represented. Not only are the “Left” deviators not Lefts without quotation marks, they are essentially Right deviators, with the difference, however, that they unconsciously camouflage their true nature by means of “Left” phrases. It would be a crime against

the Party not to perceive the vast difference between the “Left” deviators and genuine Leninists, who are the *only* Lefts (without quotation marks) in our Party. (*A voice*: “What about the legalisation of deviations?”) If waging an open fight against deviations is legalisation, then it must be confessed that Lenin “legalised” them long ago.

These deviators, both Rights and “Lefts,” are recruited from the most diverse elements of the non-proletarian strata, elements who reflect the pressure of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces on the Party and the degeneration of certain sections of the Party. Former members of other parties; people in the Party with Trotskyist trends; remnants of former groups in the Party; Party members in the state, economic, co-operative and trade-union apparatuses who are becoming (or have become) bureaucratised and are linking themselves with the outright bourgeois elements in these apparatuses; well-to-do Party members in our rural organisations who are merging with the kulaks, and so on and so forth—such is the nutritive medium for deviations from the Leninist line. It is obvious that these elements are incapable of absorbing anything genuinely Left and Leninist. They are only capable of nourishing the openly opportunist deviation, or the so-called “Left” deviation, which masks its opportunism with Left phrases.

That is why a fight on two fronts is the only correct policy for the Party.

Further. Are the theses correct in saying that our *chief method* of fighting the Right deviation should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle? I think they



are. It would be well to recall the experience of the fight against Trotskyism. With what did we begin the fight against Trotskyism? Was it, perhaps, with organisational penalties? Of course not! We began it with an ideological struggle. We waged it from 1918 to 1925. Already in 1924 our Party and the Fifth Congress of the Comintern passed a resolution on Trotskyism defining it as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Nevertheless, Trotsky continued to be a member of our Central Committee and Political Bureau. Is that a fact, or not? It is a fact. Consequently, we "tolerated" Trotsky and the Trotskyists on the Central Committee. Why did we allow them to remain in leading Party bodies? Because at that time the Trotskyists, despite their disagreements with the Party, obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organisational penalties at all extensively? Only after the Trotskyists had organised themselves into a faction, set up their factional centre, turned their faction into a new party and began to summon people to anti-Soviet demonstrations.

I think that we must pursue the same course in the fight against the Right deviation. The Right deviation cannot as yet be regarded as something which has taken definite shape and crystallised, although it is gaining ground in the Party. It is only in process of taking shape and crystallising. Do the Right deviators have a faction? I do not think so. Can it be said that they do not submit to the decisions of our Party? I think we have no grounds yet for accusing them of this. Can it be affirmed that the Right deviators will certainly organise themselves into a faction? I doubt it. Hence the conclu-

sion that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at this stage* should be that of a full-scale ideological struggle. This is all the more correct as there is an opposite tendency among some of the members of our Party—a tendency to begin the fight against the Right deviation not with an ideological struggle, but with organisational penalties. They say bluntly: Give us ten or twenty of these Rights and we'll make mincemeat of them in a trice and so put an end to the Right deviation. I think, comrades, that such sentiments are wrong and dangerous. Precisely in order to avoid being carried away by such sentiments, and in order to put the fight against the Right deviation on correct lines, it must be said plainly and resolutely that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation *at this stage* is an ideological struggle.

Does that mean that we rule out all organisational penalties? No, it does not. But it does undoubtedly mean that organisational penalties must play a subordinate role, and if there are no instances of infringement of Party decisions by Right deviators, we must not expel them from leading organisations or institutions. (*A voice*: “What about the Moscow experience?”)

I do not think that there were any Rights among the leading Moscow comrades. There was in Moscow an incorrect attitude towards Right sentiments. More accurately, it could be said that there was a conciliatory tendency there. But I cannot say that there was a Right deviation in the Moscow Committee. (*A voice*: “But was there an organisational struggle?”)

There was an organisational struggle, although it played a minor role. There was such a struggle because new elections are being held in Moscow on the basis of

self-criticism, and district meetings of actives have the right to replace their secretaries. (*Laughter.*) (*A voice:* "Were new elections of our secretaries announced?") Nobody has forbidden new elections of secretaries. There is the June appeal of the Central Committee, which expressly says that development of self-criticism may become an empty phrase if the lower organisations are not assured the right to replace any secretary, or any committee. What objection can you raise to such an appeal? (*A voice:* "Before the Party Conference?") Yes, even before the Party Conference.

I see an incredulous smile on the faces of some comrades. That will not do, comrades. I see that some of you have an irrepressible desire to remove certain spokesmen of the Right deviation from their posts as quickly as possible. But that, dear comrades, is no solution of the problem. Of course, it is easier to remove people from their posts than to conduct a broad and intelligent campaign explaining the Right deviation, the Right danger, and how to combat it. But what is easiest must not be considered the best. Be so good as to organise a broad explanatory campaign against the Right danger, be so good as not to grudge the time for it, and then you will see that the broader and deeper the campaign, the worse it will be for the Right deviation. That is why I think that the central point of our fight against the Right deviation must be an ideological struggle.

As to the Moscow Committee, I do not know that anything can be added to what Uglanov said in his reply to the discussion at the plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). He said plainly:

"If we recall a little history, if we recall how I fought Zinoviev in Leningrad in 1921, it will be seen that at that time the 'affray' was somewhat fiercer. We were the victors then because we were in the right. We have been beaten now because we are in the wrong. It will be a good lesson."

It follows that Uglanov has been waging a fight now just as at one time he waged a fight against Zinoviev. Against whom, may it be asked, has he been waging his present fight? Evidently, against the policy of the C.C. Against whom else could he have waged it? On what basis could he have waged this fight? Obviously, on the basis of conciliation towards the Right deviation.

The theses, therefore, quite rightly stress, as one of the immediate tasks of our Party, the necessity of waging a fight against conciliation towards deviations from the Leninist line, especially against conciliation towards the Right deviation.

Finally, a last point. The theses say that we must particularly stress the necessity at this time of fighting the Right deviation. What does that mean? It means that at this moment the Right danger is the chief danger in our Party. A fight against Trotskyist trends, and a concentrated fight at that, has been going on already for some ten years. This fight has resulted in the rout of the main Trotskyist cadres. It cannot be said that the fight against the openly opportunist trend has been waged of late with equal intensity. It has not been waged with special intensity because the Right deviation is still in a period of formation and crystallisation, growing and gaining strength because of the strengthening of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, which have been fostered

by our grain procurement difficulties. The chief blow must therefore be aimed at the Right deviation.

In conclusion, I should like, comrades, to mention one more fact, which has not been mentioned here and which, in my opinion, is of no little significance. We, the members of the Political Bureau, have laid before you our theses on the control figures. In my speech, I upheld these theses as unquestionably correct. I do not say that certain corrections may not be made in the theses. But that they are in the main correct and assure the proper carrying out of the Leninist line, of that there can be no doubt whatever. Well, I must tell you that we in the Political Bureau adopted these theses unanimously. I think that this fact is of some significance in view of the rumours which are now and again spread in our ranks by diverse ill-wishers, opponents and enemies of our Party. I have in mind the rumours to the effect that in the Political Bureau we have a Right deviation, a "Left" deviation, conciliation and the devil knows what besides. Let these theses serve as one more proof, the hundredth or hundred and first, that we in the Political Bureau are all united.

I should like this plenum to adopt these theses, in principle, with equal unanimity. (*Applause.*)

*Pravda*, No. 273,  
November 24, 1928

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**TO THE WORKERS  
OF THE “KATUSHKA” FACTORY,  
TO THE WORKERS OF THE YARTSEVO  
FACTORY, SMOLENSK GUBERNIA<sup>59</sup>**

I hail your initiative in organising emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the election campaign to the Soviets.

Elections to the Soviets—the organs of the dictatorship of the working class—should be the vital concern of the workers themselves.

Your participation in the election campaign should not be confined to carrying out in proper, Bolshevik fashion the elections in your own town, the elections to the town Soviets.

A more difficult, but no less necessary, task is to take a direct part in the election campaign in the countryside. The outcome of the Soviet elections will largely depend on the extent to which the working class in the towns and the agricultural labourers and poor peasants in the countryside take part in the campaign, exert their influence on its progress, take the lead of the middle peasants, force the kulaks into the background, and thus assure the leadership of the working class in

the countryside. Therefore, the interchange of challenges to emulation that you have initiated in the press will be of great significance in rousing the workers for a wide participation in the election campaign.

I wish you success.

***J. Stalin***

*Pravda*, No. 274,  
November 25, 1928

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## TO THE WORKERS OF THE KRASNY PROFINTERN FACTORY, BEZHITSA

Fraternal greetings to the workers of the Krasny Profintern Factory. I congratulate you on accepting the challenge of the workers of the “Katushka” and Yartsevo factories. I wish you success in the Soviet election campaign. Please excuse me for not being able to pay a visit to your factory.

***J. Stalin***

November 29, 1928

*Pravda*, No. 278,  
November 30, 1928



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**ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY  
OF THE FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY  
OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS'  
RED ARMY**

Hearty congratulations to the Frunze Military Academy on its tenth anniversary.

I wish it success and continued progress.

***Stalin***

*Pravda*, No. 286  
December 9, 1928

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## THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY

*Speech Delivered  
at the Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.  
December 19, 1928*

Comrades, since Comrade Molotov has already stated here the views of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation, I have only to say a few words. I intend to touch upon three questions which came up in the course of the discussion, and that only lightly.

These questions are: the problem of the capitalist stabilisation, the problem of the class battles of the proletariat in connection with the growing shakiness of the stabilisation, and the problem of the German Communist Party.

I have to note with regret that on all these three questions both Humbert-Droz and Serra landed in the quagmire of craven opportunism. Humbert-Droz, it is true, has so far spoken only on formal questions. But I am referring to his speech on matters of principle at the meeting of the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., where the question of the Rights and the conciliators in the German Communist Party was discussed. I think that it is precisely this speech that forms the ideological basis of the position taken up at this meeting by the minority in the E.C.C.I. Presidium. Consequently, Humbert-Droz's speech on matters of principle at the meeting

of the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I. cannot be passed over in silence.

I said that Humbert-Droz and Serra have landed in the quagmire of craven opportunism. What does that mean? It means that, besides overt opportunism, there is also covert opportunism, which fears to show its true face. And this is precisely the opportunism of conciliation towards the Right deviation. Conciliation is craven opportunism. I must, I repeat, note with regret that both these comrades have landed in the quagmire of craven opportunism.

Permit me to demonstrate this by a few facts.

## I

### **THE PROBLEM OF THE CAPITALIST STABILISATION**

The Comintern holds that the present capitalist stabilisation is a temporary, insecure, shaky and decaying stabilisation which will become more and more shaken as the capitalist crisis develops.

This by no means contradicts the generally known fact that capitalist technology and rationalisation are advancing. More, it is just because they are advancing that the inherent unsoundness and decay of the stabilisation is developing.

Yet what did Humbert-Droz say in his speech in the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I.? He flatly denied the shakiness and insecurity of the stabilisation. He bluntly declared in his speech that "the Sixth World Congress virtually condemned the vague general formula that the stabilisation is unsound, shaky, etc." He

bluntly declared that the Sixth Congress thesis on the third period says nothing about the stabilisation being shaky. Can it be considered that Humbert-Droz is correct in making this assertion? No, it cannot. It cannot, because the Sixth Congress of the Comintern said the very opposite of what Humbert-Droz claimed in his speech. In the paragraph on the third period, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern plainly states that:

“this period (i.e., the third period—*J. St.*) inevitably leads, through the further development of the contradictions of the capitalist stabilisation, to a further shaking\* of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism.”<sup>60</sup>

Mark, “a further shaking of the stabilisation.”. . . What does that mean? It means that the stabilisation is already shaky and insecure, and that in the third period it will become further shaken. Yet Humbert-Droz permits himself to scoff at all, including the German Communist Party, who say that the stabilisation is shaky and decaying, who say that the present struggle of the working class is undermining and disintegrating the capitalist stabilisation. Whom is Humbert-Droz scoffing at? Obviously, at the decisions of the Sixth Congress.

It follows that, under the guise of upholding the decisions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Humbert-Droz is actually *revising* them, and is thereby sliding into an opportunist conception of the stabilisation.

So much for the formal side of the matter.

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

Let us now examine the substance of the matter. If it cannot be said that the present stabilisation is shaky, or unsound, or insecure, then, after all, what is it? Only one thing remains, and that is to declare that the stabilisation is secure, and at any rate is growing firmer. But if we are faced by a capitalist stabilisation that is growing firmer, what can be meant by saying that the crisis of world capitalism is growing sharper and deeper? Is it not clear that this leaves no room for any deepening of the capitalist crisis? Is it not clear that Humbert-Droz has become entangled in his own contradictions?

Further. Lenin said that, under imperialism, the development of capitalism is a double process: a growth of capitalism in some countries, on the one hand, and a *decay* of capitalism in other countries, on the other hand. Is this thesis of Lenin's correct? And if it is correct, is it not clear that the capitalist stabilisation cannot be other than decaying?

Lastly, a few words about some generally known facts.

We have such facts as the desperate conflicts between imperialist groups for markets and fields of capital export.

We have such facts as the frenzied growth of armaments in the capitalist countries, the formation of new military alliances and the manifest preparations for new imperialist wars.

We have such facts as the growing acuteness of the contradictions between the two imperialist giants, America and Britain, each of which is trying to draw all other countries into its orbit.

We have, lastly, such facts as the existence of the Soviet Union and its progress and success in all fields

of development, in the economic field and in the cultural and political field—the Soviet Union, whose existence alone, not to speak of its progress, is shaking and disintegrating the very foundations of world capitalism.

How, after this, can Marxists, Leninists, Communists assert that the capitalist stabilisation is not shaky and decaying, that it is not being shaken by the very course of things from year to year and from day to day?

Does Humbert-Droz, and Serra with him, realise into what a quagmire they are landing?

From this error spring the other errors of Humbert-Droz and Serra.

## II

### THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS BATTLES OF THE PROLETARIAT

Just as erroneous is Humbert-Droz's opinion of the class battles of the proletariat in the capitalist countries, of their character and significance. It follows from Humbert-Droz's speech at the meeting of the Political Secretariat that the struggle of the working class, its spontaneous clashes with the capitalists, are in the main only of a defensive character, and that the leadership of this struggle on the part of the Communist Parties should be carried out only within the framework of the existing reformist trade unions.

Is that right? No, it is wrong. To assert that means to drag in the wake of events. Humbert-Droz forgets that the struggle of the working class is now taking place on the basis of a stabilisation that is *becoming shaken*, that the battles of the working class not

infrequently bear the character of counter-battles, of a counter-offensive and a direct offensive against the capitalists. Humbert-Droz fails to see anything new in the battles of the working class in the recent period. He fails to see such things as the Lodz general strike, the economic strikes for better conditions of labour in France, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the mighty mobilisation of the proletarian forces in Germany in the fights against the lock-out of the metalworkers, and so on and so forth.

What do these and similar facts show, what do they indicate? That deep within the capitalist countries the pre-conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge of the working-class movement are ripening. And that is the new element which Humbert-Droz and Serra fail to see, fail to observe, and which never will be observed at all by comrades who have become accustomed to looking backward instead of forward.

And what does looking backward instead of forward mean? It means dragging in the wake of events, failing to see what is new in developments, and being caught by surprise. It means renouncing the leading role of the Communist Parties in the working-class movement. That was precisely what caused the German Communist Party leadership to come to grief in the 1923 revolution. Consequently, he who does not want to repeat the mistakes of 1923 must rouse the minds of the Communists and urge them onward, must prepare the masses for the coming battles, must take every measure to ensure that the Communist Parties are not left behind in the wake of events and that the working class is not caught by surprise.

It is extremely strange that Humbert-Droz and Serra forget these things.

At the time of the Ruhr battles the German Communists noted the fact that the unorganised workers proved to be more revolutionary than the organised workers. Humbert-Droz is outraged by this and declares that it could not have been so. Strange! Why could it not have been so? There are about a million workers in the Ruhr. Of them, about two hundred thousand are organised in trade unions. The trade unions are directed by reformist bureaucrats who are connected in all manner of ways with the capitalist class. Why is it surprising, then, that the unorganised workers proved to be more revolutionary than the organised? Could it indeed have been otherwise?

I might tell you of even more "surprising" facts from the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia. With us, it happened not infrequently that the masses proved to be more revolutionary than (some of) their communist leaders. That is well known to all the Russian Bolsheviki. It was this that Lenin had in mind when he said that we must not only teach the masses, but also *learn from the masses*. What is surprising is not these facts, but that Humbert-Droz does not understand such simple things taken from the sphere of practical revolutionary experience.

The same must be said of Serra. He does not approve of the fact that the German Communists, in their struggle to organise the locked-out metalworkers, went beyond the framework of the existing trade unions and shook this framework. He regards this as an infringement of the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the



Profintern.<sup>61</sup> He claims that the Profintern called upon Communists to work only within the trade unions. That is nonsense, comrades! The Profintern did not call for anything of the kind. To say that is to condemn the Communist Party to the role of a passive observer of the class battles of the proletariat. To say that is to bury the idea of the leading role of the Communist Party in the working-class movement.

The merit of the German Communists is precisely that they did not allow themselves to be scared by talk about “the framework of the trade unions” and went beyond this framework by organising the struggle of the non-organised workers against the will of the trade-union bureaucrats. The merit of the German Communists is precisely that they sought for and found new forms of struggle and organisation of the unorganised workers. It is possible that in doing so they committed a number of trifling errors. But no new undertaking is ever free from errors. From the fact that we must work within the reformist trade unions—provided only that they are mass organisations—it does not at all follow that we must *confine* our mass work to work within the reformist trade unions, that we must become slaves of the standards and demands of those unions. If the reformist leadership is identifying itself with capitalism (see the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern and the Fourth Congress of the Profintern), while the working class is waging a struggle against capitalism, can it be affirmed that the struggle of the working class, led by the Communist Party, can avoid breaking to some extent the existing reformist framework of the trade unions? Obviously, this cannot be affirmed

without landing into opportunism. Therefore, a situation is quite conceivable in which it may be necessary to create parallel mass associations of the working class, against the will of the trade-union bosses who have sold themselves to the capitalists. We already have such a situation in America. It is quite possible that things are moving in the same direction in Germany too.

### III THE PROBLEM OF THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Is the German Communist Party to be or not to be organised and united, with an iron internal discipline?—that is the question, comrades. It is a question not only of the Rights or of the conciliators, but of the very existence of the German Communist Party. There is a German Communist Party. But alongside and within the German Communist Party there are two forces which are disintegrating the Party from within and creating a threat to its existence. They are, firstly, the Right faction, who are organising within the Communist Party a new, anti-Leninist party, with its own centre and its own press organs, and who day after day are violating its discipline. They are, secondly, a group of conciliators whose vacillations are strengthening the Right faction.

I shall not stop to show that the Right faction is breaking with Marxism-Leninism and waging a desperate struggle against the Comintern. That was shown long ago. Nor shall I stop to show that the group of conciliators are violating the Sixth Congress resolution on waging a systematic fight against the Rights.

That, too, was shown long ago. The point now is that this situation in the German Communist Party cannot be tolerated any longer. The point is that to tolerate any longer an "order" of things in which the Rights poison the atmosphere with Social-Democratic ideological rubbish and systematically violate the elementary principles of Party discipline, while the conciliators bring grist to the mill of the Rights, would be to go against the Comintern and to violate the elementary demands of Marxism-Leninism.

A situation has arisen similar to (if not worse than) the one which existed in the C.P.S.U.(B.) in the last phase of the struggle against Trotskyism, when the Party and the Comintern were obliged to expel the Trotskyists from their ranks. Everybody sees that now. But Humbert-Droz and Serra do not see it, or pretend not to see it. That means that they are prepared to support both the Rights and the conciliators, even at the cost of the complete disintegration of the German Communist Party.

In opposing the expulsion of the Rights, Humbert-Droz and Serra refer to the resolution of the Sixth Congress which says that Right deviations must be overcome by means of an ideological struggle. That is perfectly true. But these comrades forget that the resolutions of the Sixth Congress by no means limit the struggle of the Communist Parties against the Right danger to measures of an ideological order. While speaking of methods of ideological struggle against deviations from the Leninist line, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, in its resolution on Bukharin's report, at the same time declared that:

“far from precluding, this presumes the *utmost strengthening of iron inner-Party discipline, unqualified subordination of the minority to the majority, unqualified subordination of the lower bodies, as well as of other Party organisations (groups in parliament, groups in trade unions, the press, etc.) to the leading Party centres.*”<sup>\*62</sup>

It is extremely strange that Humbert-Droz and Serra forget this thesis of the resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. It is extremely strange that all conciliators, both those who consider themselves conciliators and those who repudiate the name, when pleading the Sixth Congress resolution systematically forget this important thesis of the Communist International.

What is to be done if, instead of the utmost strengthening of iron inner-Party discipline, we have in the German Communist Party glaring instances of the most unceremonious violation of all discipline both by the Rights and, to some extent, by some of the conciliators? Can such a situation be tolerated any longer?

What is to be done if, instead of unqualified subordination of the lower bodies, groups in trade unions and certain organs of the Party press to the leading Party centre, we have in the German Communist Party glaring instances of the grossest violation of this demand of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern by the Rights and, to a certain extent, by some of the conciliators?

Can such a situation be tolerated any longer?

You are familiar with the conditions for admission to the Comintern endorsed by the Second Congress.<sup>63</sup> I am referring to the twenty-one points. The first point

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<sup>\*</sup> My italics.—*J. St.*

of these conditions says that "the periodical and non-periodical press and all Party publishing houses must be *completely subordinated to the Central Committee of the Party*,"\* irrespective of whether at the given moment the Party as a whole is legal or illegal." You know that the Right faction have two press organs at their disposal. You know that those press organs refuse even to hear of any subordination to the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. The question arises, can such a scandalous state of affairs be tolerated any longer?

The 12th point of the twenty-one conditions says that the Party must be "organised on the most centralised lines," that within it must "*prevail iron discipline bordering upon military discipline*."\* You know that the Rights in the German Communist Party refuse to recognise iron discipline, or any discipline whatever, except their own, factional discipline. The question arises, can this scandalous state of affairs be tolerated any longer?

Or perhaps you will say that the conditions endorsed by the Second Congress of the Comintern are not binding on the Rights?

Humbert-Droz and Serra raise an outcry here about imaginary violators of decisions of the Communist International. At the present time, in the shape of the Rights we have real (not imaginary) violators of the fundamental principles of the Communist International. Why, then, do they keep silent? Is it not because they want, under the guise of a verbal defence of Comintern decisions, to smuggle through a defence of the Rights and a revision of these decisions?

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\* My italics.—*J. St.*

Particularly interesting is Serra's statement. He vows and swears that he is against the Rights, against the conciliators, and so forth. But what conclusion does he draw from this? Is it, do you think, the necessity of fighting the Rights and the conciliators? Nothing of the kind! He draws from this the extremely strange conclusion that it is necessary, in his opinion, to reorganise the existing Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party.

Just think! The Political Bureau of the C.C. of the German Communist Party is waging a determined struggle against the Right danger and against the vacillations of the conciliators; Serra is in favour of a fight against the Rights and the conciliators; *therefore*, Serra proposes that the Rights and the conciliators should be left alone, that the fight against the Rights and the conciliators should be relaxed, and that the composition of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the German Communist Party should be altered in a conciliatory direction. What a "conclusion"!

Serra will pardon me if I say here without mincing words that his position on this question is reminiscent of that of a provincial pettifogger who tries to make out that white is black, and black white. It is what we call a pettifogging defence of opportunist elements.

Serra proposes that the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the German Communist Party should be reorganised, that is, that some members should be removed from it and others put in, that they should be replaced by others. Why does not Serra say bluntly and frankly—replaced by whom? (*Serra*: "By those whom the Sixth Congress of the Comintern wanted.") But the Sixth Con-

gress certainly did not suggest rehabilitating conciliators. On the contrary, it charged us with waging a systematic fight against conciliation. And precisely because this obligation has not been carried out by the conciliators, we have now, after the Sixth Congress, the decision of the E.C.C.I. Presidium of October 6, 1928, on the Rights and the conciliators. Serra wants to assume the role of sole interpreter of the decisions of the Sixth Congress. That claim of Serra's is entirely unwarranted. The interpreter of the decisions of the Sixth Congress is the Executive Committee of the Comintern and its Presidium. I see that Serra does not agree with the decision of the E.C.C.I. Presidium of October 6, although he has not said so plainly.

What is the conclusion? There is only one conclusion: the position of Humbert-Droz and Serra on the question of the German Communist Party is one of craven, pettifogging defence of the Rights against the German Communist Party and the Comintern.

#### IV THE RIGHTS IN THE C.P.G. AND IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

I learned today from some of the speeches made here that some of the German conciliators plead in their justification the speech I made at the November plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)\* on the methods of combating Right elements. As you know, I said in my speech (it has been published) that *at this stage* of development

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\* See pp. 255-302 in this volume.—Ed.

of the fight against the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) the chief method of struggle is the ideological struggle, which does not exclude the application of organisational penalties in individual cases. I based this thesis on the fact that the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) had not yet crystallised, did not yet represent a group or a faction, and had not yet provided a single instance of violation or non-fulfilment of decisions of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). I stated in my speech that if the Rights were to pass to a factional struggle and begin to violate decisions of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), they would be treated in the same way as the Trotskyists were treated in 1927. That is clear, one would think. Is it not then stupid to refer to my speech as an argument in favour of the Rights in *Germany*, where the Rights *have already passed* to factional methods of struggle and systematically violate decisions of the C.C., C.P.G., or as an argument in favour of the conciliators in *Germany*, who have not yet broken, and are apparently unwilling to break, with the Right *faction*? I think that nothing more stupid than such a plea can be imagined. Only people who have abandoned all logic can fail to understand the vast difference between the position of the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the position of the Rights in the C.P.G.

In point of fact, the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) do not yet constitute a faction, and it is indisputable that they are loyally carrying out the decisions of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The Rights in Germany, on the contrary, already have a faction, headed by a factional centre, and systematically trample underfoot decisions of the C.C., C.P.G. Is it not obvious that *at this moment*



the methods of fighting the Rights cannot be the same in these two parties?

Further. Here in the U.S.S.R. Social-Democracy does not exist as an organised and serious force capable of fostering and stimulating the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.). In Germany, on the contrary, there is alongside the Communist Party the stronger and fairly firmly organised Social-Democratic Party, which fosters the Right deviation in the German Communist Party and objectively converts this deviation into its agency. Is it not obvious that one must be blind not to perceive the vast difference between the situations in the U.S.S.R. and in Germany?

Lastly, there is one other circumstance. Our Party grew and gained strength in fierce battles against the Mensheviks; moreover, for a number of years those battles took the form of direct civil war against them. Do not forget that in the October Revolution we Bolsheviki overthrew the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, as being the Left wing of the counter-revolutionary imperialist bourgeoisie. This, incidently, explains why nowhere, in no other Communist Party in the world, is the tradition of struggle against open opportunism so strong as it is in the C.P.S.U.(B.). We have only to recall the Moscow organisation, especially the Moscow Committee, where there were instances of conciliatory vacillation; we have only to recall how the working-class Party members in Moscow at a single stroke straightened out the line of the Moscow Committee in a couple of months—we have only to recall all this to realise how strong in our Party is the tradition of struggle against open opportunism.

Call the same thing be said of the German Communist Party? You will no doubt agree with me that, unfortunately, it cannot. More than that, we cannot deny that the Communist Party in Germany is still far from having rid itself of Social-Democratic traditions, which foster the Right danger in the C.P.G.

There you have the conditions in Germany and the conditions in the U.S.S.R., and they show that the difference in conditions dictates different methods of fighting the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the C.P.G.

Only people devoid of an elementary Marxist perception can fail to understand this simple thing.

In the commission which drafted the resolution<sup>64</sup> of the November Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), a group of comrades proposed that the basic provisions of the resolution should be extended to other sections of the Comintern, including the German section. We rejected this proposal, declaring that the conditions of struggle against the Right danger in the C.P.G. differed cardinally from those in the C.P.S.U.(B.).

## V

### THE DRAFTS FOR THE OPEN AND CLOSED LETTERS

A couple of words regarding the draft resolutions submitted by the E.C.C.I. commissions. Serra considers that these drafts bear the character of provincial resolutions. Why, one asks? Because, it appears, the draft of the open letter does not contain an analysis of the political situation which engenders the Right danger.

That is ridiculous, comrades. We have such an analysis in the decisions of the Sixth Congress. Is there any need to repeat it? I think that it should not be repeated. As a matter of fact, we might have confined ourselves to a brief resolution on the Rights, who systematically violate the decisions of the Sixth Congress and are therefore liable to expulsion, and on the conciliators, who are not waging a fight against the Rights and therefore deserve to be given a most serious warning.

If, however, we did not confine ourselves to a brief resolution, it was in order to explain to the workers the nature of the Right deviation, to show them the true face of the Brandlers and Thalheimers, to show them what they were in the past and what they are now, to show how long the Comintern has spared them in the hope of correcting them, how long the Communists have tolerated them in their midst, and why the presence of such people in the Comintern cannot be tolerated any longer.

That is why the draft resolution is longer than might have been expected at first glance.

Comrade Molotov has already said here that the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation associates itself with these draft resolutions. I can only repeat Comrade Molotov's statement.

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## REPLY TO KUSHTYSEV

Comrade Kushtysev,

I have received your letter of December 11, 1928.

Your question might at first sight appear to be correct. Actually, it will not stand the slightest criticism. It should be easy to understand that when Lenin says that "Soviet power plus electrification is communism," he does not mean by this that there will be any kind of political power under communism, nor does he mean that if we have seriously set about electrifying the country we have thereby already achieved communism.

What did Lenin mean to say when making this statement? In my opinion, all he meant to say was that Soviet power alone is not enough for the advance towards communism, that in order to advance towards communism the Soviet power must electrify the country and *transfer the entire national economy to large-scale production*, and that the Soviet power is prepared to take this course in order to arrive at communism. Lenin's dictum implies nothing more than the *readiness* of the Soviet power to advance towards communism through electrification.

We often say that our republic is a socialist one. Does this mean that we have already achieved socialism, done away with classes and abolished the state (for the

achievement of socialism implies the withering away of the state)? Or does it mean that classes, the state, and so on, will still exist under socialism? Obviously not. Are we entitled in that case to call our republic a socialist one? Of course, we are. From what standpoint? From the standpoint of our *determination* and our *readiness* to achieve socialism, to do away with classes, etc.

Perhaps, Comrade Kushtysev, you would agree to listen to Lenin's opinion on this point? If so, then listen:

"No one, I think, in considering the question of the economy of Russia has ever denied its transitional character. Nor, I think has any Communist denied that the term Socialist Soviet Republic signifies the determination of the Soviet power to achieve the transition to socialism, and not at all that the new economic order is a socialist order" (Vol. XXII, p. 513).

Clear, I think.

With communist greetings,

***J. Stalin***

December 28, 1928

Published for the first time

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## THEY HAVE SUNK TO NEW DEPTHS

The necessity of raising with the utmost sharpness the question of the Trotskyist underground organisation is dictated by all its recent activities, which compel the Party and the Soviet Government to adopt an attitude towards the Trotskyists *fundamentally different* from that of the Party towards them before the Fifteenth Congress.

The open demonstration of the Trotskyists in the streets on November 7, 1927, was a turning-point, when the Trotskyist organisation showed that *it was breaking not only with the Party, but also with the Soviet regime.*

This demonstration was preceded by a whole series of anti-Party and anti-Soviet acts: the forcible seizure of a government building for a meeting (the Moscow Higher Technical School), the organisation of underground printing plants, etc. However, prior to the Fifteenth Congress the Party still adopted measures with regard to the Trotskyist organisation testifying to the desire of the Party leadership to induce the Trotskyists to mend their ways, to induce them to admit their errors, to induce them to return to the Party path. For a number of years, beginning with the 1923 discussion, the Party patiently pursued this line—the line, chiefly, of an *ideological struggle*. And even at the Fifteenth Party Congress it was precisely such measures against the

Trotskyist organisation that were considered, notwithstanding the fact that the Trotskyists had “passed from disagreements over tactics to disagreements of a *programmatic* character, revising the views of Lenin and sinking to the position of Menshevism.” (Resolution of the Fifteenth Congress.)<sup>65</sup>

The year that has elapsed since the Fifteenth Congress has shown that the Fifteenth Congress was right in deciding to expel active Trotskyists from the Party. *In the course of 1928 the Trotskyists completed their conversion from an underground anti-Party group into an underground anti-Soviet organisation.* This was *the new element* which during 1928 compelled the Soviet authorities to adopt repressive measures against active members of this underground anti-Soviet organisation.

The organs of authority of the proletarian dictatorship cannot permit that in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat there should exist an underground anti-Soviet organisation which, although insignificant in membership, nevertheless has its printing plants and its committees, which is attempting to organise anti-Soviet strikes, and which is going to the length of preparing its followers for civil war against the organs of the proletarian dictatorship. But it is precisely to such depths that the Trotskyists have sunk—once a faction within the Party, they have now become an underground anti-Soviet organisation.

Naturally, all the anti-Soviet, Menshevik elements in the country are expressing their sympathy with the Trotskyists and are now grouping around them.

The struggle of the Trotskyists against the C.P.S.U.(B.) had its own logic, and this logic has

brought them into the anti-Soviet camp. Trotsky began by advising his followers in January 1928 to strike at the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), without setting themselves up against the U.S.S.R. However, the logic of the struggle brought Trotsky to a point at which his blows against the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), against the guiding force of the proletarian dictatorship, were inevitably directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat itself, against the U.S.S.R., against our entire Soviet society.

The Trotskyists have tried in every way to discredit the Party, which directs the country, and the organs of Soviet Government in the eyes of the working class. In his letter of instructions of October 21, 1928, which he sent abroad and which was published not only in the organ of the renegade Maslow, but also in whiteguard organs (*Rul*,<sup>66</sup> etc.), Trotsky makes the slanderous anti-Soviet allegation that the system existing in the U.S.S.R. is "Kerenskyism turned inside-out," calls for the organisation of strikes and the disruption of the collective agreement campaign, and in fact prepares his cadres for the possibility of another civil war.

Other Trotskyists say bluntly that in preparing for civil war "we must stop at nothing and not be deterred by any rules, written or unwritten."

The slanders against the Red Army and its leaders which the Trotskyists disseminate in the underground and foreign renegade press and, through it, in the whiteguard press abroad, show that the Trotskyists do not stop at directly inciting the international bourgeoisie against the Soviet state. The Red Army and its leaders are depicted in these documents as the army of a future



Bonapartist coup. Moreover, the Trotskyist organisation is trying, on the one hand, to split the Comintern sections, to disintegrate the ranks of the Comintern by creating its factions everywhere, and, on the other hand, is inciting against the U.S.S.R. the elements who as it is are hostile to the Soviet state.

The revolutionary phrases in the writings of the Trotskyists can no longer conceal the counter-revolutionary essence of the Trotskyist appeals. At the Tenth Party Congress, in connection with the Kronstadt mutiny, Lenin warned the Party that even "the whiteguards strive, and are able, to disguise themselves as Communists, and even as 'more Left' than the Communists, solely in order to weaken and overthrow the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia." Lenin at that time cited as an example the way in which the Mensheviks utilised the disagreements within the R.C.P.(B.) in order actually to egg on and support the Kronstadt mutineers, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the whiteguards, while pretending, in case the mutiny failed, to be supporters of the Soviet regime with only slight amendments.<sup>67</sup> The Trotskyist underground organisation has given full proof that it is the sort of camouflaged organisation that at the present time rallies around it all the elements hostile to the proletarian dictatorship. The Trotskyist organisation is in fact now fulfilling the same role as the Menshevik party once fulfilled in the U.S.S.R. in its struggle against the Soviet regime.

The *subversive* activities of the Trotskyist organisation demand that the Soviet authorities wage an implacable fight against this anti-Soviet organisation. This explains the measures taken recently by the OGPU

to liquidate this anti-Soviet organisation (arrests and deportations).

Apparently, by no means all Party members clearly realise that between the former Trotskyist Opposition within the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the present Trotskyist anti-Soviet underground organisation outside the C.P.S.U.(B.) *there is already an impassable gulf*. Yet it is high time to understand and appreciate this obvious truth. Hence the “liberal” attitude that certain Party members sometimes display towards active figures in the Trotskyist underground organisation is absolutely impermissible. All Party members must appreciate this. More, it must be explained to the whole country, to the broad strata of the workers and peasants, that the illegal Trotskyist organisation is an anti-Soviet organisation, an organisation hostile to the proletarian dictatorship.

Let those Trotskyists who have not yet fully committed themselves also ponder over this new situation created by their leaders and by the activities of the Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet organisation.

One or the other: either with the Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet organisation against the C.P.S.U.(B.) and against the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., or complete rupture with the Trotskyist anti-Soviet underground organisation and withdrawal of any kind of support of this organisation.

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## BUKHARIN'S GROUP AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY

*From Speeches Delivered at a Joint Meeting  
of the Political Bureau of the C.C.  
and the Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)  
at the End of January and the Beginning  
of February 1929*

*(Brief Record)*

Comrades, sad though it is, we have to record the fact that within our Party a separate Bukharin group has been formed, consisting of Bukharin, Tomsy and Rykov. The Party knew nothing of the existence of this group before—the Bukharinites carefully concealed its existence from the Party. But now the fact is known and evident.

This group, as is seen from their statement, has its own separate platform, which it counterposes to the Party's policy. It demands, firstly—in opposition to the existing policy of the Party—a slower rate of development of our industry, asserting that the present rate of industrial development is “fatal.” It demands, secondly—also in opposition to the policy of the Party—curtailment of the formation of state farms and collective farms, asserting that they do not and cannot play any serious part in the development of our agriculture. It demands, thirdly—also in opposition to the policy of the Party—the granting of full freedom to private trade and renunciation of the regulating function of the state in the sphere of trade, asserting that the regu-

lating function of the state renders the development of trade impossible.

In other words, Bukharin's group is a group of Right deviators and capitulators who advocate not the elimination, but the free development of the capitalist elements in town and country.

At the same time, Bukharin's group opposes the emergency measures against the kulaks and "excessive" taxation of the kulaks, and unceremoniously levels against the Party the accusation that, in applying such measures, it is in point of fact conducting a policy of "military and feudal exploitation of the peasantry." Bukharin needed this ludicrous accusation in order to take the kulaks under his protection, and in doing so he confused and lumped together the labouring peasants and the kulaks.

Bukharin's group demands that the Party radically change its policy along the lines of the group's platform. They declare further that if the Party's policy is not changed, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy will resign.

Such are the facts which have been established in the course of the discussion at this joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and the Presidium of the C.C.C.

It has been established, furthermore, that on the instructions of this group, Bukharin conducted secret negotiations with Kamenev with a view to forming a bloc of the Bukharinites and the Trotskyists against the Party and its Central Committee. Evidently, having no hope that their platform would carry the day in the Central Committee of our Party, the Bukharinites

thought it necessary to form such a bloc behind the back of the Party's Central Committee.

Were there disagreements between us before? There were. The first outbreak occurred prior to the July plenum of the C.C. (1928). The disagreements concerned these same questions: the rate of industrial development, the state farms and collective farms, full freedom for private trade, emergency measures against the kulaks. At the plenum, however, the matter ended with the adoption of a united and common resolution on all these questions. We all believed at that time that Bukharin and his followers had renounced their errors, and that the disagreements had been resolved by the adoption of a common resolution. This was the basis which gave rise to the statement on the unity of the Political Bureau and the absence of disagreements within it, which was signed by all the members of the Political Bureau (July 1928).

A second outbreak of disagreements among us occurred prior to the November plenum of the C.C. Bukharin's article, "Notes of an Economist," clearly indicated that all was not well in the Political Bureau, that one of the members of the Political Bureau at any rate was trying to revise or "correct" the C.C.'s line. At any rate we, the majority of the members of the Political Bureau, had no doubt that the "Notes of an Economist" was an eclectic anti-Party article, designed to slow down the rate of industrial development and to change our policy in the countryside along the lines of Frumkin's well-known letter. To this must be added the question of the resignation of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky. The fact is that at that time Rykov, Bukharin and Tom-

sky came to the commission which was drafting the resolution on the control figures and declared that they were resigning. However, in the course of the work of the commission on the control figures all disagreements were smoothed over in one way or another: the present rate of industrial development was preserved, the further development of state farms and collective farms was approved, maximum taxation of the kulaks was preserved, the regulating function of the state in the sphere of trade was also preserved, the ludicrous accusation that the Party was conducting a policy of "military and feudal exploitation of the peasantry" was repudiated amid the general laughter of the members of the commission, and the three withdrew their resignation. As a result, we had a common resolution on the control figures adopted by all the members of the Political Bureau. As a result, we had the Political Bureau's decision to the effect that all its members should declare both at the November plenum of the C.C. and outside it that the Political Bureau was united and that there were no disagreements within the Political Bureau.

Could we have known at that time that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomskey were voting for the joint resolution only for appearance's sake, that they were keeping their specific points of difference with the Party to themselves, that Bukharin and Tomskey would in reality practise what amounted to a refusal to work in the A.U.C.C.T.U., in the Comintern and on *Pravda*, that Kamenev had among his private papers a certain "memorandum" which makes it clear that we have within the C.C. a separate group with its own platform, a group

which is trying to form a bloc with the Trotskyists against the Party?

Obviously, we could not have known that.

It is now clear to all that disagreements exist and that they are serious. Bukharin is apparently envious of the laurels of Frumkin. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said in a letter to Shlyapnikov as far back as 1916 that Bukharin was "devilishly unstable in politics."<sup>68</sup> Now this instability has been communicated by Bukharin to the members of his group.

The principal misfortune of the Bukharinites is that they have a faith, a conviction that making things easier for the kulak and untying his hands is the way to solve our grain and all other difficulties. They think that if we make things easier for the kulak, if we do not restrict his exploiting tendencies, if we let him have his own way, and so on, the difficulties will disappear and the political state of the country will improve. It goes without saying that this naïve faith of the Bukharinites in the saving power of the kulak is such ludicrous nonsense as not even to be worth criticising. The Bukharinites' misfortune is that they do not understand the mechanics of the class struggle, do not understand that the kulak is an inveterate enemy of the working people, an inveterate enemy of our whole system. They do not understand that a policy of making things easier for the kulak and untying his hands would worsen the entire political state of the country, improve the chances of the capitalist elements in the country, lose us the poor peasants, demoralise the middle peasants, and bring about a rupture with the working class of our country. They do not understand that no untying of the hands of the

kulak is capable of easing our grain difficulties in any way, for the kulak will not voluntarily give us grain anyhow so long as there exists the policy of procurement prices and state regulation of the grain market—and we cannot abandon the policy of state regulation of trade if we do not want to undermine the Soviet system, the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bukharinites' misfortune is that they do not understand these simple and elementary things. That is apart from the fact that the policy of untying the hands of the capitalist elements is absolutely incompatible, theoretically and politically, with the principles of Lenin's policy and of Leninism.

That is all very well, comrades may say, but what is the way out, what must be done in connection with the appearance on the scene of Bukharin's group? As to the way out of the situation, the majority of the comrades have already expressed their opinion. The majority of the comrades demand that this meeting should be firm and categorically reject Bukharin's and Tomskey's resignation (Rykov has already withdrawn his). The majority of the comrades demand that this joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and Presidium of the C.C.C. should condemn the Right-opportunist, capitulatory platform of Bukharin, Tomskey and Rykov, that it should condemn the attempt of Bukharin and his group to form an anti-Party bloc with the Trotskyists. I fully subscribe to these proposals.

The Bukharinites disagree with this decision. They would like to be allowed freedom of factional grouping—in defiance of the Party Rules. They would like



to be allowed freedom to violate decisions of the Party and the C.C.—in defiance of the vital interests of the Party. On what grounds, it may be asked?

According to them, if rank-and-file Party members do not obey C.C. decisions, they must be punished with all the severity of Party law; but if so-called leaders, members of the Political Bureau, say, violate C.C. decisions, not only must they not be punished, they must simply not even be criticised, for criticism in such a case is qualified by them as “being put through the mill.”

Obviously, the Party cannot accept this false view. If we were to proclaim one law for the leaders and another for the “common people” in the Party, there would be nothing left either of the Party or of Party discipline.

They complain of “being put through the mill.” But the hollowness of this complaint is apparent. If Bukharin has the right to write such a crassly anti-Party article as the “Notes of an Economist,” then all the more have Party members the right to criticise such an article. If Bukharin and Tomsky allow themselves the right to violate a C.C. decision by stubbornly refusing to work in the posts entrusted to them, then all the more have Party members the right to criticise them for such conduct. If this is what they call “being put through the mill,” then let them explain what they understand by the slogan of self-criticism, inner-Party democracy, and so on.

It is said that Lenin would certainly have acted more mildly than the C.C. is now acting towards Tomsky and Bukharin. That is absolutely untrue. The situation

now is that two members of the Political Bureau systematically violate C.C. decisions, stubbornly refuse to remain in posts assigned to them by the Party, yet, instead of punishing them, the Central Committee of the Party has for two months already been trying to persuade them to remain in their posts. And—just recall—how did Lenin act in such cases? You surely remember that just for one small error committed by Tomsy, Comrade Lenin packed him off to Turkestan.

*Tomsy.* With Zinoviev's benevolent assistance, and partly yours.

*Stalin.* If what you mean to say is that Lenin could be persuaded to do anything of which he was not himself convinced, that can only arouse laughter. . . . Recall another fact, for example, the case of Shlyapnikov, whose expulsion from the C.C. Lenin recommended because he had criticised some draft decision of the Supreme Council of National Economy in the Party unit of that body.

Who can deny that Bukharin's and Tomsy's present crimes in grossly violating C.C. decisions and openly creating a new opportunist platform against the Party are far graver than were the offences of Tomsy and Shlyapnikov in the cases mentioned? Yet, not only is the Central Committee not demanding that either of them should be excluded from the C.C. or be assigned to somewhere in Turkestan, but it is confining itself to attempts to persuade them to remain in their posts, while at the same time, of course, exposing their non-Party, and at times downright anti-Party, line. What greater mildness do you want?

Would it not be truer to say that we, the C.C. majority, are treating the Bukharinites too liberally and tolerantly, and that we are thereby, perhaps, involuntarily encouraging their factional anti-Party “work”?

Has not the time come to stop this liberalism?

I recommend that the proposal of the majority of the members of this meeting be approved, and that we pass to the next business.

Published for the first time

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## REPLY TO BILL-BELOTSERKOVSKY

Comrade Bill-Belotserkovsky,

I am very late in replying. But better late than never.

1) I consider that to raise the question of "Rights" and "Lefts" in literature (and, hence, in the theatre also) is in itself incorrect. In our country today the concept "Right" or "Left" is a Party concept, properly speaking an inner-Party concept. "Rights" or "Lefts" are people who deviate to one side or the other from the purely Party line. It would therefore be strange to apply these concepts to such a *non*-Party and incomparably wider sphere as literature, the theatre, and so on. They might at a stretch be applied to some Party (communist) circle in the field of literature. Within such a circle there might be "Rights" and "Lefts." But to apply them to literature, at the present stage of its development, where there are trends of every description, even anti-Soviet and downright counter-revolutionary trends, would be turning all concepts topsy-turvy. It would be truer in the case of literature to use *class* terms, or even the terms "Soviet," "anti-Soviet," "revolutionary," "anti-revolutionary," etc.

2) It follows from this that I cannot regard "Golovanovism"<sup>69</sup> either as a "Right" or a "Left" danger—it lies outside the bounds of Party trends. "Golovanovism" is a phenomenon of an anti-Soviet order. It does not of course follow from this that Golovanov himself is incorrigible, that he cannot rid himself of his errors, that he has to be hounded and persecuted even when he is prepared to renounce his errors, that he must be forced in this way to leave the country.

Or take, for example, Bulgakov's "Flight," which likewise cannot be regarded as a manifestation either of a "Left" or a "Right" danger. "Flight" is the manifestation of an attempt to evoke pity, if not sympathy, for certain sections of the anti-Soviet émigrés—hence, an attempt to justify or semi-justify whiteguardism. In its present form, "Flight" is an anti-Soviet phenomenon.

However, I should have nothing against the staging of "Flight," if to his eight dreams Bulgakov were to add one or two others, where he depicted the inner social mainsprings of the civil war in the U.S.S.R., so that the audience might understand that all these Seraphims and all sorts of university lecturers, who are "honest" in their own way, were ejected from Russia not by the caprice of the Bolsheviks, but because (in spite of their "honesty") they were sitting on the necks of the people, that, in expelling these "honest" supporters of exploitation, the Bolsheviks were carrying out the will of the workers and peasants and were therefore acting quite rightly.

3) Why are Bulgakov's plays staged so often? Presumably because we have not enough of our *own* plays

suitable for staging. For lack of the genuine article, even "Days of the Turbins" is accepted instead. Of course, it is very easy to "criticise" and to demand the banning of non-proletarian literature. But what is easiest must not be considered the best. It is not a matter of banning but of step by step ousting the old and new non-proletarian trash from the stage by competing against it, by creating genuine, interesting, artistic Soviet plays capable of replacing it. Competition is a big and serious matter, because only in an atmosphere of competition can we arrive at the formation and crystallisation of our proletarian literature.

As to "Days of the Turbins" itself, it is not such a bad play, because it does more good than harm. Don't forget that the chief impression it leaves with the spectator is one that is favourable to the Bolsheviks: "If even such people as the Turbins are compelled to lay down their arms and submit to the will of the people because they realise that their cause is definitely lost, then the Bolsheviks must be invincible and there is nothing to be done about it." "Days of the Turbins" is a demonstration of the all-conquering power of Bolshevism.

Of course, the author is altogether "innocent" of this demonstration. But that is not our affair.

4) It is true that Comrade Svidersky very often commits the most incredible mistakes and distortions. But it is also true that the Repertory Committee in its work commits at least as many mistakes, though of an opposite nature. Recall "Crimson Island," "Conspiracy of the Equals" and the similar trash that for some

reason or other is so readily sanctioned for the really bourgeois Kamerny Theatre.

5) As to the “rumours” about “liberalism,” let us rather not talk about that—you would do better to leave “rumours” to the gossiping wives of Moscow traders.

*J. Stalin*

February 2, 1929

Published for the first time

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## TO THE WORKING MEN AND WOMEN OF THE KRASNY TREUGOLNIK FACTORY

Dear Comrades, Working Men and Women of Krasny Treugolnik, accept my friendly congratulations on the introduction of the seven-hour day at the Krasny Treugolnik factory.

Your brothers and sisters in the capitalist countries work ten, twelve and fourteen hours a day. We, the working men and women of our workers' and peasants' state, will from now on work seven hours a day.

Let it be known to all that the workers of the U.S.S.R. stand in the foremost ranks of the working-class of the world!

May our banner—the banner of the building of socialism—become the banner of the workers of all countries!

Accept my apologies for not being able to be present personally at your celebrations.

***J. Stalin***

February 2, 1929

*Leningradskaya Pravda*, No. 28,  
February 3, 1929



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**TELEGRAM TO THE RED ARMY MEN,  
COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL OFFICERS  
OF THE FIRST RED CAVALRY DIVISION,  
PROSKUROV<sup>70</sup>**

Fraternal greetings to the Red Army men, commanders and political officers of the First Red Cossack Regiment of the Red Cavalry Division. I wish you success in your work and victory over the enemies of the workers and peasants.

***Stalin***

February 22, 1929

Published for the first time

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## GREETINGS TO *SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNAYA* *GAZETA*

Greetings and best wishes to *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta*<sup>71</sup>! I wish it success in its work of investigating and elucidating questions of the development of agriculture on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Let us hope that it will become an organising centre of the active builders who are furthering the difficult work of the socialist reconstruction of our agriculture.

***J. Stalin***

*Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta*, No. 1,  
March 1, 1929

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## THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM

*Reply to Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk,  
and Others*

I have received your letters. They are similar to a number of letters on the same subject I have received from other comrades during the past few months. I have decided, however, to answer you particularly, because you put things more bluntly and thereby help the achievement of clarity. True, the answers you give in your letters to the questions raised are wrong, but that is another matter—of that we shall speak below.

Let us get down to business.

### 1. THE CONCEPT “NATION”

The Russian Marxists have long had their theory of the nation. According to this theory, a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of the common possession of four principal characteristics, namely: a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture. This theory, as we know, has received general recognition in our Party.

It is evident from your letters that you consider this theory inadequate. You therefore propose that the

four characteristics of a nation be supplemented by a fifth, namely, that a nation possesses its own, separate national state. You consider that there is not and cannot be a nation unless this fifth characteristic is present.

I think that the scheme you propose, with its new, fifth characteristic of the concept “nation,” is profoundly mistaken and cannot be justified either theoretically or in practice, politically.

According to your scheme, only such nations are to be recognised as nations as have their own state, separate from others, whereas all oppressed nations which have no independent statehood would have to be deleted from the category of nations; moreover, the struggle of oppressed nations against national oppression and the struggle of colonial peoples against imperialism would have to be excluded from the concept “national movement” and “national-liberation movement.”

More than that. According to your scheme we would have to assert:

a) that the Irish became a nation only after the formation of the “Irish Free State,” and that before that they did not constitute a nation;

b) that the Norwegians were not a nation before Norway’s secession from Sweden, and became a nation only after that secession;

c) that the Ukrainians were not a nation when the Ukraine formed part of tsarist Russia; that they became a nation only after they seceded from Soviet Russia under the Central Rada and Hetman Skoropadsky, but again ceased to be a nation after they united their Ukrainian Soviet Republic with the other Soviet Republics to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

A great many such examples could be cited.

Obviously, a scheme which leads to such absurd conclusions cannot be regarded as a scientific scheme.

In practice, politically, your scheme inevitably leads to the justification of national, imperialist oppression, whose exponents emphatically refuse to recognise as real nations oppressed and unequal nations which have no separate national state of their own, and consider that this circumstance gives them the right to oppress these nations.

That is apart from the fact that your scheme provides a justification for the bourgeois nationalists in our Soviet Republics who argue that the Soviet nations ceased to be nations when they agreed to unite their national Soviet Republics into a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

That is how matters stand with regard to “supplementing” and “amending” the Russian Marxist theory of the nation.

Only one thing remains, and that is to admit that the Russian Marxist theory of the nation is the only correct theory.

## **2. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS**

One of the grave mistakes you make is that you lump together all existing nations and fail to see any fundamental difference between them.

There are different kinds of nations. There are nations which developed in the epoch of rising capital-

ism, when the bourgeoisie, destroying feudalism and feudal disunity, gathered the parts of nations together and cemented them. These are the so-called "modern" nations.

You assert that nations arose and existed before capitalism. But how could nations have arisen and existed before capitalism, in the period of feudalism, when countries were split up into separate, independent principalities, which, far from being bound together by national ties, emphatically denied the necessity for such ties? Your erroneous assertions notwithstanding, there were no nations in the pre-capitalist period, nor could there be, because there were as yet no national markets and no economic or cultural national centres, and, consequently, there were none of the factors which put an end to the economic disunity of a given people and draw its hitherto disunited parts together into one national whole.

Of course, the elements of nationhood—language, territory, common culture, etc.—did not fall from the skies, but were being formed gradually, even in the pre-capitalist period. But these elements were in a rudimentary state and, at best, were only a potentiality, that is, they constituted the possibility of the formation of a nation in the future, given certain favourable conditions. The potentiality became a reality only in the period of rising capitalism, with its national market and its economic and cultural centres.

In this connection it would be well to recall the remarkable words of Lenin on the subject of the rise of nations, contained in his pamphlet *What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social-*

*Democrats*. Controverting the Narodnik Mikhailovsky, who derived the rise of nationalities and national unity from the development of gentile ties, Lenin says:

“And so, national ties are a continuation and generalisation of gentile ties! Mr. Mikhailovsky, evidently, borrows his ideas of the history of society from the fairy-tale that is taught to school-boys. The history of society—this copybook doctrine runs—is that first there was the family, that nucleus of all society . . . then the family grew into the tribe, and the tribe grew into the state. If Mr. Mikhailovsky solemnly repeats this childish nonsense, it only goes to show—apart from everything else—that he has not the slightest notion of the course even of Russian history. While one might speak of gentile life in ancient Rus, there can be no doubt that by the Middle Ages, the era of the Muscovite tsars, these gentile ties no longer existed, that is to say, the state was based not at all on gentile unions but on territorial unions: the landlords and the monasteries took their peasants from various localities, and the village communities thus formed were purely territorial unions. But one could hardly speak of national ties in the true sense of the word at that time: the state was divided into separate lands, sometimes even principalities, which preserved strong traces of former autonomy, peculiarities of administration, at times their own troops (the local boyars went to war at the head of their own companies), their own customs borders, and so forth. Only the modern period of Russian history (beginning approximately with the seventeenth century) is characterised by an actual merging of all such regions, lands and principalities into a single whole. This merging, most esteemed Mr. Mikhailovsky, was not brought about by gentile ties, nor even by their continuation and generalisation: it was brought about by the growth of exchange between regions, the gradual growth of commodity circulation and the concentration of the small local markets into a single, all-Russian market. Since the leaders and masters of this process were the merchant capitalists, the creation of these national ties was nothing but the creation of bourgeois ties” (see Vol. 1, pp. 72-73<sup>72</sup>).

That is how matters stand with regard to the rise of the so-called “modern” nations.

The bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties were throughout this period the chief leading force of such nations. Class peace within the nation for the sake of “national unity”; expansion of the territory of one’s own nation by seizure of the national territories of others; distrust and hatred of other nations, suppression of national minorities; a united front with imperialism—such is the ideological, social and political stock-in-trade of these nations.

Such nations must be qualified as bourgeois nations. Examples are the French, British, Italian, North-American and other similar nations. The Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Armenian, Georgian and other nations in Russia were likewise bourgeois nations before the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet system in our country.

Naturally, the fate of such nations is linked with the fate of capitalism; with the fall of capitalism, such nations must depart from the scene.

It is precisely such bourgeois nations that Stalin’s pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question* has in mind when it says that “a nation is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism,” that “the fate of a national movement, which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with the fate of the bourgeoisie,” that “the final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie,” and that “only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established.”<sup>73</sup>



That is how matters stand with regard to the bourgeois nations.

But there are other nations. These are the new, Soviet nations, which developed and took shape on the basis of the old, bourgeois nations after the overthrow of capitalism in Russia, after the elimination of the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties, after the establishment of the Soviet system.

The working class and its internationalist party are the force that cements these new nations and leads them. An alliance between the working class and the working peasantry within the nation for the elimination of the survivals of capitalism in order that socialism may be built triumphantly; abolition of the survivals of national oppression in order that the nations and national minorities may be equal and may develop freely; elimination of the survivals of nationalism in order that friendship may be knit between the peoples and internationalism firmly established; a united front with all oppressed and unequal nations in the struggle against the policy of annexation and wars of annexation, in the struggle against imperialism—such is the spiritual, and social and political complexion of these nations.

Such nations must be qualified as socialist nations.

These new nations arose and developed on the basis of old, bourgeois nations, as a result of the elimination of capitalism—by their radical transformation on socialist lines. Nobody can deny that the present socialist nations of the Soviet Union—the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Tatar, Bashkir, Uzbek, Kazakh, Azerbaijanian, Georgian, Armenian and other nations—

differ radically from the corresponding old, bourgeois nations of the old Russia both in class composition and spiritual complexion and in social and political interests and aspirations.

Such are the two types of nations known to history.

You do not agree with linking the fate of nations, in this case the old, bourgeois nations, with the fate of capitalism. You do not agree with the thesis that, with the elimination of capitalism, the old, bourgeois nations will be eliminated. But with what indeed could the fate of these nations be linked if not with the fate of capitalism? Is it so difficult to understand that when capitalism disappears, the bourgeois nations it gave rise to must also disappear? Surely, you do not think that the old, bourgeois nations can exist and develop under the Soviet system, under the dictatorship of the proletariat? That would be the last straw. . . .

You are afraid that the elimination of the nations existing under capitalism is tantamount to the elimination of nations in general, to the elimination of all nations. Why, on what grounds? Are you really unaware of the fact that, besides bourgeois nations, there are other nations, socialist nations, which are much more solidly united and capable of surviving than any bourgeois nation?

Your mistake lies precisely in the fact that you see no other nations except bourgeois nations, and, consequently, you have overlooked the whole epoch of formation of socialist nations in the Soviet Union, nations which arose on the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations.

The fact of the matter is that the elimination of the bourgeois nations signifies the elimination not of

nations in general, but only of the bourgeois nations. On the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations new, socialist nations are arising and developing, and they are far more solidly united than any bourgeois nation, because they are exempt from the irreconcilable class contradictions that corrode the bourgeois nations, and are far more representative of the whole people than any bourgeois nation.

### **3. THE FUTURE OF NATIONS AND OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES**

You commit a grave error in putting a sign of equality between the period of the victory of socialism in one country and the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, in asserting that the disappearance of national differences and national languages, the merging of nations and the formation of one common language, are possible and necessary not only with the victory of socialism on a world scale, but also with the victory of socialism in one country. Moreover, you confuse entirely different things: "the abolition of national oppression" with "the elimination of national differences," "the abolition of national state barriers" with "the dying away of nations," with "the merging of nations."

It must be pointed out that for Marxists to confuse these diverse concepts is absolutely impermissible. National oppression in our country was abolished long ago, but it by no means follows from this that national differences have disappeared and that nations in our country have been eliminated. National state barriers, together with frontier guards and customs, were

abolished in our country long ago, but it by no means follows from this that the nations have already become merged and that the national languages have disappeared, that these languages have been supplanted by some one language common to all our nations.

You are displeased with the speech I delivered at the Communist University of the Peoples of the East (1925),<sup>74</sup> in which I repudiated the thesis that with the victory of socialism *in one country*, in our country, for example, national languages will die away, that the nations will be merged, and in place of the national languages one common language will appear.

You consider that this statement of mine contradicts Lenin's well-known thesis that it is the aim of socialism not only to abolish the division of mankind into small states and every form of isolation of nations, not only to bring the nations closer together, but also to merge them.

You consider, further, that it also contradicts another of Lenin's theses, namely, that with the victory of socialism on a *world scale*, national differences and national languages will begin to die away, that after this victory national languages will begin to be supplanted by one common language.

That is quite wrong, comrades. It is a profound illusion.

I have already said that it is impermissible for Marxists to confuse and lump together such diverse phenomena as "the victory of socialism in one country" and "the victory of socialism on a world scale." It should not be forgotten that these diverse phenomena reflect two entirely different epochs, distinct from one another

not only in time (which is very important), but in their very nature.

National distrust, national isolation, national enmity and national conflicts are, of course, stimulated and fostered not by some “innate” sentiment of national animosity, but by the striving of imperialism to subjugate other nations and by the fear inspired in these nations by the menace of national enslavement. Undoubtedly, so long as world imperialism exists this striving and this fear will exist—and, consequently, national distrust, national isolation, national enmity and national conflicts will exist in the vast majority of countries. Can it be asserted that the victory of socialism and the abolition of imperialism in one country signify the abolition of imperialism and national oppression in the majority of countries? Obviously not. But it follows from this that the victory of socialism in one country, notwithstanding the fact that it seriously weakens world imperialism, does not and cannot create the conditions necessary for the merging of the nations and the national languages of the world into one integral whole.

The period of the victory of socialism on a world scale differs from the period of the victory of socialism in one country primarily in the fact that it will abolish imperialism *in all countries*, will abolish both the striving to subjugate other nations and the fear inspired by the menace of national enslavement, will radically undermine national distrust and national enmity, will unite the nations into one world socialist economic system, and will thus create the real conditions necessary for the gradual merging of all nations into one.

Such is the fundamental difference between these two periods.

But it follows from this that to confuse these two different periods and to lump them together is to commit an unpardonable mistake. Take the speech I delivered at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. There I said:

“Some people (Kautsky, for instance) talk of the creation of a single universal language and the dying away of all other languages in the period of socialism. I have little faith in this theory of a single, all-embracing language. Experience, at any rate, speaks against rather than for such a theory. Until now what has happened has been that the socialist revolution has not diminished but rather increased the number of languages; for, by stirring up the lowest sections of humanity and pushing them on to the political arena, it awakens to new life a number of hitherto unknown or little-known nationalities. Who could have imagined that the old, tsarist Russia consisted of not less than fifty nations and national groups? The October Revolution, however, by breaking the old chains and bringing a number of forgotten peoples and nationalities on to the scene, gave them new life and a new development.”<sup>75</sup>

From this passage it is evident that I was opposing people of the type of Kautsky, who always was and has remained a dilettante on the national question, who does not understand the mechanics of the development of nations and has no inkling of the colossal power of stability possessed by nations, who believes that the merging of nations is possible long before the victory of socialism, already under the bourgeois-democratic order, and who, servilely praising the assimilating “work” of the Germans in Bohemia, light-mindedly asserts that the Czechs are almost Germanised, that, as a nation, the Czechs have no future.

From this passage it is evident, further, that what I had in mind in my speech was not the period of the victory of socialism on a *world scale*, but exclusively the period of the victory of socialism in *one country*. And I affirmed (and continue to affirm) that the period of the victory of socialism in one country does not create the necessary conditions for the merging of nations and national languages, that, on the contrary, this period creates favourable conditions for the renaissance and flourishing of the nations that were formerly oppressed by tsarist imperialism and have now been liberated from national oppression by the Soviet revolution.

From this passage it is apparent, lastly, that you have overlooked the colossal difference between the two different historical periods, that, because of this, you have failed to understand the meaning of Stalin's speech and, as a result, have got lost in the wilderness of your own errors.

Let us pass to Lenin's theses on the dying away and merging of nations after the victory of socialism on a world scale.

Here is one of Lenin's theses, taken from his article, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," published in 1916, which, for some reason, is not quoted in full in your letters:

"The aim of socialism is not only to abolish the division of mankind into small states and all isolation of nations, not only to draw the nations together, but to merge them. . . . Just as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only by passing through a transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so mankind can arrive at the inevitable merging of nations only by passing through a transition period of complete

liberation of all the oppressed nations, i.e., of their freedom of secession" (see Vol. XIX, p. 40<sup>76</sup>).

And here is another thesis of Lenin's, which you likewise do not quote in full:

"As long as national and state differences exist among peoples and countries—and these differences will continue to exist for a very, very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world scale—the unity of international tactics of the communist working-class movement of all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the present moment), but such an application of the fundamental principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat) as would correctly modify these principles in certain particulars, correctly adapt and apply them to national and national-state differences" (Vol. XXV, p. 227).

It should be noted that this passage is from Lenin's pamphlet "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, published in 1920, that is, *after* the victory of the socialist revolution in one country, *after* the victory of socialism in our country.

From these passages it is evident that Lenin does not assign the process of the dying away of national differences and the merging of nations to the period of the victory of socialism in one country, but exclusively to the period *after* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on a world scale, that is, to the period of the victory of socialism in all countries, when the foundations of a world socialist economy have already been laid.

From these passages it is evident, further, that the attempt to assign the process of the dying away of national differences to the period of the victory of socialism



in one country, in our country, is qualified by Lenin as a "foolish dream."

From these passages it is evident, moreover, that Stalin was absolutely right when, in the speech he delivered at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, he denied that it was possible for national differences and national languages to die away in the period of the victory of socialism in one country, in our country, and that you were absolutely wrong in upholding something that is the direct opposite of Stalin's thesis.

From these passages it is evident, lastly, that, in confusing the two different periods of the victory of socialism, you failed to understand Lenin, distorted Lenin's line on the national question and, as a consequence, involuntarily headed for a rupture with Leninism.

It would be incorrect to think that after the defeat of world imperialism national differences will be abolished and national languages will die away immediately, at one stroke, by decree from above, so to speak. Nothing is more erroneous than this view. To attempt to bring about the merging of nations by decree from above, by compulsion, would be playing into the hands of the imperialists, it would spell disaster to the cause of the liberation of nations, and be fatal to the cause of organising co-operation and fraternity among nations. Such a policy would be tantamount to a policy of assimilation.

You know, of course, that the policy of assimilation is absolutely excluded from the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism, as being an anti-popular and counter-revolutionary policy, a fatal policy.

Furthermore, we know that nations and national languages possess an extraordinary stability and tremendous power of resistance to the policy of assimilation. The Turkish assimilators—the most brutal of all assimilators—mangled and mutilated the Balkan nations for hundreds of years, yet not only did they fail to destroy them, but in the end were forced to capitulate. The tsarist-Russian Russifiers and the German-Prussian Germanisers, who yielded little in brutality to the Turkish assimilators, rent and mangled the Polish nation for over a hundred years, just as the Persian and Turkish assimilators for hundreds of years rent and mangled and massacred the Armenian and Georgian nations, yet, far from destroying these nations, in the end they were also forced to capitulate.

All these circumstances must be taken into account in order correctly to forecast the probable course of events as regards the development of nations directly after the defeat of world imperialism.

It would be a mistake to think that the first stage of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat will mark the beginning of the dying away of nations and national languages, the beginning of the formation of one common language. On the contrary, the first stage, during which national oppression will be completely abolished, will be a stage marked by the growth and flourishing of the formerly oppressed nations and national languages, the consolidation of equality among nations, the elimination of mutual national distrust, and the establishment and strengthening of international ties among nations.

Only in the second stage of the period of the world

dictatorship of the proletariat, to the extent that a single world socialist economy is built up in place of the world capitalist economy—only in that stage will something in the nature of a common language begin to take shape; for only in that stage will the nations feel the need to have, in addition to their own national languages, a common international language—for convenience of intercourse and of economic, cultural and political co-operation. Consequently, in this stage, national languages and a common international language will exist side by side. It is possible that, at first, not one world economic centre will be formed, common to all nations and with one common language, but several zonal economic centres for separate groups of nations, with a separate common language for each group of nations, and that only later will these centres combine into one common world socialist economic centre, with one language common to all the nations.

In the next stage of the period of world dictatorship of the proletariat—when the world socialist system of economy becomes sufficiently consolidated and socialism becomes part and parcel of the life of the peoples, and when practice convinces the nations of the advantages of a common language over national languages—national differences and languages will begin to die away and make room for a world language, common to all nations.

Such, in my opinion, is the approximate picture of the future of nations, a picture of the development of the nations along the path to their merging in the future.

#### 4. THE POLICY OF THE PARTY ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

One of your mistakes is that you regard the national question not as a part of the general question of the social and political development of society, subordinated to this general question, but as something self-contained and constant, whose direction and character remain basically unchanged throughout the course of history. Hence you fail to see what every Marxist sees, namely, that the national question does not always have one and the same character, that the character and tasks of the national movement vary with the different periods in the development of the revolution.

Logically, it is this that explains the deplorable fact that you so lightly confuse and lump together diverse periods of development of the revolution, and fail to understand that the changes in the character and tasks of the revolution in the various stages of its development give rise to corresponding changes in the character and aims of the national question, that in conformity with this the Party's policy on the national question also changes, and that, consequently, the Party's policy on the national question in one period of development of the revolution cannot be violently severed from that period and arbitrarily transferred to another period.

The Russian Marxists have always started out from the proposition that the national question is a part of the general question of the development of the revolution, that at different stages of the revolution the national question has different aims, corresponding to the

character of the revolution at each given historical moment, and that the Party's policy on the national question changes in conformity with this.

In the period preceding the First World War, when history made a *bourgeois-democratic* revolution the task of the moment in Russia, the Russian Marxists linked the solution of the national question with the fate of the democratic revolution in Russia. Our Party held that the overthrow of tsarism, the elimination of the survivals of feudalism, and the complete democratisation of the country provided the best solution of the national question that was possible within the framework of capitalism.

Such was the policy of the Party in that period.

It is to this period that Lenin's well-known articles on the national question belong, including the article "Critical Remarks on the National Question" where Lenin says:

"... I assert that there is only one solution of the national question, in so far as one is possible at all in the capitalist world—and that solution is consistent democratism. In proof, I would cite, among others, Switzerland" (vol. XVII, p. 150<sup>77</sup>).

To this same period belongs Stalin's pamphlet, *Marxism and the National Question*, which among other things says:

"The final disappearance of a national movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only under the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even within the framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle to a minimum to undermine it at the root, to render it as harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country

should be democratised and the nations be given the opportunity of free development.”<sup>78</sup>

In the next period, the period of the First World War, when the prolonged war between the two imperialist coalitions undermined the might of world imperialism, when the crisis of the world capitalist system reached an extreme degree, when, alongside the working class of the “metropolitan countries,” the colonial and dependent countries also joined the movement for emancipation, when the national question grew into the national and colonial question, when the united front of the working class of the advanced capitalist countries and of the oppressed peoples of the colonies and dependent countries began to be a real force, when, consequently, the *socialist* revolution became the question of the moment, the Russian Marxists could no longer content themselves with the policy of the preceding period, and they found it necessary to link the solution of the national and colonial question with the fate of the socialist revolution.

The Party held that the overthrow of the power of capital and the organisation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the expulsion of the imperialist troops from the colonial and dependent countries and the securing of the right of these countries to secede and to form their own national states, the elimination of national enmity and nationalism and the strengthening of international ties between peoples, the organisation of a single socialist national economy and the establishment on this basis of fraternal co-operation among peoples, constituted the best solution of the national and colonial question under the given conditions.

Such was the policy of the Party in that period.

That period is still far from having entered into full force, for it has only just begun; but there is no doubt that it will yet have its decisive word to say. . . .

A question apart is the present period of development of the revolution in our country and the present policy of the Party.

It should be noted that so far our country has proved to be the *only* one ready to overthrow capitalism. And it really has overthrown capitalism and organised the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Consequently, we still have a long way to go to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat *on a world scale*, and still more to the victory of socialism *in all countries*.

It should be noted, further, that in putting an end to the rule of the bourgeoisie, which has long since abandoned its old democratic traditions, we, in passing, solved the problem of the "complete democratisation of the country," abolished the system of national oppression and established equality of nations in our country.

As we know, these measures proved to be the best way of eliminating nationalism and national enmity, and of establishing mutual confidence among the peoples.

It should be noted, lastly, that the abolition of national oppression led to the national revival of the formerly oppressed nations of our country, to the development of their national cultures, to the strengthening of friendly, international ties among the peoples of our country and to their mutual co-operation in the work of building socialism.

It should be borne in mind that these regenerated nations are not the old, bourgeois nations, led by the bourgeoisie, but new, socialist nations, which have arisen on the ruins of the old nations and are led by the internationalist party of the labouring masses.

In view of this, the Party considered it necessary to help the regenerated nations of our country to rise to their feet and attain their full stature, to revive and develop their national cultures, widely to develop schools, theatres and other cultural institutions functioning in the native languages, to nationalise—that is, to staff with members of the given nation—the Party, trade-union, co-operative, state and economic apparatuses, to train their own, national, Party and Soviet cadres, and to curb all elements—who are, indeed, few in number—that try to hinder this policy of the Party.

This means that the Party supports, and will continue to support, the development and flourishing of the national cultures of the peoples of our country, that it will encourage the strengthening of our new, socialist nations, that it takes this matter under its protection and guardianship against anti-Leninist elements of any kind.

It is apparent from your letters that you do not approve this policy of our Party. That is because, firstly, you confuse the new, socialist nations with the old, bourgeois nations and do not understand that the national cultures of our new, Soviet nations are in *content* socialist cultures. Secondly, it is because—you will excuse my bluntness—you have a very poor grasp of Leninism and are badly at sea on the national question.



Consider, by way of example, the following elementary matter. We all say that a cultural revolution is needed in our country. If we mean this seriously and are not merely indulging in idle chatter, then we must take at least the first step in this direction: namely, we must make primary education, and later secondary education, compulsory for all citizens of the country, irrespective of their nationality. It is obvious that without this no cultural development whatever, let alone the so-called cultural revolution, will be possible in our country. More, without this there will be neither any real progress of our industry and agriculture, nor any reliable defence of our country.

But how is this to be done, bearing in mind that the percentage of illiteracy in our country is still very high, that in a number of nations of our country there are 80-90 per cent of illiterates?

What is needed is to cover the country with an extensive network of schools functioning in the native languages, and to supply them with staffs of teachers who know the native languages.

What is needed is to nationalise—that is, to staff with members of the given nation—all the administrative apparatus, from Party and trade-union to state and economic.

What is needed is widely to develop the press, the theatre, the cinema and other cultural institutions functioning in the native languages.

Why in the native languages?—it may be asked. Because only in their native, national languages can the vast masses of the people be successful in cultural, political and economic development.

In view of all that has been said, I think it should not be so difficult to understand that Leninists cannot pursue any other policy on the national question than the one which is now being pursued in our country—provided, of course, they want to remain Leninists.

Is not that so?

Well, then let us leave it at that.

I think I have answered all your questions and doubts.

With communist greetings,

***J. Stalin***

March 18, 1929

Published for the first time



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## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> During his journey in Siberia, lasting from January 15 to February 6, 1928, J. V. Stalin visited the principal grain-growing regions. He attended a meeting of the Bureau of the Siberian Territorial Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in Novosibirsk, meetings of the bureaux of okrug committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and conferences of the actives of the Barnaul, Biisk. Rubtsovsk and Omsk okrug Party organisations, together with representatives of the Soviets and the procurement bodies. Thanks to the political and organisational measures carried out by J. V. Stalin, the Siberian Party organisations were able to ensure fulfilment of the grain procurement plan. p. 3
- <sup>2</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 51. p. 10
- <sup>3</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 465. p. 10
- <sup>4</sup> The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. The congress discussed the political and organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the Central Auditing Commission of the Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, and of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern; it also discussed the directives for the drawing up of a five-year plan for the development of the national economy and a report on work in the countryside; it heard the report of the congress commission on the question of the opposition and elected the central bodies of the Party. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. On December 12, the congress elected J. V. Stalin a member of the commission for drafting

the resolution on the report about the work of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The congress approved the political and organisational line of the Party's Central Committee and instructed it to continue to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to extend and strengthen the socialist sector in town and countryside and to steer a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national economy. The congress gave instructions for the drawing up of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. The congress passed a resolution calling for the fullest development of the collectivisation of agriculture, outlined a plan for the extension of collective farms and state farms and indicated the methods of fighting for the collectivisation of agriculture. The Fifteenth Congress has gone into the history of the Party as the Collectivisation of Agriculture Congress. In its decisions on the opposition, directed towards the liquidation of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, the congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 1927 to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and decided to expel from the Party all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II*, 1953, pp. 313-71.) p. 11

<sup>5</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II*, 1953, p. 355. p. 11

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- <sup>6</sup> This refers to the discussion forced upon the Party by the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc. A general Party discussion was proclaimed by the Central Committee in October 1927, two months before the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B). For the discussion, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, p. 442. p. 15
- <sup>7</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 362. p. 17
- <sup>8</sup> The joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), with participation of members of the Central Auditing Commission, was held on April 6-11, 1928. It discussed the grain procurements in the current year and the organisation of the grain procurement campaign in 1928-29, the report of a commission set up by the Political Bureau on practical measures for eliminating the shortcomings revealed by the Shakhty affair, and the plan of work of the Political Bureau and plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) for 1928. At a meeting of the plenum on April 10, J. V. Stalin spoke on the report of the Political Bureau commission and was elected to a commission set up for the final drafting of the resolution on the Shakhty affair and on the practical tasks of the fight against shortcomings in the work of economic construction. The plenum adopted a special resolution providing for the sending every year of members of the Central Committee and of the Presidium of the C.C.C. and other leading personnel to the localities in order to strengthen the fight against shortcomings in local work and to improve practical guidance by the central bodies. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 372-90) p. 30
- <sup>9</sup> This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary organisation of bourgeois experts in Shakhty and other Donbas areas which was discovered in the early part of 1928

For the Shakhty affair, see pp. 38, 57-68 in this volume, and *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1954, p. 454.  
p. 30

- 10 The *Bulletin of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection* was published periodically in *Pravda* from March 15, 1928, to November 28, 1933. Its object was to enlist the co-operation of the broad masses of the working people in the fight against bureaucracy.  
p. 35
- 11 *Komsomolskaya Pravda (Y.C.L. Truth)*—daily organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, published from May 24, 1925.  
p. 36
- 12 V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan for the Political Report at the Eleventh Party Congress (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24).  
p. 40
- 13 The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), held in Moscow, March 18-23, 1919, defined the Party's new policy towards the middle peasant—a policy of stable alliance with him—the principles of which were outlined by Lenin in his report on work in the countryside (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 175-96, and *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, *Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 361-67).  
p. 51
- 14 This refers to Circular No. 33, March 29, 1926, of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. on "Organisation of the Management of Industrial Establishments" and the accompanying "General Regulations on the Rights and Duties of Technical Directors of Factories in the Metallurgical and Electro-technical Industries."  
p. 62
- 15 The Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League was held in Moscow, May 5-16, 1928. It discussed the results and prospects of socialist construction and the tasks of communist education of the youth; reports of the Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission of the Y.C.L.;

the report of the Y.C.L. delegation in the Communist Youth International; work and education of the youth in connection with the five-year plan of development of the national economy; work of the Y.C.L. among children, and other questions. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the final sitting of the Congress on May 16. p. 70

- 16 This refers to the message of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) entitled "For the Socialist Reconstruction of the Countryside (Principal Tasks of Departments for Work in the Countryside)," addressed to the Central Committees of all the national Communist Parties, to the bureaux of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), and to the territorial, regional, gubernia, okrug and uyezd committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The message was signed by V. M. Molotov as Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and published in *Pravda*, No. 112, May 16, 1928. p. 79
- 17 In 1918, on the initiative of Y. M. Sverdlov, short-term agitation and propaganda courses were organised under the auspices of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In January 1919 they were renamed the School of Soviet Work. This school formed the basis of the Central School of Soviet and Party Work, instituted by decision of the Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.). In the latter half of 1919 the Central School was transformed into the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University. The tenth anniversary of the Sverdlov University was celebrated on May 28, 1928. p. 84
- 18 The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held in Moscow, December 18-31, 1925. J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of the Central Committee. The congress put as the central task of the Party the struggle for the socialist industrialisation of the country, as being the basis for building socialism in the U.S.S.R. In its resolutions, the congress stressed the importance of further strengthening the alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, while relying on the poor peasants in the struggle against the kulaks. The congress pointed to the necessity of supporting and furthering the development of agriculture by means of more efficient farming methods and



drawing an ever greater number of the peasant farms, through the co-operatives, into the channel of socialist construction. (For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-137. For the Fourteenth Congress, see *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course*, Moscow 1954, pp. 428-33.) p. 96

- 19 This refers to V. I. Lenin's report on "Five Years of the Russian Revolution and Prospects of the World Revolution" at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, held from November 5 to December 5, 1922 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed. Vol. 33, pp. 380-94). p. 98
- 20 This refers to V. I. Lenin's report on "The Tactics of the R.C.P." at the Third Congress of the Comintern, held from June 22 to July 12, 1921 (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 454-72). p. 100
- 21 This refers to the appeal of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) "To All Party Members, to All Workers," published in *Pravda*, No. 128, June 3, 1928. p. 103
- 22 V. I. Lenin, "Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 171). p. 105
- 23 See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, p. 425. p. 108
- 24 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 183. p. 111
- 25 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 139. p. 116
- 26 See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 193, 194, 196. p. 117

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- <sup>27</sup> The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held on November 20-28, 1927. At the morning sitting on November 23, J. V. Stalin spoke on "The Party and the Opposition" (see *Works*, Vol. 10, pp. 257-74). p. 118
- <sup>28</sup> These words from Dante's Divine Comedy were quoted by Marx as a motto in the preface to the first German edition of *Capital* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 410). p. 120
- <sup>29</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 315. p. 122
- <sup>30</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 372-80. p. 124
- <sup>31</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 352. p. 126
- <sup>32</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 355. p. 126
- <sup>33</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 342. p. 127
- <sup>34</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part I, 1953, pp. 447, 448. p. 132
- <sup>35</sup> K. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (see K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 228). p. 133
- <sup>36</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, p. 190. p. 134

- <sup>37</sup> See *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, p. 390.  
p. 137
- <sup>38</sup> *Birzhovka* (*Birzheviye Vedomosti*—*Stock Exchange News*)—a bourgeois newspaper founded in St. Petersburg in 1880. Its unscrupulousness and venality made its name a by-word. At the end of October 1917 it was shut down by the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.  
p. 142
- <sup>39</sup> The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), July 4-12, 1928, heard and took note of an information report on the questions to be discussed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and approved in principle the draft programme of the Comintern. It adopted resolutions on grain procurement policy in connection with the general economic situation, on the organisation of new (grain) state farms, and on improving the training of new experts. At the sittings on July 5, 9 and 11, J. V. Stalin delivered the speeches which are published in this volume. (For the resolutions of the plenum, see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 391-404.)  
p. 145
- <sup>40</sup> The draft programme of the Communist International, which had been discussed at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in July 1928, was drawn up by the Programme Commission appointed by the Fifth Congress of the Comintern (June-July 1924). J. V. Stalin was a member of the commission and directed the drafting of the programme. The draft, adopted by the Programme Commission of the E.C.C.I. on May 25, 1928 and approved by the July plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), formed the basis of the Programme of the Communist International endorsed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (July-September 1928). Regarding the draft programme, see pp. 211-13 in this volume.  
p. 147
- <sup>41</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 207-46.  
p. 153

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- <sup>42</sup> A Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Hungary on March 21, 1919. Its position from the very first was a very difficult one. The country was in the throes of a severe financial and food crisis, and had to contend with internal counter-revolution and with the Entente, which organised an economic blockade of Soviet Hungary and armed intervention. The Hungarian Social-Democrats who had joined the government of the Hungarian Republic conducted treasonable undermining activities in the rear and at the front, and negotiated with Entente agents for the overthrow of the Soviet power. In August 1919 the Hungarian revolution was crushed by the joint efforts of the internal counter-revolution and the forces of intervention. p. 154
- <sup>43</sup> This refers to the profound revolutionary crisis in Germany in the autumn of 1923, when, as the result of a powerful revolutionary movement, workers' governments were set up in Saxony and Thuringia and an armed uprising of the workers took place in Hamburg. However, the revolution of 1923 in Germany was defeated. p. 154
- <sup>44</sup> V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian Question" (see *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41). p. 156
- <sup>45</sup> See Draft Programme of the Communist International, Moscow and Leningrad, 1928, p. 52; see also V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 75-76, and Vol. 31, p. 27. p. 160
- <sup>46</sup> The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, July 17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities of the E.C.C.I. and reports of the Executive Committee of the Communist Youth International and of the International Control Commission, measures for combating the danger of imperialist wars, the programme of the Communist International, the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. and the situation in the C.P.S.U.(B.), and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. The congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contra-

dictions of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to a further shaking of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress defined the tasks of the Communist International springing from the new conditions of the working-class struggle. In its resolution on the situation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in the C.P.S.U.(B.), the congress took note of the achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and their importance in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international proletariat, and called upon the working people of the world to defend the Soviet Union. J. V. Stalin was elected to the Presidium of the congress, to the Programme Commission and to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International.

p. 164

- <sup>47</sup> See *Decisions and Resolutions of Congresses of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R.*, Moscow 1939, p. 225.

p. 173

- <sup>48</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 293.

p. 175

- <sup>49</sup> *Bednota (The Poor)*—a daily newspaper, organ of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), published in Moscow from March 1918 to January 1931.

p. 176

- <sup>50</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 212.

p. 183

- <sup>51</sup> *Krasnaya Gazeta (Red Newspaper)*—a daily newspaper published by the Leningrad Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies from January 1918 to February 1939.

p. 189

- <sup>52</sup> This refers to the local economic conferences. They were in existence in 1921-23 under the Executive Committees of the Soviets.

p. 194

- <sup>53</sup> *Nizhneye Povolzhye (Lower Volga)*—a monthly magazine published in Saratov by the Lower Volga Regional and Saratov

Gubernia Planning Commissions from 1924, and by the Saratov Gubernia and Territorial Planning Commission from 1926. From August 1932 to 1933 it was published by the Territorial Planning Commission in Stalingrad. p. 199

- 54 Khlebotsentr—the all-Russian central union of agricultural co-operatives for the production, processing and sale of cereals and oil-seed. It existed from 1926 to 1931. p. 203
- 55 Guild socialism—a Social-Democratic reformist trend profoundly hostile to Marxism which arose in Great Britain in the 1900's. It denies the class character of the state, rejects the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and preaches the uniting of workers, intellectuals and technicians into a federation of national industrial guilds and the conversion of the latter into organs of administration of industry within the framework of the bourgeois state. By rejecting revolutionary methods of struggle, guild socialism condemns the working class to passivity and complete subordination to the bourgeoisie. p. 213
- 56 This message was written by J. V. Stalin in connection with Defence Week, held in the Soviet Union on July 15-22, 1928. p. 228
- 57 The First All-Russian Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women was convened by the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) in Moscow, November 16-21, 1918, with the object of organising the political education of working women and peasant women and drawing them into active participation in socialist construction. The congress was attended by 1,147 delegates. On November 19 it was addressed by V. I. Lenin. (For the congress and its importance, see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 160-62, and J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 356-59.) p. 254
- 58 The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), together with members of the Central Control Commission and the Central Auditing Commission, was held on November

16-24, 1928. It examined the control figures of the national economy for 1928-29, and also the following questions: the first results and wider use of the seven-hour working day; the recruitment of workers into the Party and regulation of the Party's growth; a report of the North Caucasian Territorial Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on work in the countryside; and measures for the progress of agriculture. J. V. Stalin's speech, *Industrialisation of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, was delivered on November 19 in connection with the first item of the agenda. On November 20, J. V. Stalin was elected to the commission set up by the plenum to draft the resolution on the control figures of the national economy for 1928-29. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 405-28). p. 255

- 59 On November 21, 1928, a meeting was held at the "Katushka" garment factory, Smolensk, to discuss the organisation of emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the elections to the Soviets in the Smolensk Gubernia. At the meeting the workers resolved to ensure 100 per cent participation of the workers and members of their families in the elections to the Soviets, to arrange a pre-election interchange of challenges to emulation in the press, and to send a challenge to the workers of the Yartsevo textile factory and other factories in the Smolensk, Bryansk and Kaluga gubernias. The workers sent a letter to J. V. Stalin and M. I. Kalinin informing them of their election as honorary chairmen of the interchange in the press and requesting advice on the organisation of emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the elections to the Soviets. p. 303

- 60 See *Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Part 6. Theses, Resolutions, Decisions and Appeals*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1929, p. 57. p. 309

- 61 The Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern), was held in Moscow from March 17 to April 3,

1928. It discussed, among other questions: the results and immediate tasks of the international trade-union movement; young workers in the trade-union movement; the organisational question; measures to combat fascism and yellow trade unions; the trade-union movement in the colonies and semi-colonies. In its resolutions, the congress stressed that with the capitalist stabilisation becoming more and more shaken the class struggle was mounting and growing more acute, and that all the activities of the Profintern should be concentrated on winning the masses and leading their struggle against capital. The congress pointed out that the central task of the Profintern was to win over the reformist trade unions and to take the lead of strikes in spite of the resistance of the reformist leaders. In its resolution on organisational questions, the congress stressed that the revolutionary trade unions must carry on day-to-day work to draw the broad strata of the proletariat into the trade unions.

p. 314

<sup>62</sup> See *Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Part 6. Theses, Resolutions, Decisions and Appeals*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1929, p. 80.

p. 317

<sup>63</sup> This refers to the resolution on "Conditions for Admission to the Communist International" endorsed by the Second Congress of the Comintern on August 6, 1920. The theses of this resolution, which were discussed by a special commission and submitted to the congress, had been written by V. I. Lenin (see V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 181-87).

p. 317

<sup>64</sup> This refers to the resolution on "The Control Figures of the National Economy for 1928-29," which was drafted under the direction of J. V. Stalin by the commission set up by the November plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and which was adopted by the plenum on November 24, 1928. The concluding part of the plenum resolution pointed to the necessity of waging a fight on two fronts and defined the methods of fighting the Right danger, as the chief danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses*,



*Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 418-20). p. 323

- <sup>65</sup> For the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on "The Opposition," see *Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums*, Part II, 1953, pp. 368-70. p. 328

- <sup>66</sup> *Rul (Helm)*—a Cadet whiteguard émigré newspaper, published in Berlin from November 1920 to October 1931. p. 329

- <sup>67</sup> See V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft of the Resolution of the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on Party Unity," *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 217-19. p. 330

- <sup>68</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 35, p. 168. p. 336

- <sup>69</sup> "Golovanovism" manifested itself in attempts on the part of a certain section of the theatrical profession to transplant the old, bourgeois habits and methods of work to the Soviet theatre. In 1926-28 a group of actors of the Bolshoi Theatre, headed by orchestra conductor Golovanov, opposed the reform of the theatre's repertory in conformity with the higher standards and requirements of the broad strata of the working people and the tasks of socialist development. The group took up a hostile attitude to the general body of the theatre and refused to promote young talent. Measures taken by the Party for the reconstruction of the work of the Soviet theatres resulted in "Golovanovism" being overcome. p. 342

- <sup>70</sup> J. V. Stalin's telegram to the Red Army men, commanders and political officers of the First Red Cossack Regiment of the Red Cavalry Division, stationed at Proskurov, was sent on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Red Army. p. 346

- <sup>71</sup> *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta (Agricultural Newspaper)*—a daily newspaper, organ of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., published from March 1, 1929, to January 29,

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1930, when it was converted into the newspaper *Sotsialisticheskoye Zemledeliye* (*Socialist Agriculture*). p. 347

<sup>72</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 1, pp. 137-38. p. 352

<sup>73</sup> See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 313, 322. p. 353

<sup>74</sup> J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East" (see *Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 135-54). p. 357

<sup>75</sup> See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 7, p. 141. p. 359

<sup>76</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 135-36. p. 361

<sup>77</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Works*, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, p. 23. p. 366

<sup>78</sup> See J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 322-23. p. 367



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## BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE

(1928 - March 1929)

### 1928

- January 7* J. V. Stalin has a talk with S. M. Kirov, Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.).
- January 10* J. V. Stalin has a talk with the Chairman of the Tver Cotton Textile Trust on questions of the rationalisation of production.
- January 11* J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of Party and Soviet organs of the Bryansk Gubernia on the work of industry and on collective agreements.
- January 13* J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the Union of Agricultural Co-operatives, Khlebotsentr, Khleboprodukt and the People's Commissariat of Trade of the U.S.S.R.
- January 15* J. V. Stalin leaves for Siberia in connection with the unsatisfactory state of the grain procurements in that territory.
- January 18* J. V. Stalin attends a meeting in Novosibirsk of the Bureau of the Siberian Territorial Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) together with representatives of the grain procurement organisations.
- January 22* J. V. Stalin conducts a conference in Barnaul of the active of the Barnaul organisation of

the C.P.S.U.(B.) together with representatives of the Biisk and Rubtsovsk okrug Party organisations on the fulfilment of the grain procurement plan.

- January 23* At a meeting of the Bureau of the Rubtsovsk Okrug Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin speaks on the progress of grain procurements in the area.
- January 27 and 28* J. V. Stalin takes part in a discussion on grain procurements at meetings of the Bureau of the Omsk Okrug Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.).
- February 6* J. V. Stalin arrives back in Moscow from Siberia.
- February 9-26* J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
- February 10* J. V. Stalin has a talk with A. A. Zhdanov Secretary of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.).
- February 13* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to all organisations of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on "First Results of the Procurement Campaign and the Further Tasks of the Party."
- February 23* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the Red Army on its tenth anniversary are published in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, No. 46.
- February 25* J. V. Stalin speaks on "Three Distinctive Features of the Red Army" at a plenum of the Moscow Soviet held in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Red Army.

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- February 26* J. V. Stalin attends a parade of troops of the Moscow Garrison and a demonstration of the working people on the Red Square, Moscow, arranged in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Red Army.
- J. V. Stalin visits an exhibition of the Association of Artists of Revolutionary Russia dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the Red Army.
- March 21* J. V. Stalin has a talk with members of the staffs of the newspaper *Pravda* and the magazine *Bolshevik*.
- J. V. Stalin has a talk with the Secretary of the Omsk Okrug Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on grain procurements.
- March 28* J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of the Stalingrad Gubernia Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and of the Gubernia Executive Committee on reorganisation of administrative districts.
- April 6-11* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- April 10* J. V. Stalin speaks at the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the report of the commission set up by the Political Bureau of the C.C. to recommend practical measures to eliminate the shortcomings revealed by the Shakhty affair. The plenum elects J. V. Stalin to the commission appointed to prepare the final draft of the resolution on this question.

- April 13* J. V. Stalin delivers a report to a meeting of the active of the Moscow organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on *The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission*.
- April 30* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the workers of Kostroma in connection with the unveiling of a monument to V. I. Lenin in Kostroma on May 1, 1928.
- May 1* J. V. Stalin attends the May Day parade of troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people on the Red Square, Moscow.
- May 9* J. V. Stalin received a delegation of students of the Sverdlov Communist University.
- J. V. Stalin has a talk with the head of the Chief Metal Board of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. on reconstruction of the metal industry.
- May 16* J. V Stalin delivers a speech at the Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League
- May 26* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in connection with the newspaper's third anniversary. The greetings are published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, No. 122, May 27, 1928.
- May 27* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the Sverdlov Communist University on its tenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 122.

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- May 28* J. V. Stalin attends a meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, in celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Sverdlov Communist University.
- J. V. Stalin has a talk with students of the Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov Communist University about the situation on the grain front.
- May 30* J. V. Stalin receives the Secretaries of the Tula, Smolensk, Yaroslavl and Vladimir Gubernia Committees, C.P.S.U.(B.).
- June 8* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the Party affairs study circle at the Communist Academy on Slepkov's theses on self-criticism.
- June 12* J. V. Stalin writes an article "Lenin and the Question of the Alliance with the Middle Peasant. Reply to Comrade S." The article was published in *Pravda*, No. 152, July 3, 1928.
- June 20* J. V. Stalin writes a letter "To the Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. Reply to Frumkin. (With Reference to Frumkin's Letter of June 15, 1928.)"
- June 26* J. V. Stalin's article "Against Vulgarising the Slogan of Self-Criticism" is published in *Pravda*, No. 146.
- July 4-12* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- July 5* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Programme of the Comintern" at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).



- July 9* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "Industrialisation and the Grain Problem" at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- July 11* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech "On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms" at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- July 13* J. V. Stalin delivers a report on *Results of the July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)* at a meeting of the active of the Leningrad organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- July 16* J. V. Stalin's message "To the Leningrad Oso-aviakhim" in connection with Defence Week is published in *Krasnaya Gazeta* (Leningrad), No. 163.
- July 17* The Sixth Congress of the Comintern elects J. V. Stalin to the Presidium of the congress.  
  
J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Sixth Congress of the Comintern and is elected to the delegation's bureau.
- July 19* J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission set up by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern to draft the Comintern Programme.
- July 30* J. V. Stalin is elected to the Political Commission set up by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern to draft theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International.
- August 31* J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. V. Kuibyshev.

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- September 1*      The Sixth Congress of the Comintern elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.
- September 3*      A plenum of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin a member of its Presidium.
- October 9*        *Pravda*, No. 235, publishes the obituary notice, "To the Memory of Comrade I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov," written by J. V. Stalin.
- October 12*      J. V. Stalin attends the funeral of I. I. Skvortsov-Stepanov.
- October 19*      J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on "The Right Danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.);" at a plenum of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- October 27*      J. V. Stalin writes a "Reply to Comrade Sh."  
J. V. Stalin receives the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Railwaymen's Union.
- October 28*      J. V. Stalin's message of greetings "To the Leninist Young Communist League" on the occasion of its tenth anniversary is published in *Pravda*, No. 252.
- October 30*      J. V. Stalin receives representatives of the Central Students Bureau of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.
- November 6*      J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Moscow Soviet in celebration of the eleventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.
- November 7*      J. V. Stalin attends the parade of troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the working people on the Red Square, Moscow.

- November 16-2* J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- November 17* J. V. Stalin's message of greetings "On the Tenth Anniversary of the First Congress of Working Women and Peasant Women" is published in *Pravda*, No. 267.
- November 19* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on *Industrialisation of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)* at a plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- November 20* J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission set up by the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) to draft the resolution on the control figures of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1928-29.
- November 25* J. V. Stalin's letter to the workers of the "Kamtushka" and Yartsevo factories, Smolensk Gubernia, in connection with the organisation of emulation for the exemplary carrying out of the elections to the Soviets is published in *Pravda*, No. 274.
- November 26* J. V. Stalin receives the secretaries of the district committees of the Moscow city organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- November 27* J. V. Stalin receives leading Y.C.L. officials.
- November 29* J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the workers of the Krasny Profintern Factory (Bezhitsa) in connection with the campaign for the elections to the Soviets. The greetings are published in *Pravda*, No. 278, November 30, 1928.

- December 4* J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of worker and peasant correspondents.
- December 9* J. V. Stalin's greetings to the Frunze Military Academy on its tenth anniversary are published in *Pravda*, No. 286,
- December 12* J. V. Stalin has a talk with members of the staff of *Izvestia*.
- December 19* J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on *The Right Danger in the German Communist Party* at a sitting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.
- J. V. Stalin has a talk with leading officials of the Komi Region on the reorganisation of administrative districts.
- December 28* J. V. Stalin writes a "Reply to Kushtysev."

## 1929

- End of January and beginning of February* J. V. Stalin delivers speeches on "Bukharin's Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party" at a joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).
- February 2* J. V. Stalin writes a "Reply to Bill-Belotserkovsky."
- J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the working men and women of the Krasny Treugolnik Factory in connection with the adoption of the seven-hour day. The greetings are published in *Leningradskaya Pravda*, No. 28, February 3, 1929.

- February 12* J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of Ukrainian writers.
- February 22* J. V. Stalin sends a telegram of greetings to the Red Army men, commanders and political officers of the First Red Cossack Regiment, stationed at Proskurov, on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Red Army.
- March 1* J. V. Stalin's greetings on the occasion of the publication of *Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta* are published in the first issue of the newspaper.
- March 14* The Second Leningrad Regional Party Conference elects J. V. Stalin to the Leningrad Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).
- March 18* J. V. Stalin writes "*The National Question and Leninism*. Reply to Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, and Others."
- March 30* J. V. Stalin attends a joint meeting of the Presidiums of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and of the Councils of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R., arranged in honour of M. I. Kalinin on the occasion of his tenth anniversary as President of the A.R.C.E.C. and C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R.

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